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Drult Recommenclation
on monitoring the situutittn in the Balkans
The Assemblr'.
(t) Noting u'rth relief that the first "European \\'ar sincc 1945. prtting NATO against the Govern-
ment of Serbia. and the ethnic cleansrng engaged in bt'the latter in Kosovo for some vears. have been
brought to an end. and deepll' regretting the loss of life among the ethnrc Albanian. Serbran and Monte-
negrin populations.
(it) Recognising that in the uake of the collapse of the communist s),stem and thc gradual tntroduc-
tion of uestem-stvle democracl'in central and eastern Europc. the deep-rooted differences betr,reen the
constituent nations of former Yugoslavia rnevitabll'led to the dlssolution of the countrv:
(in) Conscious that Westem Europe uas ufiollv unpreparcd fbr the determinatton shoun bv the
protagonlsts in Yugoslavra's drssolutron and the violence thev unlcashed tn order to attaln therr oblec-
tive:
(*) Regretting that rn even' crisis that has broken out in south-eastem Europe over the past cight
vcars. the EU and WEU acted too late and too ineffectrvely to pre\'cnt it escalating tnto unacceptable
vrolence. the most hornfic examples being the \\'ar ln Bosnia and Hcrzegovina follorved b1' the conflict
rn Kosovo:
(v) Consrdering that after too many vears of ineffoctil'e forergn and securitv pohcl'. the EU and
WEU must undertake a thorough reappraisal of their responsrbrlrties and capabrlrtres in this field. on the
basis of Artrcle l7 of thc Amsterdam Treatr'.
(vr) Au'are that follouing the farlure of more than a vear of drplomatic efforts to find a peaceful
solution to the crisis in Kosovo. there lvas no choice othcr than to take mrlrtary actton agalnst
Mr Mrlosevic's regrme. rvhrch I'as committing rntolerable cnminal acts. including ethnrc clcansing.
agalnst its orvn population;
(vr) Convinced that a halt to the armed conflict is onll'thc first stage in estabhshing peace ln Koso't-o
and that it lr rll not be possible for the deportees to retum to therr homes immediatell',
(vut) Confirming that thc United Nations Securitl' Councrl has prime responsrbilitr for the matnte-
nance of international peace and securitv 
- 
a fact rvhich confers lcgitimacl' on enforcement action under
regional arrangements or bv agencles 
- 
and regretting that it drd not adopt an addrtional enabling reso-
lution follourng the failure of the Rambouillet conference and the Paris talks:
(rx) Noting uith brtter irony that the conditrons acccpted bi'the Serbian Parliament are ven'similar
to 
- 
and even more restnctive than 
- 
those rejected at the end of March and that thousands of human
liles might have been spared. as u'ell as the considerablo damage rnflrcted on Serbta and. more recentlr'.
on Kosovo.
(x) Au'are that the lack of European capabilities to mount a large-scalc mtlttan' operation left
Europe rvith no chorce othcr than to go along urth the US policl'of arr operations and support NATO's
militan,action against the FRY ainied at ending the suffenng of tht: Kosorar Albanians and securlng
their return to their rightftll homes under cflectivc internatronal protectton.
(n) Acknou'lcdging Russia's leading role in the medratron process. conducted under condtttons of
extreme difficultl':
(nt) Considerrng that Albania 
- 
a countn, suffering from senous deficicncies ln rts public admini-
stration. at the same time havrng to contend rvith u'idcspread cnmtnalrtl' and still recovering from the
conseqllences of the serious crisrs of earll' 1997 
- 
needs extensive support and assistance to cope u'ith
the manv reperclrsslons of a dramattc tnflur of reftigces from Kosovo.
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(xnt) Considerrng that the Multinational Adrison Pohce Element (MAPE) is providing the Albanian
Govemment urth help through training. assistancc and adrlcc ln re-ostablishing a viable police force
uhrch rs essentral for thc flrrther der,'elopment of the rule of lali in Albanra.
(vv') Notrng that the manv refugecs s,ho har,'e found shelter in thc homes of Albanian families or in
refllgee camps could present Albania u'ith an rnternal sccuntr- problcm given the w'rdespread povertv
and precanous socral and political situation in thc countn':
(*') Arvarc that a vrsrble presence of forcrgn militan and police forccs n'ould be a positive contribu-
tron to thc sccuntv of both the Albanian population and tho rofugees-
(rvt) Conscious that the rnflux of refugecs from Kosovo is causrng scnous problems in FYROM
u'here lt lxav harc a negative cffect on the dctenorating socio-economic situatron and thc finelv draun
cthnrc balance.
(:r.tt) Wclcomrng the fact that despite rts.justrfied concern ovcr the posrtlon of the Hungarian minoritl'
rn Vo.p odina. Hungan has put rts airspace and a number of malor ground facrlitics at the disposal of
the Atlantrc Alhance rn ordcr to help rt implcment rts arr operation agarnst Serbia:
(wrrr) Wclcomtng the posttn'e attitude of Bulgarra and Romania. rihich hare also put their airspace at
the disposal of thc Atlantrc Alliancc notrvithstanding the fact that each of these countries rs suffering
hearr cconomic losscs as a rcsult of thc conflrct rn Kosovo.
(nx) Welcomurg the posrtion the Republic of Montenegro adopted dunng the conflict in order to de-
f-cnd rts dcmocratrc po\\cr and give shclter to the Kosorv'ar refugees noturthstandrng Serbra's hostile and
thrcatcnrng stance and thc damage caused bi'the NATO bombardments:
(xr) Notrng that after a peace scttlement in Kosovo- Europe uill have a specrfic responsibilitl'for the
consolidatton of peacc and prospentt'in the rogion of south-castem Europe as a uhole and that this uill
nou be an cxtrcmelr costlv process-
(rn) Consrdering that WEU. urth rts post-conflict experience of pohce force restructunng. should be
gtven the task of fbmrrng polrcc forces in Kosovo to guarantce the securitv and peaceful co-existence of
thc diffcrcnt communltlcs and marntain the mlc of las'-
(rnt) Noturg that the confltct in Kosovo has accclerated the dobate on a much-needcd European se-
curitr and dcfencc poltcv uhrch u'ill enable Europc to manage and solve regronal criscs and conflicts on
its ternton'u'hen thc Untted Statcs docs not u'ish to be involvcd-
(xntt) Consrdering that EUAVEU membor states should urgcnth rmplcmcnt their commitment to de-
lelop a more effectrve militan capabilrtl br reinforcing their capacrtv for rndepcndent rntelligence-gath-
ering- strategtc transport and command and control. thus complcmenting NATO capabilities-
(rxrv) \\'onderrng. hotr.evcr. uhethcr strengthening the common European policv on securitv and de-
f'cnco. as envrsaged b1 the European Council in order for rt to assume rts responsrbilities. is the right
ans\\'cr if tts purpose rs mcreh'to take on board Pctersberg missions at thc loucr end of the scale. s'hile
not contemplatrng the possrbrlitv of undertakrng the size of missron rcqurred rn Kosovo for a long timc
to come:
(xrv) Considering that after a peacc settlement for Kosor,'o has been secured. Europe should partrcr-
patc ln thc intcrnatronal militan' peacekeeprng and implementatron fbrce u'ith rts orvn multinational
forccs uttch arc at thc drsposal of both NATO and WEU. in ordcr to give visiblc effect to its ambitions
rn that ficld.
(xn,t.) Wclcoming the indictment of Messrs Miloser,rc. Milutinovic. Sainovrc. Ojdanic and Stojiljkovic
fbr u'ar cnmes and crimes against humanitr 
- 
rn particular for having planned- instigated. ordercd-
committcd or othenlrse aided and abctted a campaign of terror and vrolence directed at Kosovar Alba-
nran crvrlrans. mcludrng deportation. murdcr and persccution:
I
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(xwrt) Llrgrng that raprd democratrsation bc sct in train in Sorbia to cnablc thc countn'to put bchind it
Mr Nhlos*tc. and hts regrme. rvith uhom- as a \\.ar cnmural 
- 
notu'rthstandrng tho fact that the rnterna-
tronal conrmunttr must rcach a pcacc scttlcmcnt urth him drsclrssron of thc polrtrcal and rnstrtLrttonal
basrs of Kosor,o. tho reconstnrctton of Yugoslarra as a uholc and stabrlrtr tn the Balkans cannot bc
ontortaincd.
(xxvttt) Arrarc that thc tmplcmcntatton of thc Darton Pcacc Agrcemcnt ls a comphcated process rrhrch
u'rll takc man\'\'cars. dunng uhtch not onlv the actilc role of the High Rcprcscntatrr'e and rnanv inter-
national and non-governmental aid organisations but also the presencc of SFOR rirll remain csscntial to
keep the reconstruction and further development of Bosnia and Herzegor,ina on tho nght track.
(xxrx) Considcring that u hcn the conflict is finallv over. the task of detarled and oblective evaluation of
the NATO inten ention. assessing its political and economic costs and gains. must fall to a Parhamen-
tan'Assemblv so that lcssons are drau'n for the future and the conclusrons are conveved to those in
charge of Europe's Common Foreign and Securitv Polio':
(xxx) Welcomrng thc uork of thc WEU Demrnmg Assrstancc Mrssron rn Croatra rvhrch rs helprng to
remove another obstacle to the return of refi.rgecs.
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL
l. Hclp makc proparations for the intcrnatronal mrlitan'force to bc dcplolcd rn Koso'no follourng a
pcace sottlemcnt bascd on the pnncrples laid dorrn b1'thc Gll countnes- rn partrcular br proposrng that
Europcan multrnatronal forces at the drsposal of both NATO and WEU bc part of such a forcc ur ordcr
to givo r rsible cffect to Europe's ambrtrons rn this ficld.
2 Prepare for the deplovmcnt of a WEU dcmrnrng assrstanco lnlssron in Kosovo to hclp clear thc
region of mtnes and other explosn,e devrces *htch constltllte a maJor obstaclo to the return of refligces
and deportees:
3. Make even' effort to ensure that strenghening thc corrrmon European securitv and defence pohcr
urll not be restricted to a European capacitr,'for autonomous action at the lorrer end of thc Petorsberg
scale but uill also include a capacitt'for managing crises of an ordcr of magnitude comparable to the
one in Kosol'o:
4. Prepare. building on the experience gained in thc pohce mrssions in N{ostar and Albania. for the
deplolment of a WEU adrison'police misston in Kosoro in order to estabhsh a viable policc force that
can u'in tho confidenco of the populatron through its abrlitv to guarantec securifi and enforce lau and
ordcr-
-i. Strengthen the MAPE missron rn Albanra and fi.rrthcr extend rts nrandate to rnakc MAPE more
fle.rible and less rcliant on managomcnt from WEU headquarters rn Brussels. so that rt can adapt to
rapidlv changrng ctrcumstances- thts bcing essentral rn thc prcscnt cnvironment in Albania.
6 Take action ruth grcator resolve rn futurc crisis situatrons in ordcr to prc\cnt thorn dctcrioratlng.
in ricrv of the fact that conflict pro'ention should alu'avs take prioritv ovcr thc optron of mrlrtan'rnter-
vention u'rth all rts drre conscquences.
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I. Introductiott
L For almost a dccade nou. the countrres of
south-eastcrn Europe. and rn particular in former
Yugoslar,ia. harc bccn going through a senes of
cnses and conflrcts rihich hal'e in thc main re-
sulted rn dechne. drsorder and dcsperation Gor -
ernments in Europe and in the United States hale
become increasinglv rnvolved in the complex
lssLles affectrng the region. rvhile discovering hou'
difficult it is to solve crises and conflicts stem-
ming from its comphcated mrx of territorial
clarms uhrch arc the result of ccnturies of history
and domrnatron br. forergn po\\'ers. Manv Wcst-
orn chancellenes have had to devote a great dcal
of therr trmc and onergv to the dramatrc conflicts
rn south-eastern Europe. Thrs rnight not hal'c
bcen the case had Europc and thc Unrtcd Statcs
rntcrv.cncd carhcr and morc decisivel)'.
2 h seems that a solutron is in thc making
for thc conflrct rn Kosovo *'hrch mav bring relief
to man\'. rncludrng the reftlgees u'ho har,e gonc
through a terriblc ordeal
3 The conflict in Kosovo should not- hou-
ever. allou' us to lgnore u'hat is happemng else-
u-here rn the region The present report provides
a succinct or-en'ieu'of the present state of affairs
rn south-eastern Europe and attempts to dra*
some conclusions as to u'hat remains to bc donc
In vour Rapporteur's vicn. the responsibilitl'
here lies urth the EU and WEU
II. Alhanio
-l The srtuation in Albania has becn dis-
cussed rn a numbcr of earlicr Assembh' rcportsr
and a report of the Commrttee for Parliamentan'
and Pubhc Relatrons. adopted on l9 Ma1' 1999.
pror rdes an account of recent developments rn
the countn' The present report. therefore. con-
centrates on the implications of the Kosovo con-
I Document 1589: Europe-s role in the prevention and
nunagement of crises in the Balkans. Rapporteur'
Mr Blaauu': Document 1608 Europe and the evolung
sitmuon rn the Balkans. Rapporteur: Mr Blaauu'.
Document 1627 WEU and crisis rnanagement in the
Bil.lkans. Rapporteur Mr Baumel
E-rp lu n ut or1, frI e moru n d u m
(submitted b1, Mrs Squurciulupi, Rupporteur)
flrct fbr Albanra uhrch rs strll rn the throes of
turbulcnt polrtrcal and cconomrc devclopments
and on thc role of N{APE (Multrnatronal Adr,'i-
son Policc Element)l
(u) The ytliticul implications oJ the Kosovo cu(lict
-5 Albania has alrravs been in far,our of a
peaceful solution of tho crisrs m Kosovo through
negotrations betrveen the trr.o partres. It has sup-
ported the Rambourllet peace plan. u'hich so far
rs thc onll one establishing peace on the basrs of
a provlslonal settlernent
6. The Albanrans argue that Presrdcnt Milo-
s*,rc has dehberatell rmplcmented a planncd
progranmre of ethnrc clcansing uhrch startcd
long bcforc NATO's air strikcs Hc was a\\are
that dcmocratic rulc rn thc provrncc lould lncvrt-
ablr lcad to an rndepcndent Kosovo NATO's
mrlrtan operations arc no\\' thc onlv uat to rcs-
toro pcacc rn Kosor o and after that. onlv a strong
lnternatlonal milrtary presence under NATO
command u'ill bc able to prcvcnt further conflct
The transrtronal penod mav have to last nrorc
than threc vcars and during that period Kosovo
should preferablv be an intemational protectorate
undcr EU admrnrstration.
7 As regards the KLA (Kosovo Liberation
A*l). Albanian politicians argue that as long as
there rs no strong rnternational militan' presence
on thc ground rn Kosor o. the Kosovar Albanrans
havc thc rrght to sclf-defence. nhrch justifies thc
KLA's actrvitics The KLA should be supported
because at thc moment rt rs thc onlt' forcc on
Kosovar tcrnton uhrch can help defeat the
forces of Mr Milosevrc Thcrc rs also a dangcr
that Mr Mrlosel'rc urll tn'to divrde the ranks of
Kosol'ar Albanran polrtical lcaders During the
rnrtial pcnod of NATO's air stnkes. he kcpt
Ibrahrm Rugora hostage- rn order to explort him.
The Kosovar Albanrans should do eventhrng to
.1orn ranks and help the mternational communrfi'
estabhsh a democratrc government rn Kosovo.
8. The Presrdent of the Republic and gor'-
emment authorities including the Prime Minister
r This chapter also mcludes the findrngs of a visit b]' the
Rapporteur and a delegation fronr the Assembh"s
Presrdentral Commrtlee to Albania on 20-23 Apnl
I 999 I
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and the Minrster for Public Order have empha-
sised that the rnflux of reftrgees. *hich alreadl'
represents lOo/o of the total populatron of the
countn' and could possiblv rncreasc lo 209'n-
poses a serlous securitv problcm for the govorn-
ment
9 Untrl nou- N{APE has plal'ed a posittvc
role in hclping to restntcture the Albanran poltcc
With the neu' situatron caused b1' the refugec
rnflur. tho Albanran authorities u'ould like it to
plar a more activc role. taking ll1 areas outside
Tirana and Durres as u'ell Through MAPE. the
EU-WEU should also help the Albanian police
urth basic nceds such as transport and communi-
catrons equrpment. the lack of rvhrch impedes anv
effrcrcnt pohce operation in rmpenetrable parts of
thc countn'
l0 The Minister for Publrc Order is satrstied
u,ith the lork done br NIAPE in trainrng and
adr-rsrng thc Albanran policc and asked for an
cxtension of MAPE's mandate Thts extenston
should rncludc tuo or three mobile teams of 20
personncl to train local police units on the spot
and onc or tu'o co-ordinators tn each of the 12
rcgronal poltce dtrcctorates
I I Although the govcrnment has madc great
progress rn controlling the terrrton' of Albanla.
there are still senous problems and a lack of
control rn the border area utth Kosovo. u'here
skrrmrshes arc also takrng placc betu-een differ-
ent factrons of Kosovar Albanrans The camps
posc a possrble sccuritv risk not onlY because of
thc actirrtrcs of common lau criminals but also
because of FRY agcnts tn'tng to create soctal
and politrcal tcnsion.
12 Presidcnt Rexhep Meldani has pornted out
that thc region needs a Marshall plan. This must
be an EU-supported initiative. Anv initiative b1'
the countries of the rcglon rtself rould not be
enough to trigger the rapid sconomlc progress
that rs badly needed.
13 After peace is rcstored- Kosovo should
provisionallv become an internattonal protector-
ate for an unspecrf-ted number of r.ears. A strong
lntcrnatlonal milrtan' presencc is rcqLtrred to
prcvent a reneu'ed outbreak of the conflict and
guarantec the safc return of refugees and dis-
placed persons. Thcre should also be a strong
internalonal civihan presence utth a threefold
task. humanrtarian (lRC. UNHCR and NGOs):
rnstrtutronal and politrcal (Councrl of Europe.
OSCE and WEU for poirce rcstructunng). and
cconomrc (EU and possibh the United States)
t4 Prcsident Me.ldanr has sard that rt is diffi-
cult to predict uhat thc status of Kosovo rvrll be
after thrs provisional penod It mav be rndepend-
ence but for the trme berng it is more rmportant
to promotc the concept of a multr-ethnic societr
for the pro\lnce in order to help restore a balancc
m south-eastem Europe. A partitron of Kosovo.
as suggestcd bv some. is inadmrssible 
- 
Kos-
ovo's bordcrs should not be changed. Albania
has no intentron u'hatsoever of absorbing Kosor o
rnto a "Crcatcr Albania"
15 Kosor o can bc a multt-ethnrc provlnce.
but onlv if all the varlous ethnrc groups arc pre-
pared to obev the rulcs of a democratic socictt'
Such a multr-cthnic democratrc societr cannot bc
cstabhshed urth thc parttctpation of Mr Mrlo-
se\'rc or other Serbran extremist nattonaltsts.
I6 The drffercnt poltttcal f-acttons rn tho
Kosovar Albanran communrtv lvtll still have to
make an cffort to come closer to each other and
cooperatc on the estabhshment of a riable demo-
cratrc soclctl'aftcr the end ofthc present confltct
The Albanian Gorernmcnt sill do everything
possible to stimulate this rapprochement. but thrs
oblectivc rs difficLrlt to attain nou that all the
politrcal leaders har c fled the countn' and are in
hiding.
17 . Presidcnt Meldani attaches great tmpor-
tance to thc cristence of FYROM as an inde-
pendent statc and a stabihsurg factor tn thc rc-
gion. Albania has good relattons rrith thrs ncigh-
bounng countn and is constantlv endeavoltrtng
to devclop thcm Albanta is prepared to accom-
modatc Kosorar Albanran refugees uho initralh'
f'led to FYROM rf thrs hclps to preYcnt a desta-
brlisation of that countn lt is no secrct that thrs
rs one of Mr Milosevrc's sccondan'objectrves
llt. Finallr'. thc Presrdcnt has cmphasrsed that
the Darton Peace Agrecnrcnt brought pcace to a
part of the regton Evcn though rt rs tnro that
implementatron of thts agrecment is slou and far
from easr'. there rs no othcr chotcc but to con-
tinue rvorking on it
(b) 'the refugec problent
19. \4/hen r our Rapporleur vrsrted Albanra
from 20-23 Apnl 1999. a total of 365 000 refu-
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gees from Kosovo had crosscd thc bordcr rnto
Albanra srncc 24 March. of uhom some 130 000
\\'erc ln the region of Kukcs near the bordcr.
Around 80 000 had found shelter u,rth Albanran
famrhes u'hrle of tlic rcmarning 
-50 000. half u'erc
lrvrng in tcnts and the other half in the opcn arr.
Of the reularnrng rcftigees 
- 
some 240 000 
-
about 130 000 ucre lnrng urth Albanian fami-
lies or rn large burldings. u'here ar arlable. and
tent camps
20 Srnce thcn. the number of refugccs and
dcported persons has risen ftirthcr and on 2 Junc
UNHCR put therr total numbcr rn Albania ct
113 100 Bv mrd-Mav 1999. some I20 000 rrcre
rn and around KLrkes. UNHCR estimated that of
these 120 000. somc 
-50'2o had found shelter in
the homes of Albanran families. 40'% in pubhc
and utrlrtanan burldrngs and l0% in tont cantps
rn that regior-r In the Kukes region- rcfugecs are
under a pcnnanent threat of Serbran bombrng
and rncursrons. rlhrlc the KLA is actirelv recruit-
lng \ oLurg rcfilgecs for rts forces L|NHCR and
NATO arc thereforc rnakrng efforts to convince
reftlgees in thc regron of Kukes to move to other
parts of Albania but onlv a fbu of thcm volunteer
to do so
2l Thc Albanran Govcnrmcnt is prepared to
recel\re all Kosor'ar Albanran refugecs. includrng
those uho- for various reasons. har,'e come to
Albanra after rnrtrallr' havrng foLrnd shclter rn
Montencgro or FYROM It does not u ant to
lmpose a hmit on the number of refugees it can
take rn but recognises that rt needs the help of
othcr countrrcs. international organisatrons and
NGOs to cope nrth the conscquences of the rclir-
gee influx uhrch is not onlr causing acconlmo-
dation probleurs but also problems relating to
rnfiastructurc. pubhc liealth- cleaning and sup-
pll'
22 Houcrcr. the policv of transferring Koso-
var Albanran refugees frorn FYRON{ to Albania
has recentlr been rcyised. Whereas thc Albanian
Govemment. NATO and LINHCR originallv
talkcd of sonre 60 000 reftrgees to be transfcrred.
thrs figurc has nou dropped to 5 000 to 6 000 on
conditron that thct leave FYROM on a voluntan
basrs Nlanv reftlgees do not \\.ant to be trans-
fcrred to Albanra becausc thrs ruins their chances
of a transfcr to another countn',
23 An rnternatronal ard effort began \,'en' soon
after thc begurnrng of the massn e refilgee influr
rnto Albanra. but therc rs no doubt that the earh
aid rras not adcquatc to mect the nceds of the
unexpectedlr' hrgh numbers of rcfi.rgees The
govemment argues that Albanra has the rnfra-
structLlre and admrnrstratl\ e structures to cope
u-ith thc aid operatron. but fbrcign organisations
on the spot take a drft'erent r icrv Inc.i'rtablr,. such
shortcomings and drsagrccments on both sides
did not facilrtate thc aid operation in its first
u'ecks. Houcver. rt norr sccms that a pattcrn of
cooperation betu'ocn the Albanran Government
and aid organisations is gradualh developing.
24 A specific effort is being made to help the
Albanian farnihcs u'ho are accommodatrng refu-
gccs. Food for thcse refi.rgccs rs distributed bl'thc
International Rcd Cross uhrle the fanrilics rc-
ccn'e €9 2-i a month pcr reftlgeo u ith a maximum
of €l I I pcr month. A budget of €7 4 million has
bccn carmarkcd for this operatron
25. The Albantan Goverrunont has pointed out
that thc retunr of Kosovar rolirgees to their oun
territon'mav take a long timc. cven after the cnd
of thc present conflrct. Tho reftlgees mav c\ en
har.e to spend the rrrnter season rn Albanra-
u'hich rneans that at an earlr- stage preparations
u'ill have to be mado for morc protcctn e shelter
Thc Albanian natronal budget u'rll need substan-
tial financral aid from abroad because the num-
bers of refugees rcprssent more than l0% of the
total populatron and this has raprdlr emptied the
national coffers. Accommodating rcfugees rn thc
homes of Albanran famrhes can onlv be a tempo-
ran' solutron and for those refugees too- shelter
urll havc to be provided rn tents or othcr tempo-
rar1, lodgrngs.
26. The LINHCR rcpresentative rn Albania
praised thc hosprtalrtr and generositv of the Al-
banran Goverrunent. He noted houever that the
govenxnent quite naturallv uould not be able to
cope uith thrs large-scale refugce problem with-
out forcign assistancc While anv form of shclter
uas rvelcomc rn thc rnrtial penod. including pub-
lic buildings and pnr ate homcs. in thc longer run
ncll-organrscd reftrgcc ctmps urth adcquate
sanltan' and other nccessan' facilrtrcs rvcrc the
onh' possrble u'av of accommodetrng the refu-
gces until thev rcturned to Kosovo. The assis-
tance of the milrtan. rn buildrng camps \\'as
nccdcd bccause thcv uerc the onlr ones u'ho had
tho equipment and staff to do so at short notice
ln Albanra rt uas rmportant to trf'to accommo-
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date thc refugees auav frotn the border rcglon
uith Kosor.'o. sincc rn thrs area ther' \\ere too
exposed to thc possrbilrtv of attacks br Scrb
units. forced drafting bv KLA elements and er-
ploitatron b1' crrminal gangs
27. Sccuritv in the camps is bound to posc a
problem that urll u1creasc. given that the cantps
rr ill be there for longer After a tirnc. refugces
lrill run out of mone\'. boredom srll take rts toll
and pettl' cnme. rape. prostltutton and othcr
forms of exploitatron rvill make thcir u'av rnto the
camps. The Albanian polrce arc alreadv over-
strctched and both the UNHCR and NGOs lrth
rcsponsibility for thc calxps uould therefbre uel-
come the presence of an rntsmatronal pohcc force
to control the srtuation Thrs task could easrlv be
pertbrmed bv N{APE. rr'rth an extcnded mandate
and rncreased personnel. MAPE has cxpcrtence
in u'orking uith the Albanian adminrstration and
policc and its knoulcdge of the country and local
culturc uould greath' factlttate lts s'ork of
ensuring secuntv rn and around the refilgee
camps.
(c) Multinutionul Advisory Police Element (MAPE)
28. In response to a rcqllest of the European
Council u'hich dates back to 22 Scptember 1998.
WEU undertook a feasrbrlrtl' study of the differ-
cnt options available to help the Albanian auth-
orities to restore larr and order in the countn'. On
the basis of this studl'. thc WEU Council adoptcd
on 2 Februan, 1999 a contingcno' plan for a
police training and assrstancc operation in
Albania. This plan u'as in its turn the basis for a
decrsion of the European Council in carlv March
1999 to adopt a common action plan regarding
the EU's contribution to the re-estabhshment of a
viable police force rn Albanrar. WEU rvas for-
malll' asked to rmplement thrs plan.
29. The European Unron's common actron
plan envisages the re-estabhshment of a riablc
police force rn Albanra bv providing training and
advice to the Albanran pohce. including dircct
assistance by tcams of advtsers. The EU action
3 Derunark has declared that lt will not partrcipate in the
EU common action plan because. rn accordance uitlt
Scction C of the European Council decrsion taken tn
Edrnburgh (11 and 12 Deccmber 1992). it does not
participate in the elaboration and rmplementation of
decisions and actrons of thc Europcan Union u'ith
defcnce irnplicatiorm.
plan rs part of and rernforces IVIAPE's mlssrorl as
rmplemented br WEU. This training. assistancc
and adrrcc mlsslon r,rill nol bc extcndcd to rn-
clude thc pro\/lsroll of rclcvant adr ice to spccrfic
mrnistrrcs (in partrcular the Minrstry of Pubhc
Order). drrcctorates and police drstncts. Thc
MAPE mrssron s staff urll be graduallv cxtendcd
to reach a total of 160 rn March 20(X) Alto-
gether. 3 000 of thc estimatcd total pohcc com-
plement of l3 000 should bcnef-rt from thrs train-
rng. u'hrle another I 150 are bcing traurcd rn
complcmentan' prograrrrmcs conducted b1' rndr-
ridual EU mcmbcr states.
30. The extension of MAPE's mandatc rs a
sensitire sublcct. Whilc sorno Albantan autlton-
tles are askrng for an increased N{APE rnput.
others u'ould prefer lts presence to bc dtscrcct in
order to makc it look as though the governmcnt is
m control of the countn' The n*r sttuatron
caused by' thc Kosorar reftlgce mflux u'tll no
doubt create an urgent need for morc asslstancc
for a national Albanran pohce forcc lhrch rs
lacking basrc equrpment to fulfil its task.
3 I Among expcrts in Albania u ith thorough
knos'ledge of thc flinctioning of MAPE. therc rs
a strong feeling that WEU headquartcrs rs e\crt-
ing far too much control orer the mlsslon uhrch.
or cr time. has dcgenerated into an examplc of
disastrous micro-managcmont. WEU hcadquar-
ters should prot'idc missron support and not tn
to plal' thc role of head of mission. espccrallv in
the present situation u'hcrc rt docs not har e
enough hands-on expertise for this specific police
missron. The police expertise in Brussels necds to
be remforced rf WEU rs gorng to plal a rolc in
establishing neu' pohce structures in Kosovo A
more flexiblc mandatc s'ould prorrde MAPE
uith much-needed opportunitres to adapt to rap-
rdly' changrng circumstances- an abilitr rrhtch ts
cssential for the survn,al of anv misston *'orktng
rn the prcsent Albanran enraronment.
32. Vrsible presence of forcrgn mrlrtan' and
also pohce forces on the territon' ts constdered to
be essentral to reassure both rcfugees and thc
Albanian populatron for as long as thc gcneral
situatron rn the countn' rcmains fragrle. MAPE
has alreadl' startcd to advise the Albanran
authorities on the cstabhslilnent of a specral po-
hce force to provide securitr,' in the rcfugee
camps Thc govemment has agreed to tts recom-
mendations but has a problcm in financmg such
actir rties.
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33 There should also be more flesbrlrtv rn
filhng NIAPE's mrssron posts Countries should
not lnslst on filling spccific posts rf thev arc not
able to provrde the approprratc candrdates.
III. Blsnia oncl Herrygovina
3+ Wrthout clarmrng to be exhaustrre- this
chapter dcscnbes some of the rcccnt der elop-
mcnts rn Bosnra and Herzegor ina u hich enable a
r rnr to be taken on the present state of atfairs
and rndrcatc the trcnd rn the further implcmenta-
tron of thc Darton Peacc Agreernent
(u) Return ofrefugees and displaced persons
35 Thc right of all reftrgeos and drsplaccd
pcrsons to retlrrn freelr to the propertv of uhch
thev ucre depn'rcd rn the \\'ar. remalns one of the
central issues rn the rmplemontation of the Dar -
ton Peace Agrcement In the agenda it adopted in
Madnd on l6 December l99tl. the Peace Imple-
mcntatlon Council (PIC) u'clcomed thc fact that
morc than Il0 000 people had returned to their
homcs from outsrde and urthin Bosnra and Her-
zego\ula in 1998 It regrctted that of thc one
mrlhon u'ho uerc supposcd to go back to minor-
rt\ areas. onlr' 35 000 to 40 000 
- 
far feu'er than
had been antrcrpated 
- 
actuallv rcturned to arers
uhere thev u'ere an ethnrc mrnorrtv The PIC
notcd ln partrcular that disapporntnglv feu'
pcople rctumed to Repubhka Srpska and to their
homes u'rthin the Federatron The PIC further
noted that there remarncd almost 3l 000 refugecs
from Bosnn and Herzegovura in Croatia. 210 000
refugees from Bosrua and Herzegot'ina in the
Federal Repubhc of YLrgoslavra (FRY). as ucll
as somc 130 000 refugocs ln \\'estern Europe In
Bosnra and Herzegovina thcrc tverc strll some
860 000 displaced persons
36 The Rcconstruction and Rcturn Task
Force (RRTF). uhrch operatcs across Bosnia and
Herzcgovina. has do'eloped an action plan for
I9qq. cnr isagrng 120 000 retunls rncluding
40 000 mrnorrtv rcturns to Repubhka Srpska. It
is expected. hou'e','cr. that the conflrct in Kosovo
urll have a ncgatne effect on the implemcntation
of this action plan
37 It should bc noted that manv of thc partrcs'
obhgatrons 
- 
under Anner 7 to thc Peace Agree-
ment 
- 
to creato surtablc condrtions for return
havc not bcen fulfilled The most successful rc-
turns have takcn placc rn the arcas l'hcrc SFOR
rras closch rnvolved rn the plannrng and imple-
mentatron Thc cstablrshment of the RRTF/Bos-
nia and Herzegol,ina Consultatron Group pro-
rtdes a high-lcr.cl hnk betuecn the RRTF and
Bosnra and Hcrzegovina authoritics This plan
also rncludes an intensive programrne to address
the kcv issues of space. sccurrtv and sustain-
abilrtv
38 At the same time. the Unrted Natrons
Missron rn Bosnia rs implcmenting its Strategr'
on Retum and Recruitment of Mrnoritv Pohce
Thrs strategr. promotes. in partrcular. retums to
kcv crtres such as Sarajevo. Mostar and Banja
Luka. uhrlc also urging thc removal of all legis-
latrve and admrnrstratn e obstacles to such rc-
turns Municipal authorrties arc plaving a r ital
rolc rn fosterrng rcturns The Hrgh Reprcsenta-
tn'e has therefore decidcd to dcplov a number of
specral cnvovs rn municipalrtics rn order to hclp
speed up rmplemcntation of the Peace Agreemcnt
at the local ler,el. depending rn cach case on ur-
gent local reqnrrcments It should be noted that
there rs a closc link bctrreen progrcss in returns
and progress rn such vrtal rssues as the rulc of
llr and economlc reconstruction.
39 It is rmportant to remember that one of the
ob.lectrves of the Darton Peace Agrecment uas to
restore thc mtrltr-ethnrc character of socictv in
Bosnra and Herzcgovrna to ri'hat it had bccn be-
fbre l99l An Agreement on Refugees and Dis-
placcd pc.sons* fbrms part of the Darton Peace
Agrcement (Anner 7) Arttcle I of thrs anncx
stipulates that "All rcfugees and drsplaccd per-
sons have the right freelv to retum to their homcs
of orrgrn" It flrther cont-rrms that .'The earh'
rcturn of refugees and displaccd persons is an
rmportant ob.lectn'e of the settlemcnt of the
conflrct rn Bosnra and Herzegouna".
-10 Almost four vears aftcr the srgrung of
Darton. hou'cr cr- Bosnra and Herzegot'ina rs rn
fact drvided rnto thrce ethnrcallr' "plrre' areas.
rr.here each ethnic communitr reprcscnts ntore
than 90% of the population Scrbs live rn Repub-
lika Srpska. Mushms or Bosnrans in the Bosnran
Repubhc and Croats in Herceg-Bosna, u'ith the
t Rcfugees persons u.ho rvenl to another countn' after
lealing therr hone or haung been expelled frour it
Drsplaced pcrsons. persons uho lcft or \\'ere cxpellcd
from therr homes but staved urthn the borders of
Bosrua and Herzegovina.
l0
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latter tu'o areas formallr unrted rn the Federatron
of Bosnra and Herzegovlna. Onlv tlvo cantons
have a mrnontv of over l)%u Tluzla (13%) and
Saralevo (13%).
4l At thc moment. the populatron of Repub-
lrka Srpska. uhrch occupios 49Y" of the ternton'
of Bosnia and Hcrzegorina. rs betueen 92o/o and
9491, Serb. Thc rematnrng 69o to 8?o ts Croat or
Mushm (betueen 70 000 and 100 000) Beforc
1991. some I rnrllion Croats and Muslims \\'erc
lir rng ur that samc torriton . Out of thrs total of
1.2 rnrllion Serbs- some 3-50 000 harc come from
areas uhrch arc no\\. inhabited b1' Croats and
Mushns. Since 1995. onlv about l0 000 Mus-
lims and I 000 Croats 
- 
mostlv elderh 
- 
have
retumcd to Repubhka Srpska terrrton'.
12. Tho Muslims- or Bosnians. occup\' 329, of
the territory of Bosnra and Herzegovina rvhere
thev constrtute o\cr 909, of a population of I.7
mrlhon. Thrs rncludes the 350 000 or so Bosnran
rcfugees rrho came from other- marnlv Serb.
aroas and rcscttled in thc Bosnran part of Bosnra
and Herzegovrna The Croats occup\ l9% of the
torrlton of Bosrua and Hcrzegovrna u'hcre thcv
constrtutc ovcr 90oh of its 120 000 inhabitants
On 13 N{ar 1999. LNHCR estrmated that somc
I8 500 refugees from Kosovo had found sheltcr
rn thc Fcderation of Bosnra and Herzcgolrna.
43. The Republic of Croatia no*' has a
population of 4.7 milhon people.
Betu'ecn 200 000 and 300 000 of them
are Croat rofugees fiom Bosnra. It is
cstrmated that somc 300 000 to 330 000
Scrb refi-rgeos from Croatia norv hr,e in
thc FRY. u'hilc another 30 000 to 3-r 000
Serb refugees from Croatta are hvutg in
Repubhka Srpska.
't-+ In summer 199-5. Operatron Storm lod to
thc rccapturc of the Kra.lina bv thc Croat armed
forces Croats rcturned to their homes but some
IttO 000 to 200 000 Serbs fled thc Kralrna Onlv
a fcu of the 50 000 Scrbs u'ho rcturncd to Cro-
atra post-Darton actuallv returned to thc Krajrna.
-l-i. In the collrse of the t\\.o-\'ear I|NTAES
protcctorate of Eastern Slavonia. 32 000 of thc
86 000 Croats uho had becn drir-en oLrt bv the
\\ar \\cre sufficrcntlv confident to rcturn More
mrght har,c comc back had there becn jobs Of
thc 73 000 Serbs lrvrng there rn 1991. houever.
l8 000 loft during thc LNTAES mandatc Smcc
the mandate ended in carlv 1998. officiallv I 200
Serbs lear,'c eren'three months but the real figure
rs hkelr-to bc much highcr
-l(r. Whcrcas before l99l the Serbs constrtuted
l2'h of the population of Croatia. it rs estimated
that thev no\\' account for onlr' 6%. The FRY
also shelters some 220 000 Serb refugees from
Bosnia
47. In a rgcent artrclc. a Bosnian official
pointcd out that thc promrse of refugee return rn
the Darton Peace Agreement has beconrc a dcad
Ietter' The non-rmplementation of the retum of
refugees and displaccd persons has 
- 
rn hrs r ieu
- 
also proved to be ths greatest obstacle to pcace
and normalitv rn post-Dalton Bosnra It has
strengthened the urflucnce ofthc radicals and the
perpetrxtors of ethnrc cleansrng. encouraging
them to contrnue rvrth the disintcgration of Bos-
nia and Herzegol.rna bv stcalth
(b) The rule of law and humun rights
4tt. At its December 1998 meeting in Madnd.
the PIC madc rt clear tliat burlding the rulc of
lau. fbunded on an independent judiciary and a
rehablc policc fbrce. uill be a top prioritr for
1999. It r"rrged the High Representatl\'e to further
derelop a comprehcnsire.yudrcial reform strategv
plan- rdcntif ing short- and longer-term priorr-
ties- rn consultation rvith the relevant authorities
and intemational and other organrsations
-19 An-rong manv other things. this plan should
include the adoption. br' 30 June 1999. of legis-
lation to establish an rndependent and rmpartral
.1udicrary'. focusrng on ludicial and prosecutonal
appointmcnts and thc promotion of a multi-ethnic
ludician' throughout Bosnia and Herzegovrna.
Progress sliould be made on lntcr-entrtv judicral
coopcration. rncluding the signing of a Memo-
randum of Understandrng on Intcr-Entitv Lcgal
Assistance and the estabhshment of the lnter-
Entitl' Legal Commissron.
50 Essential propert)' logislation tbcilitating
returns has bccn adopted rn Republrka Srpska.
but still has to bc rmplemented fulli' The PIC rs
also concerned bv the slorv progress in implc-
mentatron of the propertl' lass bv aLrthorities rn
the Fedcration
' Muhanrcd Sacirber' "Applring the lessons of Darlon
to Kosor.'o". ll'al I Sin'ett,lournal. 26 April 1999
ll
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5l At the bcgrnnrng of Aprrl 1999. the Hrgh
Represcntatn e extendcd the deadlinc for filng
requests for thc restoration of occupancv rights
to statc-ou'ncd apartmcnts ln the Fcdcratlon to
I Julr' 1999 In the Fcderation. approximatclv
75'lu of abandoned apartrncnts havc nou been rc-
claimed. The deadline for reclarnrrng apartmcnts
rur Republika Srpska is 19 Junc- but the Hrgh
Representatne u'rll ertcnd rt rf the proccss of
registerrng clarms docs not lmpro\e dramatrcalh'
rn the comrng months
52. Thc suift and efficient implementatron of
legrslatron on ne\\'unrform rcglstratlon platcs and
common vehtcle rcgistration has dramatrcallr
lmpro\ ed fieedom of moventcnt throughout the
ternton' of Bosnia and Herzegot,ma
53. Accordurg to earlier PIC conclusrons. all
cltlzens of Bosnia and Herzcgor rna should har c
been rn posscssion of netr trar,'el documents.
undcr the releyant lau. br' 31 December l99tt
Hou.evcr. the slou' and burcaucratrc applicatron
of thc larr has prevented manv crtizens fiorn
obtainrng thcrr netv passports. Thc PIC has nou
cxtended to 30 June 1999 the deadline bevond
u'hrch passports valid rn the formcr Repubhc of
Bosnia and Hcrzegot'rna u'ill no longer bc rec-
ognrsed bv all PIC members
(c) Missing persurts
-i4 Among the positive do,clopments arc
those rcgardrng nrrsstng persons and crhuma-
tions. Thcrc rs rmpror,cd coopcratlon betuccn thc
Entrtres rn tho arca of joint cxhumations Grcat
efforts rn thrs ficld har.e also been madc br the
Hrgh Representatrr,'c and b1 NGOs. tn particular
Phvsicrans for Human fughts. the Intcmational
Commrssron for Missing Persons and the Inter-
natronal Commrttce of the Red Cross (ICRC)
The PIC is nou' urgmg a stronger focus on the
devclopment of longer-term stmcturcs. to includc
rmpro\ ed assistance for thc families of the mrss-
lng- more cffoctrvc traclng procedures and intcr-
Entifi'forcnsrc cooperatlon It has also called fbr
thc establishment of mortuan' facrlrtres rn Bosnra
and Herzegovrna capable of accommodatrng cx-
hr-rmed bodrcs and for the trarning of Bosnia and
Herzegol'ina medical pcrsonnel rn forcnsrc nrcdr-
cll1e. so that the countn has thc means to coll-
trnue thrs uork independcntlv rn tho longer te rm
(d) Perxtns indicted fitr wur crintes
5-5 Sincc thc inccption of the ICT\' (lnter-
national Cnmrnal Tribunal fbr thc fbmrcr Yugo-
slar ra). 8-l rndn,rduals havc been pubhclv rn-
dictcd rn 25 indrctments Six accuscd har.'c dred-
chargcs have becn dropped against I 8 others. one
rs scn lng hrs scntence. anothcr has cornpleted hrs
scntcnce. and a thrrd u'as acquitted. Currentlr'.
thc total numbor of accused pcrsons. pending
arrsst or pondrng complctron of thc procecdings
rs 58 in 22 rndrctments Currenth- arrest \\or-
rants are strll outstandrng against 3 I persons ac-
cuscd of \\ar cnmes. uhilc 25 accuscd are rn
custodr-6
-56 Thc Bosnians arc coopcratlng *ith the
ICry. Whrlc Bosnran Croats have cooperated as
regards thc surrender of all but tro pubhc rndrct-
ces. thcr have not complied ftillr rrrth thc Trrbr.r-
nal's orde rs that thev turn o\/er docurnents
needcd for the fair trarl of a number of rndrcted
persons
57. According to the PIC. some progrcss has
becn madc rn tho coopcratton of Republika
Srpska uith thc ICTY but rn Decembcr 1998 the
PIC called upon the President of Repubhka
Srpska to enslrre that thc countn' meots all its
obhgations to cooperatc u'rth the Trrbunal Al-
though thc tu'o indicted rvar crimurals uith thc
hrghest protilc. Rador an Karadzrc and Ratko
Mladrc. arc still at largc. thetr politrcal and mrh-
tan influcncc has durndlcd considcrablr
(e) I)cmining
5l't. The contmuing prcsencc of mrncs and
minefields on the ternton' of Bosnra and Hcrze-
go\lna rs onc of the major obstaclcs to thc return
of drsplaccd persons and reftrgecs to therr orrgi-
nal homcs. It rs cstrmated that at prcscnt some
750 000 mrncs rcmam dispcrscd thror.rghout the
ternton. of Bosnra and Hcrzcgo\,,1na. most of
them lard close to tho Inter-Entrtv Boundan' Line
along the former hnes of confrontatron
,59 Accordrng to Artrcle IV of Anncx l-A to
thc Darton Pcacc Agreemcnt. the signaton' par-
tres are responsrble for the remoral and destmc-
tton of all mrncs Earher Assemblv rcports havc
crplarned uhv too little progress is bcing made rn
thrs parnstakrng cffort
60 Conscrous of thc relationshrp betuccn
progress rn dcntmtng and the retllrn of refilgccs.
L,TNHCR do'cloped a deminrng programntc rn
1998 in support of thc countnrrrde programme
t2
n ICTY fact sheet. l2 NIar 1999
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to encouragc cthnlc mulontv retllm. This specral
demrnrng progranxne implemented bv UNDP
startcd in March 1998 *ith thc oblcctrve of
handrng lt over to Bosnia and Hcrzegovlna tealns
uith a national sustainable capacitr b1'thc end of
1999 Demrnrng teams. each consrsting of 40
pcrsonncl. rvcre draun fronr Gorazde and Trar-
nik in the Bosnran areas- Busovaca and Jajce irr
thc Croat arcas and Mrkonjic Grad and Pale
from the Bosnran-Serb areas. Har.'ing follouod a
trarning corlrsc from March to Mav 1998. the
teams started dcmrnrng operations rn thc thrcc
opcn cltles of Busovaca. Mrkonjic Grad and
Gorazde and in a number of its nrinontt' mturici-
palrties UNHCR nou' hopes to drau' on SFOR
for support rvrth demining equrpment for its pro-
gramrne and to add a dog-search capabrlitl'
LNHCR u'rll also use commercial-hrre companv
support for the rest of 1999
6l [n the meantime. SFOR makcs a contnbu-
tion through proactrve pubhc cducation on the
dangers of the landmines that rcmain and also
helps to train and advise Entltv Armed Forces
derninrng teams and helps them obtam propcr
cquipmcnt. With SFOR's assistancc. threc mme-
clcarance tralnrng estabhshments have been sct
Lrp. Indirrdual countncs har,'c donated protcctrrc
equrpment. ambulances- mine-clearance vehicles
and ftlndcd the use ofspeciallv traurcd dogs
$ lWilitun, and security issues
62 The mrlitan' situation rn Bosnra and Hcr-
zcgo\lna has stabrhsed and for a long time no
incidents affecting the ceasefirc har.e taken place
The arms control regimcs established under Ar-
ticles ll (confidence- and securitr -burldrng meas-
ures) and IV (arms reduction and limrtations) of
Annex l-B to the Darton Peacc Agrecment are
being applied Even bv October 1997. Bosnra
and Herzegor,'ina and the othcr partres \\'ere com-
plving ulth the limrtations rmposed on battlc
tanks. annourcd combat vehicles- artillen. com-
bat arrcraft and attack helicopters as mentioned
in Article IV. The ratros for these armaments arc
5.2'.2 for the Fcderal Republic of Yugoslavra.
Rcpublic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
respcctivclv. These armament levels harc been
respected since then A draft mandate for a re-
gronal stabrlitl'agreement as mentloned in Artrcle
V has been approved Ncgotrations usre duo to
begrn rn earlv 1999. but the Kosovo cnsis has
caused a dclal'.
63. On the othcr lrand. rt should be noted that
the Entrtt' Amrcd Forccs remain substantiallr
drvidcd along cthnlc lrncs Ercn the rntegratron of
thc Fedoratron Armt 
- 
ono of thc conditrons of
thc train and oquip programme 
- 
rs makurg ven'
slos progress and does not ertend to corps ler,el
unrts and belou. Thc Darton Peacc Agrccment
pror ides for the creatron of a joint armr,' of the
Croat-Muslin Fcderatron of bctueen 30 000 and
3-5 000 professronal troops. compnsmg three
Muslim aud onc Croat armed corps The tram
and equip programme has. hou'ever. helped to
integrate the Mrnrstn' of Defcnce and provrde
thrs cntitv sith a credible deterrent capabilrtl'
Hoso'cr. rt rs unhkelv that the target of fuIl inte-
gratron u'ill bc mct bv August 1999. as origrnallv
specified
64. At tho same time. the Bosnran-Serb annr
contrnues rts rclatronshrp urth thc armv of thc
Federal Republic of Yugoslaria (FRY) utile thc
Bosnran-Croat elemcnt of the Fedcratron armv
maintains tres u'ith Croatra Houcrer. limited
rcsources considerabll' restnct the matenal sup-
port the FRY and Croatla can provide.
65 . Altogethcr. lt sccms that each of the ethnrc
groups lishes to rctarn its oun defensive cap-
abrlities in ordcr to bc able to defend rtself in the
event of a neu' cnsis Mutual trust rs still in a
ven' earl1, stage of development. rf it exrsts at all.
66 In the anncx to thc Madrid Declaration of
16 Docembcr l99tl. thc PIC cxpresscd &sap-
porntment that hesrtation and delav r.rere still
hampering implomcntation of the agreemcnt on
confidence- and securitr -buildrng measures and
that. as a result- there has been a lack of real
progress tou'ards improving the lcr el of coopera-
tion and trust betu'ccn the Entity Armed Forccs
and u'rthin thc Federatron arm\'. It also noted the
lncreaslng dn,crgence rn rloctrine and training
betu'een the Entitv Armed Forces and urgcd that
plans be drau'n up rn 1999 fbr a training and
development programme common to all the
armed forces of Bosnra and Herzegor.,rna.
61. On 9 Januan 1999. SFOR seizcd mrlrtan'
equipment from the Croat forces ln Bosnia
(FfVO) in rcsponso to the unauthorised appoint-
ments of several HVO generals u'ithin the Fed-
cratron armv These appointmcnts and prorno-
tions had bcon made bv Ante Javelic. the Croat
menrbcr of thc Bosnian collegial presidcno'. On
8 Januan'. SFOR had demanded that the ap-
l3
DOCUMENT 1653
porntments be inrmcdratclv suspendcd until th*'
had been approvcd bv a commrttee hcaded bi' the
SFOR cornmandcr. in compliance uith thc pro-
r,'rsions in forcc since October 1998
6tt From 16-23 Januan' 1999. a programmc
of bnefings and drsclrsslons \\as held at the
NATO school in Oberamnlcrgau. SHAPE in
Mons. NATO in Bmsseis. and thc MoD in Lon-
don- for high-lcvel military and cn rhan authon-
tres of Bosnra and Hcrzegovlna. \\ ith the aim of
restoring a climatc of recrprocal confidence bc-
tu'een thosc authoritres.
(g) International urbilration over Brcko
69. Undcr Articlc V of the Agreement on the
Inter-Entrtv Boundan'Linc (Anncx 2 to the Dar'-
ton Agreement). the Parties agreed to binding
arbrtration over the disputcd portlon of the Inter-
Entrtl' Boundan Lrne rn the Brcko area. Arbitra-
tion u'as to be the task of one arbrtrator ap-
pornted br the Federatron. onc appointed bi Re-
pubhka Srpska and one to bc sclected bv agree-
ment of the Partres' appointees If thcl could not
agree. the thrrd arbrtrator u'ould be appointed bv
thc Prcsidcnt of the Internatronal Court of Jus-
trce. The procecdings uould be conducted in
accordance riith UNCITRAL (Unrted Nations
Commission on International Tradc Lau) rules
and the arbitrators \\cre to take therr decrsion no
later than onc vear from the entn' into force of
the Dar.ton Peace Agrcement
70 The position of Brcko is important sincc
the toun is srtuated on a narro\r neck of land
comecting the trro halvcs of Republika Srpska.
For the Muslims rn Bosnra and Herzegor,ina. the
ril'er port of Brcko provrdcs tho onlv acccss route
to central Europe rra the Sale and thc Danube It
is also an important road and rail junctron Be-
forc its scizure bv the Serbs in Ma1' 1992. Brcko
had a population u'hich u'as -l-lolo Muslim. 26%
Croat and 2l% Serb After the seizure. vrrtuallv
all its non-Serbs ucre erpelled or killed. The
arbitration decrsron was postponed first rn Dec-
ember 1996 and again in Fcbruan' 1997 *'hcn
the tos'n rvas placed undcr an international su-
penisron team headed b1'the US diplomat Rob-
ert Farrand- u'ho u'as also to oversec Brcko's
ethmc reintegration Arbrtration \\.as further
postponed until March 1998. The Municipal
Statute u'as amended rn order to estabhsh a
multi-ethnrc adminrstration. ludrcran, and poLce
forcc in Brcko. All the political partres partici-
pated rn thc fbrmatron of thcse nrulti-ethnrc bod-
ies and somc progress rras made
7l On l-i N{arch 1998. thc arbitratron pancl
for Brcko. chaircd bt Robcrt Orlen. dccrded vet
agarn to defer final arbrtratron on the status of
thc tolvn and its rmmedrate surroundings until the
cnd of 1998. Later. thc decrsroll \\.as postponed
untrl Febman 1999 NIr Ouon argucd that the
general instabrlrtl' in the regton and the raprdlv
shifting politrcal scene in Rcpublika Srpska 1us-
tified thrs further delar'.
72. [n earlv 1999. tlie arbrtratron panel organ-
rsed hcarings so that the vanous partres could
express therr opinions. Muslims have suggestcd
granting Brcko neutral status- rulcd br the Bos-
nian Federatron under rntemational supenrsion.
u'ith a refererrdum to be hcld at a fttturc date to
be dctermrned Thc Serbs are against thrs solu-
tton because thet are a mlnorltv rn thc Bosnran
Fcdcratron Ther have suggestcd makrng Brcko
an internatronal protectorate for a fir'e-r'ear pcr-
iod
73. Up to 15 March 1998. thc Brcko area \\'as
controlled b1'three ethnrc grollps. each respon-
sible for drffercnt areas. tr-ith the Croats control-
ling Ravne/Brcko. the Bosnians controlling Brka.
and thc Serbs the toun of Brcko and its immedr-
ate surroundrngs Mrnoritv retums urthrn the
boundarres of thc Brcko municipalrtv havc most-
11 been hmrted to thc zonc of separatron. or to
areas uhere thc returnees arc not rn a minoritr
The tos'n police force has been nominallv intc-
grated. but in fact rcmarns under the control of
the local ruling Serb polrtical partr' (SDS). In
fact. there are threc separate pohce forccs rn thc
Brcko municrpalitv one Croat-controlled force rn
Ravne/Brcko. onc Bosnian-controlled force rn
Brka and thc police forcc of central Brcko. thco-
reticallr- under thc control of the Ministn of
Internal Affairs of Republika Srpska but in prac-
trcc under that of the ruling local polrtical partr'.
thc SDS. A simrlar separation apphes to ludges
and munrcipal emplovecs. It rs qurte plain that
this situation has resulted m an envrronment that
is not conducive to minontv returns and merelr,
confirms the results of cthnrc cleansing.
74 On 
-5 March. the Brcko Arbrtration Tribu-
nal decrded that the pre-\\'ar municipalrtv of
Brcko. uhich the Dalton Pcace Agreemcnt left
divided betlccn the tu-o entrtics. uould bc reuni-
fied as a self-goveming "neutral district" The
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north-eastern part of the muntctpalitv u'hich uas
tenrporarilr' part of Repubhka Srpska. and the
southcrn part- u'hich had been Fcdcration tcrri-
tory.. arc norv held bv both entitres on a "con-
dominrum" basrs urth both havrng to surrcnder
control to the nes district go\ornn'tcnt.
75 The neu gor,'ernment of Brcko urll bc
democratic. multt-ethruc - trrth an elected as-
sembl1'. executlve board. ludiciary and pohce
force 
- 
under Bosnia and Herzegovina so\ror-
eigntl' and sublcct to the aLrthontv of the Bosnra
and Herzegovina ccntral institutrons. The decr-
slon to creato a neutral district is also intendcd to
allou all uar-dtsplaced persons and reftlgees to
return to their origrnal homes. Entitv militan'
forces uill gradualll be phased out of thc dis-
tnct. The ne\\ arrangemcnt uill not tmpcdc anv
lcgrtirnatc movement through thc Brcko area and
rrrll- at the same tinte. ensurc the territorial con-
trnuitv of Republika Srpska.
76 Thc Tnbunal once agatn emphasrscd thc
inrportancc of thc rcturn of displaced persons and
refilgccs to thetr origrnal homcs uhtch hard-line
natronalists rn the district had hitherto prevcntcd.
77. The arbitration auard lavs dosn se\ere
pcnaltrcs for anr' ftrture non-compltance uith the
obligatron to allorr thc return of displaced per-
sons and rcftlgces If one partv serlouslv ob-
structs rmplementation. the Tnbunal has the
authonfi' to place the distnct under the erclttstr e
control of thc compltant entrtv.
78. Clearll'thc dcciston on the status of Brcko
cannot be implcrnentcd overnight. It rs hoped that
the ncrr gorcrning structLlrcs rvrll bc in place b1'
the end of 1999 In the meantime. extsting lau's.
policres and structurcs urll remain and the pres-
ent Supen,rsor- Mr Brll Farrand. u'ill stat'in post
to overseo the transition.
79 Thc Parliament of Republika Srpska re-
jected the decision as inconsistent u'tth the Dar-
ton Peace Agreement and. tn protest over the
arbrtratron arrard. decided on 7 March that all
Bosnian Serbs should be urthdrau'n from Bosnia
and Herzegovtna s state bodres The resolutron.
adopted b], a clear ma.1ont1'. also made tt clcar
that the Rcpubhka Srpska Parhament u'ould not
accept dectsions made b1' Bosnia and Herzc-
govina's state instttutions in the absence of thc
Serb representatives Prime Minrster Mrlorad
Dodik tendered his resignation in protest and
appealed to intcrnatronal officrals for a change rn
thc arbrtratron over Brcko
80 Mr Dodrk argued that the govcrnmcnt of
Republrka Srpska had donc as much as tt could
to coopcratc urth the intcmational supenisor for
Brcko bi'introducrng multi-ethnic poltcrng and a
multr-ethnrc local admrnistration in order to mcet
standards laid doun in thc Tribunal's earlicr
lnterrm dectsron After tcndering hrs restgnation-
hou.cver. he retnatucd in offrcc as carctakcr
Primc Minrster.
8l. In response to rcprcsentatrves of thc Othcc
of the Hrgh Representatlve emphastsltg hou
much could be achicrcd br constructr\e cngagc-
ment ln nogotratrons on the anne\cs to the Brcko
dccrsron. Mr Dodrk u'tthdrcrv hts tcndcr of restg-
natron on l5 Nlarch
82 Prrme Minrster Dodrk has succecded in
estabhshrng a pohcl'for Rcpubhka Srpska rvhrch
rs less depcndcnt on dccisions madc b1'the gor'-
ornnlent of the FRY and mar' g\ en run counter to
Belgradc's rvishes if rt is considercd to be too
much rn Rcpubhka Srpska's o\\11 uttcrost He has
managed to persuade RepLrbhka Srpska of thc
adlantages of lookrng after tts cconomlc tntcrests
and uinning intemattonal respect
83. On ths othcr hand. it should bc noted that
Primc N'lrnister Dodrk. like most of his follorters
and compatriots. does not rcallv bcher'c tn thc
Davton Peace Agrecment as a lasting and r iabic
solutron for Bosnia and Hcrzegovtna With a
ncghgrblc numbcr of minontv reftlgee returns
har ing been rmplcmented b1' his governmcnt. thc
masslve international support hc has does not
sccm 1ustified. but it mav u'cll be that thc inter-
natronal comrnunltv rs fullv a\\'are of the hmrts of
u'hat rs feasiblc under thc Darton Peace Agrcc-
mcnt Thc influence of fonner Prcsidcnt Biljana
Plavsrc. nho u'as defcated br. Mr Poplasen in the
last presrdential elccttons. has dcchned
(h) Dismissul oJ President Nikolu Poplasen
It4 On 5 March l99t). aftcr manv months of
open obstmction to the Darton Peace Agreement.
Nrkola Poplasen \\as removed from officc as
Presrdent of Repubhka Srpska b1'thc High Rep-
rcsentatne. Carlos Westendorp. Thc Immcdtat!)
cause of Poplasen's removal u-as hts lctter to tlic
High Rcprcsentatrvc tn rvhtch he rejected thc
latter's demands ln conncctlon uith hts orrn il-
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legrtrmate attcmpt to unscat Republika Srpska's
Pnme Mrnrstcr. Mrlorad Dodik.
85. Mr Wcstendorp has also givcn a number
of other lmportant reasons for renroving Presr-
dent Poplasen. ut accordance urth the po\\ers
vestcd rn the High Rcprcsentatir e under Artrclc 5
of Anner l0 to the Darton Pcacc Agreement and
conf-rrmed b1 thc PIC at its Bonn Conference on
l0 Dcccmber 1997 and its Madnd Conference on
[6 Decembcr l99ti.
86 Among mant' other transgrcsstons. Presr-
dcnt Poplascn refi;sed to consult the parttcs and
coalrtrons rn thc Republika Srpska Parhament
ovcr thc nomrnation of the Primc Mrnister and
declincd to nominate Mrlorad Dodrk. the candi-
date rrho orrdcntlr had thc sllpport of tho malor-
rtr of the Parlramont Through Presidcnt Poplas-
en s lnalroeur ring. Rcpublika Srpska has bcen
left $ ithout a goYcmntent lcgitimated bY parlia-
ment for almost six ntonths. President Poplasen
also rcfllscd to srgn legrslatron uhrch had bcen
dr-rlr and legalli passed bv rnaloritv votc rn the
Parhament and cven attempted to provokc a
govcrnmcnt crisrs bv unconstitutrona[1r' attcmpt-
u1g to unscat the carctakcr Pnme Minrstcr.
U7 Mr Poplasen s succcssron is guarantecd
rundcr the relcr ant provisrons of Rcpublika
Srpska las These desrgnate the Vtco-Prcsidcr-rt
and. farling that. a replacement appointcd rn ac-
cordancc u'rth generallr accepted practicc. For
the tinrc bcrng. houcvcr. rt has not becn possible
to frnd a succcssor to Mr Poplasen
(i) Consequences of the Kosovo conJlict
in Republika Srpsku
88 The Government of Repubhka Srpska has
shoun srmpathv for thc posltlon of thc FRY
uhrlc stopprng short of bccoming inrolved rn the
conflrct- although it mav not succeed in distanc-
rng itsclf from rt conrpletclv As mrght hare been
cxpected- tho populatron of Repubhka Srpska is
hostrlc totr-ards NATO's arr stnkes agarnst the
FRY and rnternatronal organisations. fcaring
possiblc vroletrcc. have ri'ithdrau-n thelr foreign
staff members from Repubhka Srpska territon'
89 Thc fact that SFOR troops havc deliber-
atelr drsmpted the rarluav hne betu'cen Belgradc
and Bar rvhcre rt crosscs the tcrritorl' of Repub-
hka Srpska coLrld be considered as a needless
shou of forcc. provokrng hostrlrtv among the
populatron of Republika Srpska. IPTF pohce
ofhcers in Repubhka Srpska are keeping a lou'
profile becausc thc Repubhka Srpska policc have
said thcv camot guarantee therr safbtr'.
90 On the uholc. rt can be said that the situa-
tion in Rcpublika Srpska rs rathcr fiagilc. espe-
cialh' after the dccisron on Brcko and thc escala-
tion of the conflict rn Kosoro, Morc than three
r oars afte r tho conclusron of the Datton Peaco
Agreement. Republika Srpska has made r.en'
little progress torrards the rmplernentation of
rvhat Darton u.as arming to achreve.
(j) Rcducing SF0R?
91. ln Dccomber 1998. NATO decidcd to
rcduce SFOR strength bv some l0oz{, through
ratronalrsatron. rcstructr.rring and efficiencv mea-
sur0s.
92 Bv 13 Febnran' 1999. tlie SFOR contrn-
gent \\'as 32 700 strong rvith 30 500 troops in
Bosnia and Herzegor,rna and thc rcmainin g 2 200
deplovcd rn Croatra
93. NATO has 
.lustrfied thc rcduction on the
ground that tho mrlrtan'part of the Darton Peacc
Agreement has no\\ bcen fullr implemented
SFOR's missron to prel'ent a reneu'al of hostili-
ttcs bctucen the entrtres. prottdc a secure cnri-
ronnent for the civihan population and transfer
rndicted u'ar crimrnals to the ICTY in The Hague
is continuingT Horvcver. thc rcductron of
SFOR's strcngth has not bcen implemented orr-
ing to the detcnoratron of tho conflict in Kosol'o
rn March 1999
(k) Assistance to Bosniu und Herzegovinu
91. Bcforc thc PIC's Madrid Conferencs on
l6 December 199U. the Hrgh Rcprcsentatir e.
Carlos Wcstendorp. sard that the reconcrhation
programmc ir-r Bosnia and Herzegovina u-ould
have little meaning unless thc West could gct
Bosnia's economv back or its tbet. Hc suggestcd
that targets should bc set to rcduce "absurd"
militan' spcndrng. u'rth donors scalrng doul aid
if the targcts u cre not rnet
95. Tho European Commissioncr fbr Aid Pro-
grammes- Enura Bonrno- said that intomational
assistancc could "hardlv be kept at the current
high levols much longer"' B)' thc ond of 1998.
Le:\Ionde. li Febnurn' 1999
" Ftnctrtctttl 7 tttre.:. 16 Decenrber 1999
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most of thc US$ 5 brllron ard programme launch-
ed in 1996 had alreadl'been spent.
96. In uerv of the ven'negativc impact of thc
Kosovo conflict on do,elopment in the reglon. the
EU is nou discussing the modalitres for a -'Stab-
rlrtv Pact for south-eastern Europe'' of uhrch
Bosnia and Herzegovina urll be one of the benc-
ficiaries (see Chapter XII. section (d). paragraph
342 of the present report)
97 . In conclusion. it is cppropriate to quote
Muhamed Sacirber'e *ho recenth' insistcd that
the Darton Agreement should be maintarned and
that the mternational communit-r- should remain
committcd to its implementation In partrcular.
three pillars of the Agreemcnt should be bol-
stered thc return of all refugees- full cooperation
rvith the ICTY in The Hague and the slrpremacv
of the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovlna.
the objective of u'hich is to creatc a secular. lib-
eral democratic Europcan state.
IV. Bulgario
98 In the opinion of the Bulgarian Govern-
ment. the Kosovo crisis has extremcly adr ersc
conscquences for the econom)' of thc country.
These result not onlv from the UN embargo
against the FRY. rvhich has alu'avs been one of
Bulgaria's most important trading partners. but
also from the fact that foreign investors are re-
luctant to invest in the region. rvhich thel still
consider to be unstable Prime Mrnrster h'an
Kostov recentlvrt' estimated the losses to hrs
countn' since the begrnning of the Kosovo u.ar to
be about US$ 33 milhon orving to the traditronal
trade route through Yugoslavia being cut off and
commercial traffic along the Danube parah,ssd.
A trade embargo agalnst Yugoslavia rvould obvi-
ously place a further burden on the econom\'
Such prospects are naturalll' drstressrng to a
government and countn'that at last seemed to be
on the pornt of an economic upturn. uith healthy'
grorth (4-5%)- lorv inflation (11%) and govern-
ment finances shou'ing an improvement (econ-
omic indicators at end l99tt).
99. The Bulgarian Govemment succeeded in
stabilising the economic situation in 1998 and
e Mulumed Sacirbel': "Applyrng the lessons of Datlon
to Kosovo". Il'all Street .Iountal.26 April 1999.
to Le ltlonde.5 Ma1' 1999
grouth rvas cxpected for 1999 Inflatron droppcd
Io lo/o and GNP *ent up bv 1-5olr. The govcm-
ment also rntroduced fiscal reforms uhich in-
crcased state rcvenue bv l0%
100 In ternrs of all forcrgn tradc. Bulgarra's
exports of goods to rvestcrn Europc. uhrch ac-
count for more than 5()n/o of its total cxports-
have to pass through Romania- but onlv onc
bridge across the Danube connects Bulgaria rvrth
Romanra despite the fact that the bordcr betu'een
the tr,ro countries is over I 000 krlomctrcs long.
After manv t'ears of negotiations. thev har,,e not
1'et agreed on the location of a second bridgc
Forergn trade and 
- 
as a consequence 
- 
state
carnings have diminished Forergn rnvestmcnt has
decreascd and the parallel economv is takrng off
again. although government officrals clarm thc
state has succeeded in cxercising morc control
over criminal commercral actl,rtres.
l0l . On the other hand. some expcrts arguc that
the conflict in Kosovo is not the onlr reason for a
stagnating econom\'. Thcl say'that the economrc
and administrative structures are not 1'et flexiblo
enough for quick adaptation to a changrng en\l-
ronment. While fbreign companies rn Bulgana
manage to cope u'ith rising trcnsport costs. Bul-
ganan companies cannot because thet, continue
to rvork rvith old and outdatcd management pro-
cedures. The big. old state companles have not
vet been privatiscd and. as ln manv othcr coun-
tries in thc region. manv privatisatrons have not
been implemented because of the far-rcachrng
social consequences of such decrsions.
102. Bulgana is thercfore in favour of the rnter-
nalonal conrmunity"s active tn'v'olvement ln
finding a peaceful and lasting solutron to the
conflict rn Kosovo and is prepared to make a
contribution to that end. It should be notcd too
that the majorrtv of the populatron (659/o accord-
ing to an opinron poll in late Apnl) are opposed
to the bombrngrl.
103. President Stovanov argues that the confltct
in the FRY should prompt the EU to establish
appropriate mcchanisms to help the rcgion 
- 
a
sort of Marshall plan. rvith support for.;oint pro-
jects. which rvould open up the Balkans to
Europe EU member states should guarantee
private investment rn the region and mvest in
much-needed infrastructural improl'ement
t7
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l0-l On 4 NIal 1999. thc Bulgarian Parliament
r,,oted rn favour of opening up Bulgarran airspacc
for NATO's alr operatlon agarnst the FRY.
noturthstanding the fact that popular feehng
rrithrn the countn. uas hrghlv critical of thc
morc- for fear of Bulgana being draun into a
conflict uhich it uas hoped could bc ended as
soon as possrble The governmcnt has aluavs
sLrpported the Contact Group's polict' on the
Kosovo cnsis and ls. as Presrdent Stovanov
stated m a recent intcn'ieu' "on NATO's side
agalnst the inhuman regime of Slobodan Mrlo-
sevrc Har rng been hostage to President Milo-
sevic's policv for over seven vears. Bulgaria
reckons it has nou'had enoughrr.
105 The conflrct rn the FRY rs isolating Bul-
gana from \\.estcm Europc economrcallr and
drscouraging forcign ln\-cstors. Presrdent Stol'a-
nov has argued that the Mrlosevrc regime rvould
not have lasted as long as rt has rf. frorn the out-
set- Europe had had a clear prograrrunc for crcat-
rng a belt of democracr'. prospentv and securitr
rn rts south-castcrn regions
I 06 Before the start of the second round of the
Rambourllet negotrations on l-5 March 1999. the
Charrman of the Bulganan Parliamcnt's Foreign
Affarrs Committee. together urth his collnter-
parts from the parhamcnts of FYROM. Hungan'
and Romanra. planned to visrt Belgrade to try'
and convrnce the Yugoslal'Parhament and pubhc
opiruon rn thc FRY that the agrcement proposed
b1'the Contact Group. uhich urcluded provrsion
for a NATO pcacekeeping force on FRY terri-
ton'. u'as the onll' acceptablc solutron This rnr-
tiative farled because of the Serb refusal to re-
cerl'e the delegatron. That same rreek. the Bul-
ganan Mmrster for Forcrgn Affarrs visrted
FYROM and Albania to discuss the Kosovo
crisis among othcr thrngs A further morc in therr
efforts to present a corrlmon front rn the Kosovo
conflrct rras the message sent b1 the Presidents
of Bulgana- Hungarl and Romanra to President
Miloseuc bcfore l5 March. urglng hrm to accept
the RamboLrillet proposals. Presrdcnt Mrlosevrc
has clearlv shoun that he is not rnterested in
advice from hrs counterparts rn nerghbounng
countncs
107. A verl'important and positn,e development
in Bulgana's relatrons uith FYROM took place
urth thc srgnaturo of a dcclaratron and a number
of agrccments bctuccn thc tuo states u'liich put
an cnd to a long-standurg dispr.rte or er national
languages and also inclr"rdcd a Bulganan donation
of a largc number of battlc tanks and other mrh-
tan' equrpm'rnt to FYROM
l0tJ Bulgana has good relations riith both
Turkel'and Greece. In order to improve ties gen-
crallv betueen the countrres of the region. a num-
ber ofissues are no\\' berng discussed rn tripartrte
mcctings bctrrecn Bulgaria. Romania and Turkel'
and Bulgarra. Romania and Grecce. It rs hoped
that thrs procedure mav lead to constructive
rapprochemenl and a four-u'av drscussion forum
being established
109. Bulgana takos a r,en posrti're approach
tou'ards securifi' and stabrlitv rn the region. u'ith-
out trying to stand apart from rts nerghbours
Thrs should be borne in mrnd by both NATO and
WEU. Problems rn othcr countnes of the reglon
should not be allo*.cd to havc an advorse influ-
enco on Bulgaria's furthcr integratron m Euro-
pcan and \\cstcrn orgcnisations.
V. Rqmaniq
I 10. Srnce thc fall of corrrmunlsm. Romania has
adopted a markedlv pro-Western stance. u'rth
mcmbershrp of NATO and thc European Unron
as the cardrnal arms of its foreign policy'. Thcrc rs
hol'ever a feeling 
- 
rernforced after the Washing-
ton Sumrnrt of uhrch more \\'as expected 
- 
that
the West. NATO ln partrcular. does not rcspond
to the ertcnt rt should
I 1 l. Successive presrdents and gor,cmments
have consistentlv pursued this policl,' *'hrch rnter
olra has helped srgnrficantlv to enhance relations
u'ith strategrcallv rmportant neighbours such as
Hungary and has contnbuted to a rcmarkable
lmprovcment in the degrce of integratron of the
countn"s mrnorities in the life of the nation 
- 
the
involvement ln goverilncnt of a parfi' represent-
ing Romanrans of Magvar origin berng obrious
proof In addrtron to this general strategic onen-
tation. mentron should also be madc of the mas-
sive endeavour of the present govemment to lib-
eralise an economv still burdened bv a past leg-
ao' of unproductir c rndustn' and clumsily' col-
lectivised agnculture Nevertheless. such efforts
to modernise have not produced the long-desrred
economlc upturn (grollth -60/" n 1997. -1'l'o in
1998. and inflailon remaining at over 50%). One
Itt
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possible reason is that the govcmment 
- 
although
elected by' a clear maloritr' 
- 
has not managed to
secure lvidespread support for rts reform efforts
In an oprnion poll organised b1' the Soros Insti-
tute. 5 1'% of the sarnple thought that therr srtua-
tron had uorsened since 1989 The social unrest
of recent months also points to the samo conclu-
sion. Morcorcr. thc economic srtuatron is bound
to becomc even more diffrcult. at least for a
uhile. becausc of the present conflict in Kosor,'o,
The Romanran authoritres estlmate that. srnce the
start of thc bombings. the countn' has been los-
rng US$ 
-50 mrlhon a ucck through direct loss of
trade and ouing to traff-rc on the Danubc being
paralt sodr 3.
l12. Moreover throughout thc successi\;e crises
in south-eastern Europe. Romanra has activelv
co-operated u'ith [,N. WEU and NATO efforts.
thc most obvrous examplcs being the embargo on
thc Danube (LN and WEU) and the MAPE mis-
sion to Albania (WEU). Romania readrlv gave
permission for NATO planes to use its arrspace
in the contert of therr operations against Yugo-
slav targets Nu'ertheless. havrng. hke other
Balkan countnes. every economic and polrtical
reason to fear the prospect of a general destabili-
sation of the region. especrallr one connected
u'ith the positron of etlulc mrnontrcs. Romania is
naturallv against anv change rn Balkan frontiers
and riould clearlv prefer to see the prcsent crisrs
end as soon as possrble.
I13. It should houever be noted that in Roma-
nra. l'rth a large Orthodor mayoritv and a histon'
of alhances ruth thc Serbs. pubhc scntimcnt rs
not in favour of crushing Yugoslavia. er.en rvith
Mr Milos*'ic at its head A recent poll slior,ved
that tuo-thrrds of thc population s'ere against thc
bonrbrngs 
- 
although 52o/o were rn favour of
intcrvention in Yugoslar ia.
W. Crqatia
I14. Since Croatra is one of the co-signatones
of the Darton Peace Agreemcnt. the political
srtuatron in that countn' has a beanng on the
rmplementation of that agreement and on the
state of affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
t3 Le -\l,ttcle.21 Apnl 1999.
I 15 An earlicr Asscmblv reportrr on the Bal-
kans mentioned that rn Februan' 1998 Presrdcnt
Tudlrnan still appeared to bc suggesting that the
estabhshrnent of a urder Croatran state. rvhich
would includo Bosnran ternton'. remained a le-
gitimate national aspiration According to manr'
observ'crs. thrs cast "senous doubt upon Croa-
tia's commitmont to thc terntonal rntegritv of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and rts u'rlhngness to
includg ethnrc Serbs and othcr mrnorrtics as full
and equal rnembers of Croatian socictr,''. Srnce
then. the situation has not greatlv rmproved
116. A rccent report bv thc Organisation for
Securitv and Cooperation rn Europc (OSCE) has
stronglv critrciscd Croatia Thc report notes that
there has been no progress rn rmproving compli-
ance rr ith human rights, the nghts of minorities
and the rule of lau'm Croatra.
ll7. The report mentions in partrcular the re-
pression of thc mcdra b), thc Croatian Govem-
ment- its lack of coopcratron rirth the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slaua (ICTY) and the harsh treatment of ethnic
Serbs Only a small percentage of the 300 000 or
so ethnic Serbs expolled from therr homes durrng
the uar have bccn alloncd to rctum.
ll8. The Councrl of Europe too recentlv er-
prossed strong criticrsm of the attrtude of the
Croatran authontres rn tht: treatment of its ethnrc
minorities and tou-ards the return of retugees
(Serbian for thc most part) to their homcs m
Croatra. Hence. in rts report on the "Return of
refllgees and displaced persons to therr homcs in
Croatia"r' the Committee on Mrgration. Refugees
and Demographv of thc Assombll' of the Council
of Europe notes "contlnumg rnsecuritv in the
regions of retum. including harassment. intrmi-
dation and the presence of landmines ( ) difn-
cultl' for those u'ishrng to return to obtain the
reqursite citizenshrp and travel documents from
the Croatran authorities" and recomrnends- mler
alru- that the Govemment of Croatia '-ensure the
sccuritt' of returnees bv means of cffectir-e multi-
ethnic pohcrng and rmmedratc. thorough investi-
gations of all secuntt' rncrdents ( )". It also asks
for the urgcnt amendment or repeal of drscrimi-
natory legislation and for resolutc actron to bc
Ia Assernbll' Docurnent 1608. 13 Mav l99tj- Rappor-
teur Mr Blaauu'.
r5 Document 8368. 9 April 1999, Parlianrentan Assem-
bh, of the Councrl of Europe
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taken to resolr,c cases of illcgal occupancr Drs-
cnmrnation agalnst the Itahan minontv rn the
Croatran tcrriton' of Istria has also been strongh'
condcmned bv a group of mcmbcrs of the
Councrl of Europc Asscmbh'r6 rrto report prcs-
sures berng put on lcading figures among the
Itahan minontv and urge the Croatran Govcrn-
ment to takc thc rleccssan stcps to honour rts
commitments rn rts trcatmcnt of thc Italran mr-
norrtr'.
l19. Human Rrghts Watch's ''World Rcport
1999" nicntions a large number of shortcomrngs
in the Croatian authontrcs' pohcr rn thc ficld of
human rights. Like manv other organisations.
Human Rrghts Watch drau s attention to thc
manv drfferent hurdlcs uhrch makc it ren drffi-
cult. rf not lmposslble- for refugees to rctum
Among other thrngs. rt notes discrimmatron
against Serbs rn housing and ertensrrc legal and
admrnrstratlvc drscrrminatron against thenr rrhcn
tirev tn'to obtam documents and pensions. The
report also provrdes examples of the tenuous
freedom of the press and other mcdra and the
lulnerabrlrtr. of the nght to frce assernblv rn
Croatra.
120 In its rcport. Human Rrglrts Watch also
notcs that Croatia's proccss of accountrng for
\\'ar crlmes remalns a mattcr of senous collccrn.
It sat's that confirsion about the lau' on general
an.mestv and politrcrsed uar crimes trials con-
tinue to be a source of rnsecunt! for Serbs livrng
in Croatia and an rmpedrment to the retum of
refugees. N{entron rs made of irregularities rn thc
conduct of u'ar crrmes trials- leadrng to suspr-
crons that prosecutrons have been politrcallv
motivated Ser'ere rcstrictions har,'e bcen placcd
on thc monitonng of such tnals bv OSCE and
I-IN rcprescntatives
l2l. A rcport on human nghts pubhshcd bv the
US Statc Department at the end of Februarl'
1999. descnbes Croatra as "nominalh' demo-
cratrc" but "rn realrtv authoritarian"lT.
122 There are strong rndicatrons that the gov-
ernrng Croatran Democratic Unron (HDZ) has
become even more radrcahsed. In an internal
po\\'er struggle. the partl's hardliners 
- 
u-ho
favour a nationalist and xenophobrc pohcr' 
-
16 See Document 8273. 30 Novcmber 1998.
nrcntan'Assemblr of the Council of Europe
1: Intentatronal f{eraltl'[-rtbLtne. -t March 1999.
har o got the uppcr hand The moderates rn thc
HDZ are norr isolatcd. but increasing socral dis-
content and a numbcr of scandals in the HDZ
har e lcd to a sharp decline in popr.rlar support for
the govcrnrng part)'
123 Dunng the s'ar in Bosnra and Herzc-
gorina. thc Croatian Dofence Mrnrstn' (MORH)
plavcd an important role in secretlv helprng to
meet Croatia s annamcnt rcqulrcments and sc[
\\eapons produced bt' Croatran anns manufbc-
turers to othcr countries. The Defence Nlinrstn'
also prolrdcd the Bosnian Croats and thcrr amred
forces u'rth srgnificant asscts When thc hardlrnc
Dcfcncc Mrnrster Susak dred rn Mar I99tt. he
\\as succeedcd bv Andrqa Hcbrang. u'ho in-
tended to reform and rationalisc the Mrrustn' rn
order to adapt it to peacctimc rcqulremcnts Thrs
plan met u'rth strong resrstance from the Herze-
gor rnran lobbr rn the HDZ supportcd bi' thc
hardline Ivrc Pasalic. Prcsrdent Tud.;man's ad-
r,lser on intemal affarrs. and the President him-
sclf Frnalll'. Defence Minrster Hebrang uas
forced to rcsign rn October 1998
124 October 1998 also salv the resrgnatron of
Mr Sarinrc as Head of the presrdential office and
Mr GregLrric as presidcntial advrser on Bosnia.
These important and relatn'el1' moderate HDZ
members had allegcd that the mrlitan' counter-
rntclhgence sen,ice (SIS) had been uscd as a
polrtical rnstrument b1 the partl's rrght uing. but
th*' ucre rcpudrated b1' the HDZ whcn thev
could not providc concrete proof of their allcga-
tions
125 Opinion polls s ould appear to suggest that
a coalrtron of srx opposrtion partics u'ould stand
a chance of defeating the HDZ in the 1999 elec-
tions. An electoral victorl' for them mav har,'c
posltl\ e consequences for Bosnra and Herze-
govina becausc of their morc constnrctivc attr-
tude tolr-ards their neighbour
126. Desprte the cntrcrsm contamed in manv
reports as regards developments in Croatra and
thc bchariour of its govornmcnt. both the EU and
the Unrtcd States appear to temper therr judg-
ment of Croatia's Prcsrdcnt Tudjman on the
grounds that his cooperation rs vital to SFOR
operations in Bosnia. Westcrn countries are also
concerned that crrticism. rf too harsh- uould help
hardliners in the HDZ to get the upper hand in
thcrr struggle agarnst the moderates in the partv
I
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ovcr \\'ho is to succeed Mr Tudlman as party,
leader.
127 Finallr'. one posrti\ c devclopment that
should be mentroned is landmrnc clearance.
u,hich mav hclp restore normalitr bv removrng
another obstacle to thc return of refugees.
I28 A request from the Europcan Councrl for a
WEU actron force to remove landmtnes has bccn
approved b1' the WEU Councrl. Thc correspond-
mg agrecment. \\hlch *'as signed in Brussels on
22 April 1999. between the WEU Socretan'-Gen-
eral. thc Permancnt Rcprcsentative of Germanv
and thc Forcrgn Mrruster of Croatia defines the
main task of the WEU Demtrung Assistance
Mission rn Croatia as asslstance and advicc to
the appropnate authorities Thc Council has des-
ignated Sl'edcn as the pilot natron for the prolect
129 Thrs WEU russlon. rrhich startcd rvork on
l0 Mar 1999- urll last for tcn months. It conststs
of nrne military e\perts fiom thc fblloriing coLrn-
tnes Austria. Belgium. Bulgaria. Frnland.
France- Germanl'. Italv and the lcad nation Su'e-
dcn. Thesc c\pcrts providc advice. technrcal
exportise and traulng support to the Croatian
Minc Action Ccntrc (CROMAC).
VII. Hungarl,
130 Of thc three neu' NATO membcrs. Hun-
garv undoubtcdll' finds itself ur the most dehcate
position. Onlv a feu ueeks after loining NATO.
thc Alhance 
- 
and Hungan,rvrth rt 
- 
has become
engagcd rn an armed confltct against its southern
neighbour Although not bound to it b1' ties of
rehgion or traditronal frrendsllp as othcr coun-
tries in tlio rcgion arc. rt ts nonethcless linkcd to
Serbia b1'geographr and through some 300 000
cthnic Hungarians. uho livc in the Serbian rcgion
of Volr'odrna. Thc plight of thrs large mrnont\'.
rnr,'olved in the conflrct both as recruits of thc
Sgrbran am1\' u1 Kosor,o and as victims 
- 
accl-
dental or othenvise 
- 
of intensive NATO bomb-
rng. rs naturalll' of caprtal importancc to Hun-
gary s attrtude Thus the Hungarian Forcign
Mrnister expressed hrs countn"s dtstress at thc
NATO bombing of the Vo.p'odinan toun of Sub-
otrca rrhrch has a mainlv Magrar populationrt
Nlorcor,cr. the Hungartan Govcmment. having
readrlv agrecd to the usc of its airspace b1'
)"'l he llconotttt.st.2l Apnl 1999
NATO u'arplanes and its military bascs bv
NATO forccs. has refuscd to allol' Hunganan
soldiers to be rnvolved in thc operations. Nonc-
thelcss. the importance of using Hungarian air-
space from u.hrch NATO AWACS aircraft are
also operaturg is obrior.rs. Speakrng to the press.
tho Commander of Hr,rngan"s armed forces.
General Fcncnc Vegh. confirmed that his countrl'
gn es onh indirect support to NATO in anti-Serb
oporatrons. although Hungarian lo1'alt1' to NATO
should be regarded as unu'ar,cringl'' Dcep an-
xretv for the fatc of the Volrodrna Hungarians.
alongsrde commitment to NATO action. rvas also
expresscd b1' thc Hunganan authorittcs during
the Presrdcnt of the WEU Assemblr''s official
vrsit to the countn on l2-13 Apnl 1999.
131 Rcccntlr'. the Forctgn Minister of Hun-
gan. Jinos Martonvr- declared that "rf tho gen-
cral conditions to attain a sottlernent of the con-
flrct rn Kosor,o arc nret. then the autonom\, of
Vojvodina must bc on the agenda". On the other
hand. thc suggestron about making Volrodrna a
snrall sovercrgn state u'as rclectcd br thc gor -
emmentl'.
l-12 Hou'ever. strong support u'as also cx-
prcssod for Europc's efforts to resolve the cur-
rent conflrcts and lav the foundattons of lasting
peace and stabilrtl rn the rcgton. This policl' of
suppo(rng NATO urthout partrcrpating ln Atr
strikcs on Yugosla\la \\as agatn cotrfirmed bv
the Hungarran Pnmc Minister at the begrnrung of
Mo)'t'
133 N{oreover. in carlr April a largclv Russtan
corl\ov tnrng to pass through Hungarian tcrri-
tory to deliver ard to Serbia \\'as blocked b1 the
Hungarran authonties. uho in the cnd alloucd it
to cot-rtrnue to lts dcstrnation u'ith lust the appro-
priatc quantrtl' of fllel needed for the convov to
travcl to Belgrade and back home agam.
l3-+. On -i Mar. NATO amounced that tt
uould deplor- 24 F-ltl combat aircraft and a
number of KC-13-5 reflrclhng aircraft and C-130
transport arrcraft. Thc aircraft rrould start to
arrive on l0 Ma1'at thc Taszar airbase (90 kilo-
metrcs from the FRY) u'hrch is thc logistic basc
for the US troop contingent rn Bosnta srncc 1995.
1" 7he Il all Street.lttrrrnal. 26 Apnl 1999
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135 The Hunganan Ministry of Forergn Af--
fairs stated at that time that "no Hunganan sol-
dier u ould go into Yugoslav territon . not even rn
the framervork of a peacekeepmg effort"rr The
opposrtion Socralist partv announced its rntentron
to table a motion in parliament u'hich uould limit
NATO access to Hunganan mrlitan'bases.
VIII. FYROM
I36 As earlier developments in FYROM l'ere
highhghted in reccnt Assemblv reports. the fol-
loling paragraphs concentrate on the more re-
cent developmcnts in this multi-cthnrc state.
137 Parhamentan, electrons u'erc held on 18
October and I Novernber l99tl. Thesc elections
rcsulted in 49 seats for the lnternal Macedonian
Revolutionan' Organrsation 
- 
Democratrc Partv
for Macedonian Natronal Unrtr' (VMRO-
DPMNE) led b1' Llubco Georgin ski. 13 scats
for thc Dcmocratrc Alternative (DA) lcd bv Vasil
Tupurkovskr- 27 seats for the Social Democratrc
Union of Macedonia (SDSM) led bv the formcr
Primc Mrnister. Branko Cn,enkovskr- l4 for thc
Partv of Dcmocratrc Prosperrtr'. an cthnlc Alba-
nian partl' led bl,Abdurrahman Alrtr *hich had
been rn a govemmcnt coalition uith the SDSM
for the past six t'ears. and ten for the Democratic
Partv of Albanrans (DPA) led bv Arben Xhaferi.
The Liberal Democratic Partr' (LDP) u'on four
seats
138 The netv government. a coalrtion in ivhrch
the VMRO-DPN{NE has l.l ministers. rncluding
Prrme Minister Georgievski. the DA eight mrnis-
tcrs and the DPA f-rvs. *'as given a vote of confi-
dence b1' the parliament on 30 November l99tl
139. Prime Minrster Georgrer,'skr has grven two
reasons for including the ethnrc Albanran DPA in
the government coalition. In the first place- it u'as
to demonstrate that FYROM is determrned to
become a factor for stabilrtv in the regron and
stop being a sublect of concern to the interna-
tional commurutl, Secondlr'. this step rvas takcn
to secure intcrnal stabilrtv and securitr'.
140. In FYROM, top prioritv issues for the
present go\ernment are the status of the etluric
Albanians. economlc reform and reconstructlon
and the reform of social u-elfare. but it seems
likeh' that rt uill not dcal seriouslv nith thcse
rssues until after the presrdenttal electrons in
1999 Local electrons are planned for the rcar
2000
(o) Economy
l4l. Economrc reform and reconstruction is
clearly the main issue for the present govcrn-
ment. In mid-1998. the unemplovment rate was
28'/o and untrl nou' thcre has been no foreign
investment of anv srgnrficance The Prrmc Minrs-
ter has promised that the pnvatlsattons brought
in under thc prerrous go\ernmcnt rrrll be re-
vrewed. There have been allegations that fa-
vouritism- cronvism and corruptron have plaved
a maJor role in such prrratisatrons
142 Accordurg to the ne\\' goverrrment. the
sharcs of companres u'hich do not fulfil thcir
obligatrons tou'ards the state rvill be floated on
the stock market. public utilrtv companies rvrll be
prn'atised and privatisation rvill be made more
attractive to foreign capital. The gol'emmcnt has
pledged to bring the unemplovment rate dolrn to
l5o/o in 2002 by reducing public spending in
ccrtaln fields and bv stimulatrng economic der.el-
opment.
143 Bv creatmg a better legal frameu'ork- re-
ducrng tax. cracking doun on corruption and
extending o"lnership guarantees. the government
hopes to be able to attract more foreign rnvest-
ment Frghttng corruption in government and
rndustn' uill be impossible u'rthout putting an
end to the practice of polrtrcal tar,ourrtism and
cronvism u'hich seems to be such an cndemrc evil
in the Balkans that it rs I irtuallv rmpossible to
stamp it out. The government's Plan for Recon-
struction and Development rs supen'ised bv an
Agencl' for Reconstruction and Developmcnt.
headed bi Vasil Tr.rpurkovski.
144. In order to achreve economlc rcconstruc-
tron. thc govcrnment u.ill also have to make
major rmprovements in the countn"s rnfrastmc-
ture u'hich at the moment is senoush'dcficrent
145 FYROM has had problems in dercloprng
its economv since independence This is partlr.
due to the reluctance of the government to intro-
duce legislation u'hrch could attract forcign tn-
l'estors and make the cconomic reforms uhich
are badlr needed in the field of pnvatrsatron and
banking Senous economrc problcms have also
been caused b1' the rnternatronal economic em--" Le -\Ionde.7 Mar 1999
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bargo agarnst the Federal Repubhc of Yugosla-
via (FRY) and b1 a similar embargo rmposcd b1'
Greece because of a dispute over the name. flag
and constrtr"rtron of the countn'. Both thcse coun-
tnes have alu'avs been FYROM's most lmpor-
tant trading partners.
l-16 The Greek economic cmbargo cnded rn
Scpternber 1995 u'hen FYROM and Greece
srgned an lntenm agrcement on the abovc-
mentioned &spute In March 1999. Grccce and
FYROM agrced to build a pipcline to carn'crude
oil fiom the Grcek port of Thessalonrka to a re-
fincn' near FYROM's capital. Skopje At the
same time. Grcek companles bought a maloritr'
stako m FYROM's state-ou'ned oil refincn and
are to invest in rts modernrsation. (The pipelinc
sill later be cxtendcd to Belgrade ) Thrs US$
l-i0 million pipeline prolect u'ill be the brggest
forctgn invcstment in FYROM since rt bccame
rndcpcndent 
'n 
1 u9 l:'.
147 The conflict in Kosoro and thc resultrng
intcrnational economic embargo against the FRY
are. hos'ever. causlng ven' senolls economic
problerns fbr FYROM. The FRY used to be
FYROM's most lmportant trading partner but
bccause of the cmbargo and thc fightrng rn
Kosoro- economic exchanges betrveen the trro
countrics havc come to a complcte standstill. Tlic
govemment of FYROM also notes that thc marn
translt route for lts export goods to rvestcrn
Europe through the FRY has bcen closed. rvhrlc
alternatrre routes are longer. nrore expensive and
therefore not fbasible for most of FYROM's
erport trade. Experts argue that the modest eco-
nomlc groi,rth originallr forecast for 1999 urll in
actual fact turn out to be lnto a recession of pos-
srblv l0% of GDP
148. Factones are closmg dou-n through lack of
rau-materials and sales. and the state treasun is
depleted because of lorver tax revenues and un-
erpected costs due to the accommodation of a
huge mflux of relirgees from Kosovo Pensrons
and salaries of public servants and statc-ou'ned
companv u'orkers are being paid nith arrcars and
there is even less lnoncv for social benefits and
public health
149 According to some cstrmates. the economrc
recesslon ma1, alreadt'have resulted in an unem-
plormcnt rato of -10-50'7o:a All these negatl\e
dcvelopments arc callslng drssatrsfactron among
thc populatron u'hrch could easrlv turn into socral
unrest rf no appropriate measurcs are takcn.
combined u'ith generous and raprd financial and
technical support from abroad and in particular
from rvestern Europcan countncs.
(b ) Int er-ethn ic r el ati t m s
150 So far. thc new government has not un-
rerled its plans for the status of the Albanian
nlnont\'. The Primc Minrster has pledged to
"confront all expressions of mtolcrance. chauvrn-
rsm and segregatlon" and has sard that his ulti-
mate goal is to protect both the ethnrc and cul-
tural rdentitv of natronal murontres and the in-
tcgrlt\ of the state. The government plans to
comph uith all international requirements re-
gardrng human rrghts and crvil libertres
151 The main dcmands of the DPA's polrtrcal
lcader. Arbcn Xhaferi. regarding the status of
Albanians have aluavs been that ethnic Albani-
ans be recognrsed as a constitucnt natlon and that
tho' bc grven the right to tuitron rn therr oun
language at all lerels. In addrtron. he u'ants Al-
banian to be rntroduced as a sccond offrcral lan-
guage and ethnrc Albanrans to be gln,en propor-
tronal representation at all levels of the state ad-
ministration. including in the pohce. armed forces
and the management of public enterpnses.
152 The first demand for the Albanrans to be
recognised as a constitucnt nation is certainll thc
most difficult to ftilfil and mav prove impossrble
In the preanrble to the curront constitutron. Mac-
edonia is defined as a "national state of the Mac-
edonian pcople. rn u-hrch fulI equalitl' as citizens
and permanent co-cxistence u'ith the Macedonian
people is prouded for Albanrans. Turks. Wala-
chrans. Roms. and other nationalitics lnrng in the
Repubhc of Macedonia" An1' proposal to change
the constitution to meet the Albanians' demand
u'ould be critrcised bv the other minorrties and br'
the Maccdonian maloritr
153 A proposal to accord to Albanian thc
status of a second officral languagc nill most
probablv nreet rvith srmilar largc-scale resistance.
According to Articlc 7 of the Constitution of
FYROM- minontv languages can currenth' be
rr International Crisis Group, "-\Ioceclotua
tle.stabrlrsahon) ", 77 Mav 199923 Ftnonctal Ttnte.t. l7 March 1999.
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used alongside Macedonian at a local level rn the
state admrnrstratron rvhere cthnrc minortties con-
strtutc thc maloritv or a signrficant minorttv of
thc populatron. The rntroduction of Albanran as a
second official language at all lerels mav bc
lustrfied for rcasons of stabilrtr in the countn.
but rt mrght also pose considcrable problems for
an alreadv top-heav1 bureaucracr
15.1 Thc issue of flr'ing mrnoritr' flags. uhrch
rn June 1997 led to serious clashes in Gostrvar
and Tetovo- has lost much of rts rmportance in
the hght of a recent Constrtutronal Court ruling.
On 18 Novcmber 1998. the Court rulcd that the
June 1997 lau- strpulating that rninontr. flags
could be floun on public burldings onh' on cer-
tarn public holidavs and alongsrde tho Macedo-
nran flag- u'as not in hne rr,rth the natronal Con-
strtution or the Europcan fiamerrork convcntion
for thc Protectron of National Minonties. Cur-
renth. the displav of flags other than the natronal
flag of FYROM on pubhc buildrngs rs not regu-
lated b1 anv legislatron.
l-5-i In Dcccmber l99tt. the parhament passed
an anmestv brll uhich made rt possrble to rclease
the mavors of Gostivar and Tetovo and other
ethnrc Albanran polrtrcrans fiom pnson in earlv
1 e99
l-r6 Ethnic Albanians consider unir,'ersity tui-
tron in therr orvn language a kev to achierrng
social and cconomrc pantv urth thc Macedoruan
majoritr'. At present. the natronal universitv in
Skoplc onlv offers education in the Albanian lan-
guagc in rts Pedagogical Facultt' rn ordcr to train
teachers for Albanran-language pnman' and sec-
ondan schools In December 1994. the ethnic
Albanians founded thcrr ou'n unn.ersrtv ln Tc-
tovo- n'hrch is not rccognrsed bl' the government
but uliich contrnues to operatc Thc new' gov-
ernment has not vet made anv proposals regard-
ing the ethnic Albanian univcrsiti- but on 30
Novembr;r 1998 the Primc Minrster declared that
rt uould "create conditions to open foreign fac-
ultrcs u ithout the partrcipatron and financial
support of thc statc as rs done in the highlv de-
vclopcd countnes". The ethnic Albanrans. hou'-
er er. continuc to demand that therr Tetovo uni-
vcrsitv bc legallr recognised as a state unil'ersitv
end there arc reports that thrs mal' happen after
tho prcsidentral elcctions schcduled for autumn of
I 999
l5 7 Proportronal reprcsentation of cthnic Al-
banians rn thc state adminrstration of FYROM
and rn state-ouned and public cnterpnses ls an
lmportant issue and mceting this ethnic Albanian
request sccms justified. not lcast because its im-
plemcntation could hclp to defuse tonsions and
promote stabilrtr in the countn Nevertheless-
immcdiate full irnplementation u ill not bc casv
The public sector is alreadv too big and anr' fur-
ther extensron u'ould lead to increased spcnding
uhich the stato carmot afford. Thc government.
houever. is auare of the problem and is appoint-
ing cthnic Albanians to rmportant and sensitive
positions such as thc Police Chief in Tetovor5.
I58. AlthoLrgh Albanran politrcians in FYROM
naturallv shou solidaritr *hen it comes to tho
fate of the Kosovar Albanians in their conflict
ruth tlic govcrnment of Serbia. ther- have little
srmpathv fbr thc idea of a "Greater Albanra".
Albanians rn FYROM are uell a\\are that thev
fbrm the most prosperous Albanran communitl
in thc region. Thc DPA has grven up its threat to
declare autonom\ and seek union u'ith Albanra.
As part of the centre-right coalitron government.
uhich has publrcll' plcdgcd to promotc cqualitv
for the cthnic Albanians. it rs confident of
achieving progress on the rssue of autonomv as
regards language. edncation and local govern-
ment.
(c) Foreign relutions
1-59 For obvious reasons. the accesslon of
FYROM to the European Union and NATO can
onlr be r long-ternr objcctire
160. Before Jornrng thc EU. the countn' u'ould
have to undertake rnaJor economic and legal re-
forms and fllrther improve rclations s'rth Greece.
As regards NATO. some progress is being made
as a result of FYROM's active participation in
NATO's Partnership for Peace programme Be-
cause of rts strategic posltlon in the rcgion. the
cxtraction forcc for the Kosovo Verification
Mrssron uas dcplovcd on FYROM territon'.
NATO forces arc also deplol'ed on its ternton in
preparation for a possible militan, force to con-
trol the implemcntatron of an agreement betrveen
the government of thc Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Kosovar Albanrans.
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l6l. As regards relations \\,rth thc neighbouring
countries- Mr Georgierski's govcrnment has
promised a balanced regional polio' based on
friendlv relatrons and close cooperation rvith all
four ncighbours. Duc to the present politrcal
srtuation. horvevor. relations u ith Bulgana and
Greece may'lvell bccome logrcal prionties.
Btlgona
162. Whcn FYROM became rndependent in
1991. Bulgaria uas one of the first to recognrse
its existence as an indepcndent state although. at
that trme. rt drd not rccognise the Macedonian
people or language. u'hich rt considered to be a
uest Bulgarian dialect. Bulgaria and FYROM
put an end to nran\'\rears of drssension over their
rcspective national languages shcn. on 22 Feb-
ruar1' 1999. the Bulgarian Prime Minister. Mr
Kostor'. and thc Pnme Mrnister of FYROM. Mr
Georgievski. signed a declaratron to the cffect
that nerther countn, has anv terrrtorial clarms
agarnst the other The declaratron rs drafted in
tlvo languages. Bulganan and Maccdonian. indi-
catmg that Bulgaria has implicitlv recognised the
Macedonian Ianguagc.
163. The joint declaratron uas accompanred br
a number of agreements on oconomrc and finan-
cral cooperation. the construction of motonravs.
other infrastructure prolects and rnilitary coop-
eratron.
Greece
164. Good rclations urth Greece arc of utmost
importance for FYROM, not onlv becausc thel'
can help dcvelop thc natronal econom\'. but also
because Greece is the onll' nerghbounng countn'
rrhich is a full mcmber of both the EU and
NATO. An interim agreement betuecn FYROM
and Grcece u'as signed in September 1995 in
uhich Greece undertook to hft its economic em-
bargo u'hile FYROM agreed to change rts flag
and natronal emblem. It also agreed to amend the
preamble to its Constitution. rvhrch referred to a
Greater Macedonia. and Articlc 7 referring to
FYROM's commitment to protcct Macedonran
national minorrties livurg rn other Balkan coun-
tries
165. The UN-brokered negotiations on a ne\\'
namc for the Republic of Macedonia. uhich
Greece refuses to rccognrse- havc not vet rcsultcd
in an agreement. but there arc slgns that a
breakhrough mav be reached ven' soon
Albaruct
166 According to the prescnt go\,ernment.
FYROM's rclations lith Albanra are rn good
shape- especrallv smce the sociahst govcrnment
under Pnme Minister Nano took over from the
Democratic Partl' and Presidcnt Berrsha stcpped
doun. This positive trend contrnucd aftcr NIr
Nano rl'as succeeded b1' Mr Pandeli Majko
More than 14 bilateral agreements harc nou,
been concluded, rncluding agreements on thc
rccognition of a common bordcr and on economrc
cooperation. It u.as emphasised. houcvcr. that
Albanra still needs more internatronal support
and assrstance to control its borders and the
countn' as a u-hole. The Gor ermnent of FYROM
sharcs the Albanian Government's opinion that a
solution to the status of the Albanian minoriti in
FYROM should be found uithin the cxrstrng
borders.
Th e I;e cl e ra I lle puh I i c o.f' Yu go s I avt a ( FRI' )
167. Relatrons with the FRY are at a lou The
common border betu'een FYROM and thc FRY
has strll to be delineated and desprte the fact that
talks have been going on for man\' \'ears. a final
ssttlement is not expccted rn the near fliturc
168. The deplol'ment of NATO's extraction
force and of more NATO troops for a possible
peacekeeprng operation rn Kosovo has lcd to a
further detenoration in brlateral rclations. At thc
end of February'. the FRY started deplovurg
troops and securitv forces at the border betueen
Kosovo and FYROM. preventmg Kosovar Al-
banians from crossing the border rnto FYROM.
and it \\as apparentll' prepared to stop anv at-
tempt br. NATO forces to cross the border rnto
Kosovo. The marn road betu'een Pristina and
Skopje u'as closed and mined at the border. The
Serb communitv in FYROM has protested
stronglv over FYROM's policl' of supportrng
NATO
169. Thc events that follouod the start of
NATO air stnkes against thc FRY are onlv too
*'ell-knolvn. The huge numbers of refugecs from
Kosovo u'ho began flooding into FYROM in
earlv March soon increased to dramatrc propor-
tlons. The govcrnment in Belgrade u'as uell
a\\arc that the organrsed deportatron of thc rna-
joritv of the Kosol'ar Albanran populatron could
have a destabrhsing influence on the rnternal
situation in FYROM- especrallv gtven the pre-
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carlous rclatlons bcts'ecn thc ethnic Albanians
and the Macedonrans rn the rcpublic.
170 Suggestions rn the media that the govem-
mcnts of FYROM and the FRY had a secret
agrecment on the flou of refi"rgees cannot be
gil'eu credcncc if onll' becausc thc government of
FYROM u'ould lose rts credrbilitl both inside the
colultn' and rn rts rclatrons urth the countries
from uhich rt expscts support and assistance
(d) Refugees in FYROM
17 | In carlv l9c)9. the Govemment of FYRON{
took steps to regularise the srtuation of Albanian
refugees from Kosovo uho had crossed thc bor-
der after vrolcncc cruptcd in March 1998. In
Fobruary 1q99. the golcmment announced that
all persons comlng from Kosovo should register
urthin l5 davs at the local offices of the Ministn
of the Intcrror Those rcglstcnng u'ould rcccir e
an rdcntitr card confirming humanitanan pro-
tcctcd status for thrce months- urth the possibrl-
itv of an e\tenslon Thc government also stated
that rt could temporanlv handlc up to 20 000
rcftlgces fronr Kosovo Rcccptron ccntres u'ould
be set up at the bordcr. fiom uhrch pcoplc uould
be transferred to othcr destinations The Gor,-
emment provrdcd fi.rnds for accommodatron.
u'hrlst food and clothrng n'erc provided b1' the
LNHCR and othcr humanitarian agencies
172 Thc Ministn of the Intcrior cstimates that
in l99fl some 6 000 Kosor,'ar Albanians fbund
sholter rn FYRON{. Nlost of thoso rvho crossed
the bordcr rnto FYROM ucre able to find shelter
u'ith relatives Thev intended to return to therr
orur countn'as soon as the situation stabilised.
173. Thc srtuatron rn earlv 1999. u'hich thc
govemment of FYROM u'as able to manage on
lts o\\n. took a dramatrc turn in March u'rth thc
dctermrned pohcl' of thc FRY to track doun and
deport thc malontv of the Kosovar Albantan
populatron to ncrghbounng countnes. Refugees
started to pour in bv tens ofthousands.
174. On 2 June 1999. LINHCR estinrated that
refi:gces uho had entered FYROM since March
l99tt and silll remamed in the countn'numbered
241t.100. rcprescntrng more than ll% of the
population Of thrs number. 109 800 \\'ere ac-
commodated in camps. rvhrlc an cstrmated
138 600 u'erc lrvrng uith host famrlies and clse-
rr.hcre
l7-5 In earlv Mar'. thc FYROM govemment
authoritrcs dcclarcd that thel' uould continue to
allou rn a number of refugees equal to the num-
ber to bc evacuated to thrrd countries, In re-
sponsc to these repeated and urgent rcquests of
tho FYROM Govemment. tiNHCR estabhshed a
humanrtanan er acuation programme ri.hich en-
ables refi-rgces to find tcmporan acconrmodation
in third countrics Under thrs programme.
LTNHCR has bcen offercd 137 000 places in 40
countries. Br' 2 June. a total number of 75 231
reftrgccs had lcft FYROM for thrrd countrics
176 Thcre has been frictron betueen the gor-
ernment authoritrcs and tlie rntcrnational humani-
tanan organrsatrons or-er the constmctron of
camps and the lack of comprehensron about the
urgcnt nceds of the countn' and FYRON{'s pol-
ro of keeprng the finell' draun cthnrc balance
under control
177 The prospect of a peace settlcmcnt as ac-
cepted b1' Presrdcnt Nlilosevrc on 3 June. hou'-
erer. urll no doubt ease thc tension and pave the
u'av for activrtics in readiness for the reftlgees'
return to therr orvn homes in Kosovo.
178. On 
-i N'[ai' 1999. a meeting uas held in
Paris betseen donor countnos. rnternational rn-
stitutions and representativcs of the Gorernmcnt
of FYRONI in order to examlne the countn's
cconomlc problems as a result of thc conflict rn
Kosovo.
179 Frnance Nhnister Borrs Stolmenor,' o.\-
plarncd that the massrve influx of refugees and
the near total cessatron of commercial exchanges
rvrth the FRY. s'hrch reprcsentcd 709/o of
FYROM's total trade- had caused huge econornic
problems for hrs countn'. He noted that for 1999.
there uas a trade defrcrt of €340 mrlhon and a
budget deficrt of €170 mrlhon. or 4 59,a of GNP
He estimatcd that for thrs I'ear alone. FYROM
sould necd €-1.10 mrllion Recognising that the
Parrs Club had alreadv agrecd to a rcneu'ablc
one-\'ear suspellslon of forergn dcbt rnterest. hc
asked for further concesslorls
180 At the Paris mcctrng. the rnternational
communrtv pledged Lrrgcnt financial ard of €235
million. committing itself to lncrcasc thrs aid to
€365 mrlhon dunng the vear. rn order to help
FYROM copc ruth thc thrcat of cconomrc reces-
sron and problems rn the balance of pavmcnts lt
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is important for FYROM to reccrve this financral
aid at short notice
(e) Association with tlte Europeun Union
Ittl On 15 and 16 February 1999. a govorn-
ment delegation from FYROM under Prime
Minister Georgrevskr had discussrons uith the
Presrdcnt of the EU Commtssion. Jacques Santer-
and Commissioner Hans ran den Broek. Prtme
Mrnrster Georgievskr urged them to speed up thc
process to grant FYROM association status and
rndicated that his goverrunent u'as readl' to re-
solve the problems that u'ere of concern to the
EU- such as the higher education of ethnrc Alba-
nians and democratrsation of thc media
I82. Rclations betrveen the EU and FYROM
are bascd on a cooperation agreernent uhich
came into force on I January 1998. Srnce thcn.
FYROM has often cmphasrsed tts desire to start
accesslon negotiatrons as soon as possible. At its
meeting on 5 March 1999. the EU-FYROM Co-
operation Council exprcssed the u'ish to upgrade
relations betueen thc EU and FYROM and on 8
March 1999 Prime Mrnrster Georgievski asked
the European Commission President. Mr Santer.
to grant his country the status of assoctate w'tth a
vior to future accesslon to thc EU as a full
member.
183. In thrs context. thc European Parliament
has referred to the positive rolc plaved br'
FYROM in the region. in particular thc rm-
provement in relations sith Bulgaria. Greece and
Albania and its valuable coopcration u-rth botli
the OSCE and NATO in therr efforts to find a
solution to the conflict in Kosol'o.
184. More rccenth'- discusstons on relations
betrveen FYROM and thc EU u,ere given an
entirelr'new perspective through the EU initiative
for a Stabrli[, Pact for south-eastern Europe
u'hich is under consideratton at the moment.
(10 United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
(UNPREDEP)
185 Until February 1999. FYROM's border
u rth the Federal Repubhc of Yugoslavra \\.as
monitored b1'the United Nations Preventir,'e De-
plovment Forcc (UNPREDEP). consisting of 350
US troops. 350 mrlitan, from the Nordic coun-
trrcs. 50 Indonesian engineers and 35 military
observers under Russian command. Its mandate-
onginalll'due to explre on 3l August 1998 las
extended to Februan' 1999 and Denmark- Fin-
land. Nonral'and Sucdcn dcplot'ed a 3O0-strong
unit as a reinforcement. UNPREDEP's mandatc
prcvcnted it from intervenrng in cases of arms
trafficking or illcgal border crossings but all
rnformation it received \\.as comrnunicated to UN
headquarters.
186. At the end of Februan' 1999. Chrna vetoed
the prolongation of the LNPREDEP mission.
u'hrch lcd to thc end of its mandate. LINPREDEP
nas created on I I Decembcr 1992 b1' virtue of
LlN Socurity Councrl Resolutron 795 and startcd
its mrssron rn Januan' 1993.
187. China's veto in the LIN Secuntv Council is
one of the consequences of the recognition of
Tarrvan b1'the neu FYROM Govcmmcnt under
Pnme Minister Georgrevskr. rn exchange for pro-
mrses of investment bv Taruan China has also
severed its diplomatic rclations u'ith FYROM.
188 The Govermnent of FYROM recogniscs
that UNPREDEP has plaved an important role in
prer.'enting anv spillovcr of the conflrct in former
YLrgoslavia. It takes the vieu'that LINPREDEP's
departure has been offset b1' the massir,e pres-
cnce of NATO troops on FYROM's ternton
because of the crisis in Kosovo. It also thinks
that this presence ri'rll facilitate FYROM's rnte-
gration rnto NATO.
IX. Kosovrt
(0) The Rambouillet negotiutions
189. Soon after the conclusion of an agrcement
bct*ecn American envo\'fuchard Holbrooke and
Presidcnt Milosevic on 25 October lc)98rn- rt
became clear that Presrdent Milose'r'ic \\.as un-
urlhng to implement it u'hrle the KLA continued
rts operations agalnst Serb targets. provokmg
e\ren more disproportronate reactions. Thc Scrbs
continued to deplov neu' regular units in Kosol'o.
leaving hear.r' \\'eapons under the responsrbilrtr
of Serb police officers
190. The massacre bv Serb forces of some .10
Kosovar Albanians in the village of Racak on l5
January r'vas a further turning point in the
Kosovo cnsrs r,vhich strengthened the Contact
ro See Assernbly Documeut
Rapporteur: Mr Baurnel.
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Group's determrnatiou to dcal decrsivclr uith
rtlT
l9l NATO scnt both SACEUR. Gcncral
Weslel' Clark. and the head of the Nlihtan'
Conrmrttec- General Klaus Naumann. to Bel-
grade rn order to convev a strong mcssage to
Presrdcnt Miloscvrc concernrng NATO resolr'e in
the Kosovo cnsrs Thc generals came back to
Bmssels emptr'-handed and drsappointed at Pres-
rdent Mrloserrc's intransigent position NATO
took flirthcr mcasurcs. enabhng it to launch air
strikes u'ithrn 48 hours of a decisron to take
actron. cmphasrsrng hou'ever that mrlrtan' action
could not rn rtsclf provide a solution and that anr
rctron should be part of a clearlv defined polrtrcal
strategr'.
192 On 28 Januan'. thc NATO Permanent
Council issr"red a ne\\' uaming to Belgrade and
thc Kosovar separatrsts- urglng them to ccasc
hostrlrtres and pro'v'ocatlon and start ncgotiatrons
qurckh urth a r ieu' to a transrtional polrtrcal
solution that uould offer a more fbvorable status
for Kosoro. presen'e the territorial rntegntv of
the FRY and maintarn the nghts of all cthnic
grollps
193 On 29 Januan,. the Contact Group sum-
moned representatives of the Kosolar Albanrans
and the Govcmments of the FRY and Serbia to
negotratiorrs rn Rambourllet startrng on 6 Fcbru-
an'. to cstabhsh a statutc of substantial auto-
nomv for Kosovo These negotiatrons- under the
charrmanshrp of the Forcign Mrnisters of France
and the Unrted Kingdom. and ri'ith the drrect
rnl'olvement of the Contact Group. tvere to har c
becn concluded u'ithin seven dar.s The rosults
u'ere then to be communrcated to the Contact
Group lrhich. dependrng on progress. could al-
lou' a fr-rrthcr penod of up to one ueek to brrng
the negotrations to a successful conclusion. It
n'as later confirmed that there u-ould be three
mediators rnrolved rn the ncgotiations: the US
Ambassador to FYROM. Chrrstophcr Hill. the
Austrian Ambassador. Wolfgang Petntsch. rep-
tt The FRY Governmcnt clnimed that the dead uere
armcd etluuc Albanian separatists or cir rhans accid-
entallr caught rn crossfire the betrvecn governntent
secunt) forccs and separatist rebels. Hol'ever. an e\anl-
rnatlon camcd out bv a terun of mdependent Finrush
foreusrc e\perts. pubhshcd on 17 N1arch 1999. lbund
that the vrctlms l'ere unarmed ciuhans. executcd rn an
orgarused massacre
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resentlng thc EU. and Russra's rcpresentative on
Kosovo. Bons Mat'orskt'
194 The Contact Group demanded- rnter alra.
that the FRY meantrme stop all offensive actions
and rcpression rn Kosoro- complr fi"rllr' trith the
agreemcnts rrith the OSCE and NATO srgncd in
October 1998. promote the safe return of all
thosc uho had bcen forced to flee therr homes
and coopcrate u ith humanrtarian re lief agencies
and NGOs Thc Contact Group ernphasrsed that
compliance urth UN Secuntv Councrl Rcsolu-
trons 1160. ll99 and 1203 also apphed to the
Kosovar Albanrans and condemned all proroca-
tion bv the KLA
19,5. Thc Contact Group's efforts \\'cre sup-
portcd bl the UN Securitv Councrl On 30 Jan-
uan. NATO gave its full support to tho Contact
Group's strategv of negotlatrng an interim
polrtical settlement. At the same tlme. it stated rt
uas readt' to take uhatever mcasures \\'ere ncc-
essan' to ensurc both partres' compliance *'rth
intcmatronal commitments and requirements In
order to speed up the decrsion-makrng process
r,r'ith a r reu to mrlrtan' action. the NATO
Permancnt Council agrced that the Secretan-
General could authorise arr strikcs agalnst targets
on FRY tcrriton depending on hou the srtuatron
rn Kosovo and the diplomatic process opencd bt,
the Contact Group evohed Operational plans for
limitcd arr strrkes agalnst Serb targets \\'ere
updated. At the same time. NATO urtensificd its
discussrons on scffing up a ground force to be
deplol,cd on the territon' of Kosovo in support of
a peace scttlement.
l()6 The Rambouillet plan. as put to the Ser-
bran and Kosorar Albanian delegatlons. includcd
the follou'rng elements u.ith *hich both partics
u'ere meant to comph for a penod of three l'ears
- 
Kosovo u'ould remarn a part of Serbia.
rvhich uould control lts cconom\',
mone\'. defbnce and foreign relatrons.
Serbra rvould reducc its polcc presence
in Kosovo to 2 575 men in dcfined
tasks. rncludrng border control. The
amrv prcsence u'ould be reduccd to
I 500 troops. confined to a fir,e-krlo-
metrc zone along Kosovo's border r.r'rth
Albania and FYROM. under rules cn-
forced bl'ground troops belonging to a
NATO-led rmplemcntatron force.
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local police uould be trained at a rate
of 300 to 400 officers and men monthlv
rn ordcr to pro\ ide a 3 00O-strong force
u rthin a vear Thrs rvould in effect al-
lou'the KLA tighters to takc oler larr-
cnforcemcnt rn therr oun communitics.
KLA fighters u,ould bc required to sur-
rendcr thcrr hearr' \\'eapons to storage
depots under the supen,ision of the
NATO implementatron force and th*'
u'ould be banned fiom carn'rng light
\\'eapons or \\'earlng milrtary' lnslgnla:
- 
Kosoro's populatron u'ould rulc itself
autonomollslv through a 1O0-mcniber
parhamcnt rcpresentmg all communi-
ties and having control orer taxes and a
budget.
there uould be 30 local councrls re-
sponsrblc for rssues such as lau' en-
forcemcnt- schools. nrcdical care and
planning.
thc Koso'"ar Parhament rvould elect a
prcsidcnt uho uould havc thc authontv
to appornt a primc minister.
- 
Kosovo rrould harc rts ounludrcian'.
- 
an international militarl' forcc under
NATO conrmand uould be deplol,ed on
Kosor,ar tcrnton' to control and verif'
the implemcntatlon of the agreement br'
both parties This 25 000 to 30 000-
strong forcc u'ould be marnh' European
but the Unrtcd States uould supposedll'
contributc some 4 000 troops:
the uholc agrcement r,r'ould be revrer,ved
at the cud ofthrce vears.
191 Before the Rambouillet talks started. thcre
*'erc intensn'e drsclrssions bet*een the Unrted
States and Europcans about thc threat or use of
force 
- 
thc option favoured bv the Americans 
-
and thc Europeans preference for diplomacl'. The
distrrbution of responsibilrtres that emerged u'as
for US po\\cr and authont)-to support a peace
confercnce organised bv Europeans
198. The Europeans acknoulcdged that US
rnsistence on possrble militan' intcrvention u'as
u,hat finallr brought Presrdent Mrloser,rc to the
Rambouillet negotiatrng tablc.
199 In the final mn-up to the Rambouillet
talks. US officrals discovered that the UK and
France had failed to include Annex lA. conccrn-
ing a stabilisation force on tlie ground rn Kosovo
to enforce an accord. in the draft peace plan
Thts uas thercfore rncludcd at the last minute
200 Beforc the Contact Group lould agree to
call thc Rambourllet talks a success. the US mc-
dtator. Christopher Hill 
- 
rrho had carher drafted
a plan for autonomv in Kosovo uith the Serbs
and Kosovar Albanians 
- 
\\as to ensure that both
parties accepted all the crucral polnts If thc
Contact Group's Rambouillct rnitiatn'e failed.
the NATO Secretan-Gcneral u'oLrld harc the
authoritv to order air strikes to forcc the partres
to agree. France had originallr proposed that the
NATO Secretan -General seek approval from thc
Contact Croup beforc using force. but the Unrted
States managed to con\ lnce rts alhes that NATO
must not bc sLrbordinated to another polrtical
authorit)'.
201. In Januan' 1999. the US Secretan of
State. Mrs Albright. had told thc Russran Gol-
ernmcnt that the Kosovo cnsis. uhich threatened
to dismpt NATO's Washrngton Summrt. left no
alternative but action
202. On 6 Februan' 1999. almost as soon as
negottations in Rambouillet had bcgun. thc Serb-
ian delegation demanded that the tuo partrcs first
sign an agreemcnt acceptmg ten basrc principles
set ollt b1' the mediators. the most rmporlant
bcrng the "so\erclgntv and tcrntorral uTtegritv of
Serbia and Yugoslavia".
203 Thc Kosor,ar Albanran delegatron insisted
on a ceasefire and deplovment of an intcmatronal
milrtan' force on the ternton' of Kosovo. Thet,
also demandcd that a refcrendum take placc on
indepcndence Undcr the crrcumstanccs. thc nc-
gotiations failed to make much progress The
situatron rvas comphcated b1- the fact that thcre
uas dlsagreement rmong the different sponsors
of thc negotiations as to u,ho sould have thc
ultimate responsibrlih' for implementrng thc
peace agreemcnt. Thc Russian and French Gor -
ernments u'anted thc Contact Group to be rn
overall chargc rvith thc OSCE monitonng com-
phance. and milrtan support provrded bv an
rntcrnatronal tbrce The United States. rrhich uas
prcpared to contribute troops to an rmplementa-
tion force. demanded that thc entirc command
and responsibilrtv be entrusted to NATO. rn r ieu
of the drsastrous dr-ral-kc1' command arrange-
ments for UNPROFOR rn Bosnra.
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201 On I I Fcbman. thc Scrbran Prcsrdent.
Mrlan Mrlutlno\'rc. jorned thc Serbran delegation
uhrch thcn unilaterallv srgned the ten prrncrples
lard doun b1' the Contact Group as the basis for
thc negotrations When- after a rreek of talks. the
ncgotlatrons sccmed to hare stalled. the US Sec-
retan' of Statc. Madclcinc Albnght. decrdcd to
rntcn cnc personallv to tn' and achrcve a break-
through Shc uanted to throu' the ueight of US
credrbilrtr behind the option of NATO air strikes
rf Presrdent Mrloselrc reflrsed to rield. a threat
rrhich Europcan governmcnts had boen lcss
*rlhng to brandish
205 NATO approved thc opcratronal concept
for a possrble ground peacekccping fbrce in
Kosovo of 26 000 troops (KFOR) on 12 Febru-
an'. uhrlo a r.anguard or enabling force of some
6 000 troops. parth'from thc Alhed Raprd Rcac-
tron Corps- u-as alreadv berng assembled. The
enabling force. r.rluch had thc task of prepanng
thc arrrral of KFOR. uas also taskcd to coopcr-
atu u'tth thc Extraclon Forcc ln casc of a general
c\acuatron of tlic OSCE'"'crrfiers from Kosovo
206 The Unrtcd Statcs also focr"rscd on pcr-
suadmg the Kosovar Albanran delegatron to ac-
ccpt a pcacc agrecment allourng Kosovo sub-
stanttal autonomv but not urdependence. u'hrch
the Contact Group membcrs refuscd to support
On 14 February'. thc Contact Group agreed to
give both parties one more ucek 
- 
untrl noon on
20 Fcbruan' 
- 
to rcach agreement on thc thrcc-
)'ear rntennr arrangcment for autonomv for
Kosovo u'ithrn Yugoslar ia Nlcctrng rn Pans on
thc same da1'- the EU Forergn Mrnrsters drscloscd
an ambrtrous plan to help reburld Kosovo and
rescttlc rcfirgees lrth an ard programme uorth
€-i00 milhon oycr thrcc rcars The EU also
rvanted thc World Bank to bccome un'olved rn a
rcconstmction programme for Kosoro. but rec-
ognrsed that rt rvould bo difficult. as Kosor o is
not a sovorcign countn, but a part of Yugoslat'ra
and as such sublect to sanctions and banned fiom
World Bank mcmbership and credrts
207. The Serbian dclegatron continued to raisc
ob.lectrons to political autonom\ fbr Kosoro and
the Serbran President. Mr Mrlutrnovic said the
proposals -'practrcallr rmphed the scparation [of
Kosorol from the state of Serbra"rt Thore rras
also strong opposrtron to the dcplovment of anv
foreign rnrlitan.force rn Kosovo
20ti Thc Kosorar Albanian dolegatron. on the
other hand- rnsisted on more clantr about holdrng
a roferendum on Kosolo's rndcpendence at the
end of thc three-r'ear perrod referred to in the
Rambourllct proposals Thev uere also reluctant
to accept total drsarmament of KLA fighters and
sLrggested rncluding a pror,isron in the agreement
for thc creation of a "national guard'' or '-self-
defence force"- the core of rrhrch could be the
prcsent KLA fighters
209 On 16 Fcbruary'. thc US mcdrator. Chns-
topher Hill. uent to Belgrade to meet Presrdent
Milosevic and told hrm that NATO u'or.rld bomb
hrs countn'rf the FRY dclegatron did not acccpt
the Rambourllet proposals beforc noon on 20
February'. Presrdcnt Milosevic. hou'ever. ro-
maincd adamant. Hc sard that thc FRY's recalci-
trant attitude touards the deplolment of forcrgn
troops in Kosoro \\as supported bv the cntrre
parhament and populatron of the countn' He
\\as con\rnced that the ke1 issue rn terms of a
lastrng solutron rn Kosovo uas "obsen'ance of
thc pnncrple of cqualrtv bctu'cen the natronal
communrtrcs and recognrtron of the territorial
integntr and soverergntv of the Repubhc of
Serbra and tho FRY"r'.
210 The US Govemment rcacted bv scndrng a
fLulhcr 5l u'ar planes. including 12 "Stealth'-
bombers. to Europc rn addrtron to the hundreds
of arrcraft standing readv in theatre to carn ollt
arr stnkes. Thrs morc caused Russran President
Bons Yeltsrn to dcclare publiclv that ho u'ould
not permrt the usc of tbrce bv NATO mrlrtan'
aircraft rf the Rambourllot peace talks farlcd
Russra's Foreign N{rnister. Igor Ivanol. said that
if the talks failed. the onlv altemative sas for the
Contact Group to mect again and continue the
search for a pohtrcal sottlemcnt. because there
could bc no otherr"
211. In this final stagc of the Rambor.rillet ne-
gotrations. cracks \\erc appearing in the Contact
Group's unanimrtr'. Thc Russran medrator Boris
Mavorskv drssociatcd himself and his coutltn'
publich' from anv mrlrtan' presencc rn Kosovo
Hc dcnounced reports that Russra \\as tnrng to
:" Le.\k,tttle.ltt Februalr 1999j" htterndtktnul fleraltl 'fnbune.lg Febnurn' 1999:E Internatt()tlal Llerultt Trtltune.l(r Fcbman 1999
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perslrade Mr Milosevic to accept a NATO force
in Kosovo as -'blatant hcs"'tr
212 On l9 Fcbman'. US mediator Christopher
Hill agarn u'ent to Belgrade. but farlcd to mcet
Presrdent N{ilosevic Thc Prcsident told a C}p-
not delegation tliat NATO stnkes riould not
force Serbia to acccpt "forergn occupation".
adding "rie uill not givc up Kosovo- cven at thc
cost of bombardment"-tr Hasnn Thacr. the chref
KLA delcgate at Rambouillet. u'as allorvod to flr'
to Slovenra and consult rrith hrs 
- 
highlr cnucal
- 
supportcrs
213 On 20 Fcbruary. the Contact Group Mrn-
istcrs. havrng mct the tuo parties and heard the
rcport of thc thrcc medrators. concluded that
maJor progrcss had been made. Th* thought that
a last-ditch cffort to reach an agrcement \\as
lustrfied and postponod thc deadline to 23 Febru-
ary at 15.00
211 The Unrted Statcs rcportedh' agreed to
extend the talks onlr reluctantlr'. relccting the
argumcnts of Europcan alltcs u'ho rvanted a
longer postponement Several Europcan alhcs
had doubts over a bombrng campaign just to give
NATO threats credibilrtrj3.
215. The US Sccretan' of State. Madeleine
Albright. returned to Rambouillct to step up the
prcssure on both srdes. Exasperatcd uith both the
Albanrans and thc Serbs. she sard that NATO
u'ould not carn out its bombrng threat if thc
Albanians continued to insrst on a rcferendum on
rndependence at sorne future date.
216. Under such intense pressure- dn isions
emcrged lr rthrn the Kosor-ar Albanran delegatrorr
and Hasim Thacr tenderod his resignation as
leadcr of thc negotratrng team. but later decrded
not to break thc ranks In Kosovo itself. healry
fightrng betrveen Serb special policc and armr
Lrnits and KLA forces north of the capital Pris-
tina lcd to thc displacement of more than 4 000
Kosovar Albanrans3t
217. Finalh'. on the aftcrnoon of 23 Februan'.
i,rhen the officral deadhnc of 15 00 had alreadl'
passed. the Kosovar Albanran delegation re-
quested a trvo-ueck break in order to consult its
t' linartctol Ttnrcs.79 Febnran' 1999
3t l.l n ancr ol Tnne.s. 2l\-21 Febman 1 999
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"polrtrcal and militan'" base in Kosor o Thc co-
chairmcn announced that the cfforts of thc partics
and mcdrators had led to
"a consonsus on substanttal autonomv for
Kosovo. rncluding on mcchanisms for free
and fair elections to democratrc rnstrtu-
tions. for thc gorcmancc of Kosolo. for
tlre protectron of human riglrts and the
rights of mcmbers of natronal comnruni-
ties- and for the estabhshmont of a farr ju-
drcral systcm."
and added that:
"A polrtical frameu'ork is norr in placc. as
set oLlt rn the Rambourllet Accords and the
groundrvork has thcrebl' been lard for f-r-
nalising the implemcntatron Chapters of
the Agrccment. rncludrng the modalities of
the inr itcd intematronal cn ilian and mrli-
tan-prcsence rn Kosovo It is esscntial that
thc agrccment on thc rnterim accord bc
complctcd and signed as a uhols In thrs
sprnt- thc parties committcd thcmsclvcs to
attend a conferencc. co\ cnng all aspects of
implementatlon. rn Franco on 15 March.
follou'ing consultatrons urth thc partics
and relevant international organisatrons. "
218 Ncrther of thc tu'o parties had signed In a
letter to the Contact Group. thc Albanran sidc
said it could acccpt the draft peace plan subject
to consultatrons iu Kosovo Acccptance of the
peacc plan uas, hou'el,er. dopendcnt on -'rapid
deplorment" of a NATO fbrce and on ''a rcfer-
endum to ascertain the urshes of thc peoplc".
Although the Kosovar Albanran dclcgatron drd
not mention lt rn lts lctter. thc KLA represcnta-
tnes drd not u'ant to see the KLA drsarmcd if
there ucre no bettcr guarantecs for Kosovo's
rndepcndence after three I'ears. The Scrbian srds.
in its letter to thc Contact Group. erpressed rts
uillingness to support autonomv for Koso'r'o.
provrded rt drd not lead to independence or thc
founding of a third repubhc of Federal
Yugoslavra. It also statod. in an apparent con-
ccssion. that the FRY rras readr to "discuss the
scope and character of an international pres-
ence''t5. In the lettcr- the Scrbs also regretted that
the Rambourllet tcxt madc no mention of the
equalrtl' of the "difTcrent national communrties"
3I
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in Kosovo rr-hrch ther rdcntrfied as Montenegnns.
Turks. Mushms. g) psies. Egvptians and
Gorancr. In an inten're\\.on 30 Apnl 1999 lith
UPI (United Press Intemational). President Mr-
losevrc statcd that there uere 250 000 Serbs in
Kosovo. 200 000 N{uslim Serbs uho u'ere not of
Albanran origrn. 150 000 g1'psres and 50 000
Turks.
219 In plain language. although some progress
uas made on the political frameu'ork of Kosovo
self-govemment. it must be admrtted that. not-
wrthstandrng threc u'eeks of ertremely painfi"rl
negotiations. no progress u'as made on thc issucs
rihich s'ere consrdered vrtal b1' cach partr'. Eren
threats of arr strrkes directed torrards the Serbs rf
thev did not sign and threats of no arr stnkcs
directed torr-ards the Kosovar Albanrans rf thev
did not sign. drd nothrng to make them more
flexiblc.
220. Serbia's Deputl' Prrme Minrster. Vuk
Draskovic. stated on 22 Febman'that Belgrade
should *'elcome the presence of foreign troops in
Kosor,'o- bccause thet' rrould eventuallv drsarm
the KLA. Hc also said that Serb rcjection of a
settlement n'ould constitute a "natronal disaster''
because the resultant NATO arr strikes rvould
provoke a fresh u'ave of anti-American sentlment
and encourage hardhncrs to create a "gulag"
u'here no dissident would bc tolerated36.
221. On 23 Februan. the dav the Rambouillet
ncgotiations \\.ere suspended. the Kosovar AIba-
nran delegation. after consultatrons betr.r'een the
KLA. Mr Rugova's Democratrc League of
Kosovo (LDK) and the Unrted Democratrc
Movement. agrecd to form a provisional govent-
ment rn Kosovo. uith a KlA-appointed prrme
ministcr to lead the provincc until the elections
providcd for rn the Rambouillet proposal lrere
held. nine months after the signing of a peace
agrccment. A feu' davs later the Kosovar Alba-
nian leaders approved the apporntment of Hasim
Thaci as Prime Minrster of thrs provisional gov-
ernmcnt. These moves *'ere indicative of an Lln-
expccted degree of unitv among the Kosovar
Albanian leadershrp and the KLA's determina-
tron to become a politrcal force to be reckoned
utth Thev also further marginalised Ibrahrm
Rugova. uho had led the peaceful opposition
movement since thc earlv 1990s Thrs prol'isional
government. horvever. nerer got off the ground
and old rifts bccamc apparent again. The LDK
refused to cooperate and Mr Thaci announced hrs
o\\rl provisronal govcrnmcnt in trhat little
Kosovar ternton' u'as still held by the KLA
222. The attitude of thc KLA representatives in
Rambourllet and the dccisron to create a provi-
sional coalrtron govcrnment ln tvhrch the three
malnstream political groups \\'erc reprcsented
causcd Adani Demagr. the KLA's polrtical repre-
sentative. to stand doun on 2 March. According
to some sources. he rr'as dismrsscd bv KLA
commanders. Demagr. a champron of Kosovar
Albanian separatism uho had spcnt 28 r'ears in
Yugoslar, prlsons for the caltsc. called the Ram-
bourllet plan a betral'al of the hrstoncal rights of
Albanians. Radrcalh' opposed to the Rambouillet
talks, he liad sought to block the proposed
agreemcnt in every rval' possiblc
223. Despite the fact that thc FRY uas deplol'-
lng ever more troops and hear,r' \\eaponn' in and
around Kosovo and. at the same tlme. lncrcaslng
the number of specral police troops rn uolation
of the October l99tt Holbrooke-Milosevic agree-
ment. NATO took no actton to enforce com-
pliance lvith thc earlicr agreementsT
224. According to NATO. Serbia's strength in
Kosovo. limited to l0 000 arm)' troops and
11 000 paramilitan' policc rn the October 1998
agreement- had grorin b1' the end of Febman' to
25 000 troops and police m Kosovo and a strll-
expanding force of 7 500 troops and 200 tanks
just to the north of the provmce".
225. At the end of Februan' 1999. Wrlliam
Walker. Head of the OSCE's Kosovo Verifica-
tion Mission. stated that 50 000 cn'rlians rn
Kosovo had been displaced from their homes in
Januan'and Februan 19993e A grouing number
of vrolent incidcnts \\'ere occurring in Kosovo.
but the Alhance preferred not to take actlon
against Serb militan' targets because it did not
want to endanger thc resumption of the peace
talks on l-5 March- and because it n'as arvare that
the KLA u'as also violating the October agree-
3' Internattonol Herttlcl Tnbtne. -l March 1999
33 Intentattortal Heraltl Tnbune.26 Februan' 1999
3" Intentattonal Ileralcl Trthttne.26 Fcbruan 199936 Internattonal Lleralcl 7-rrbune.23 Februnn 1999
32
DOCUMENT I65J
ment b)' engaging in ambushes. kidnappings and
other forms of attack+'
226. NATO lvas, houcver. continurng rts prc-
parations for thc deplolment of a 30 0O0-strong
implementation force. chrrstened KFOR. to back
up a possible pcace agrcement. The UK n'as to
provide 8 000 troops for this force 
- 
under
NATO command. witli UK Lreutenant General
Sir Michael Jackson of the Allied Raprd Reaction
Corps as commander 
- 
France and Gernianl'
some 5 000 each. the Unrted States 4 000. Italv
2 000 and other NATO members' numbcrs as y,ct
undefined. An initial contingcnt of some l0 000
troops. including hcavv equrpment such as tanks.
armourcd r,'ehicles and hearl'artrllen'- uas being
deplol'ed rn FYROM.
227 . US particrpation in the peacekeeping force
rvas considered essential because. as Secretan'of
State Albrrght told US Senators. "There is zero
chance that thc Kosor,ar Albanians rvill sign up
to this [the Rambourllet] deal if thc US does not
participate in rts implemontation"rr
228 The remammg lveeks beforo tho resump-
tion on 15 March of talks on the Rambourllct
proposals rvero charactenscd b1' drplomatic ac-
tivitl'to ensure signature bv both parties. Whilc
the Kosovar Albanians promrsed that thel' rvould
approve the Rambouillet plan. a constant stream
of officials from Contact Group countrres. rn-
cluding the US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke.
beat a path to Mr Mrlosevic's door in Belgrade.
The Govornment in Belgrade norr started to ask
for numerous changcs to thc text of tl-rc Ram-
bouillet plan. including specral provisions for
Serbs livrng in Kosovo and alteratrons to u'ords
like "constitution" and "presrdcnt" in thc para-
graphs dealing srth Kosovar alltonom\'. But
President Milosevic also refuscd to accept a
NATO-led military force in Kosovo to enforce a
political settlement. At the same trme. the Chair-
man of NATO's Military Committee. General
Klaus Naumann. said that anf international
military forcc in Kosovo should bc under NATO
command and not inr,'oh'e "dual-ker'" command
arrangements. NATO contrnued the build-up of
its l0 O00-strong advance force rn FYROM.
torvards an estimated total of 26 000 troops.
a0 International [[eraltl Trhune. +
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Wcstem allicd govemmcnts also started to talk to
the Russian Govemment about Russian troops
bcrng mvolvcd{
229. From Kosovo itself came frequent signs of
lncreasrng violence against civrhans and fighting
betucen Serb forces and the KLA.
230. On 15 March 1999. negotiations on thc
Rambourllet proposals rcsumed in Paris. in an
atmosphere of gloom. rvith the same delegations
of tlie tw'o parties and the same three medrators
231. The Kosor,'ar Albanran leaders had an-
nounccd therr intention of signrng the peace plan
upon arnval in Pans- ho$'ever the KLA made
clear in a statemcnt that it u.as not the solution
thcv s'anted rnost. u'hrle Mr Rugova s vle\\. \\'as
that the Albanians uould sign because therc rias
"no more trme to negotiate'-13.
232 Although no deadhne had been announccd.
it soon became clear that the Paris confercncc
irould have to end *,ithin a feu da1's. The FRY
delegation continued to usc delaving tactics. tab-
ling amendments and refusrng to accept the mili-
tan aspects of the peace plan The mediators
insisted that the political and rnilitan' sectrons of
the plan \\'ere lnseparable. that onlr. marginal
changbs \\'ere acccptable and that the principle of
the deplol,ment of a military force undcr NATO
command \\,as non-ncgotiablc.
233 In Kosovo rtself'. the Scrbian specral tbrces
and thc FRY army had been deeplv engaged for
three u'eeks in an operation in the north of the
province to cradicate the KLA. It u'as estrmatcd
that 30 000--10 000 troops. plus heall tanks and
other arrnolln' \\'cre berng deplol'ed in and
around Kosovo.
231 On l8 March. the peace negotrations con-
cludcd rvith tho Kosovar Albanian delegatron
srgning the Rambouillet peace plan rihile thc
FRY delegation continued to refuse to do so. On
Fndav I9 March. the Britrsh and Frcnch Forcign
Minrsters closed the Paris conference- girrng the
FRY delegatron Lrntil 23 March to change rts
mrnd. and Allied leaders rr amed that NATO ri'as
standing bl'to take u'hatever measures \\'ere nec-
essary rf Belgrade refused to reverse its decrsion
t1 Intentalrotral Herald Tnbune.l0-l I March 1999.
" Il'oll Street.Iountal. l-5 March 1999.
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23-5 Apparentlr'- thrs farled to makc anv irn-
prcssron on Prcsrdent N{rlos*rc Since March
199tt. hc had bccn facrng sanctrons and the threat
of more severc sanctions- r'rsrts br rnrnrstors and
othcr drgnrtanes tn'lng to convrncc hrm to change
hrs polio' rn Kosovo and threats of militan' ac-
tron if he did not do so Nel'ertheless. bv engag-
lng ln a ucll-balanced mtx of savage riolcnce
and penods of relatrvc reluctance. he had contln-
ucd to deccrvc his forcrgn opponcnts uhose mu-
tual divisions prcr cntcd decrsn c actron berng
taken agarnst hrm
236 IVIr Mrloserrc built his polrtrcal leadershrp
on his firm stancc about Scrbran rrghts over
Kosovo A r-ery large majontv of the Scrbran
people opposed anv compromrse o\rer Kosovo
He had also good reason to assume that a forergn
mlrtan' attack uould unrte an even grcater part
of thc Serbran population agamst anv aggressor
Hc mav hare thought that *'en if NATO carricd
out rts threat of arr strrkcs- thev uould not last
long bccausc of raprdlv gro\\mg drlrsrons among
Alhcd countncs orer thcrr effectivcness and lc-
gltrmac\. Hc mav also harc thought that somc
orthodox colrntnes rn thc regron. uhrch he con-
srdered to be tradrtional or potential alhes uould
hclp hrm thu'arI a sustarned air campaign agarnst
Serbia
237 All rn all. Mr Mrloso'ic thought he had
cnough ratronal arguments to take a calcr"rlated
risk and not succurnb to outside pressurc to sign
the Rambouillet proposals Hc mav havc forgot-
ten. hou'er er. to takc account of the follou rng
lmportant elements rn the equatron
238 Thc Unrtcd States and NATO 
- 
u'ith its
50th annivcrsan' in srght 
- 
could undcr no cir-
cumstanccs aflbrd to end a rnilitan' operation
against the Fedoral Repubhc of Yugoslaua rrrth-
out having attained therr oblectn'c and at the
samc tlme lettrng rt be sccn that the most poucr-
ful countn and the most po\\'erflrl alhance in the
uorld had bccn defcatcd bi. Nlr Mrloserrc A
sustained air campargn- rmplemcnted uith the
rrorld's most sophistrcated mrlrtarl' equipment
and statc-of--the-art technologr has a devastatrng
and demorahsrng effcct on thc populatron and
armcd forces of a colrntn' ivhich has to cndure rt.
providcd that the onlr' hmit to rts duration rs at-
tainmcnt of the oblcctrve In the cnd. thc rnordr-
natc violence u'hich Mr Mrloscvrc unleashed in
hls alloged fight agarnst KLA tcrronsm- rcsultmg
rn repeated massacrcs. numcroLls sllrrrrnan' exe-
cutlons. organrsed mass dcportations and othcr
crinrcs agamst humanrtr'. uhollr discrcdrted hrs
polio and kept both thc Alhed countrres and thc
malontt' of therr pLrblic oplulon unrtcd rn favour
of thc air opcratron. noturthstanding thc fact tliat
it caused civrhan casualtrcs among Scrbian and
Kosorar Albanrans Last but not least- Mr Mrlo-
sc\lc mav also har.c underestimatod the dcter-
mtnation of hrs opponents to put an end oncc and
for all to hrs abilrtv to ureak haroc rn south-
oastern Europe. u'hrch u'as thc main cause of thc
dramattc dclav rn thc dcr elopmcnt of ccouomy
and dernocracl. throughout thc rcgron
239. On the othcr hand. therc rs no doubt that
the Contact Group and NATO also madc some
serious rniscalculatrons ln thorr pohcv Ther nrar
hare undercstimatcd Mr Mrlosevrc's dctcrmina-
tlon to gne in as linle as possrble for the abore-
mentroned reasons N{ost of thc Alhes mav there-
forc have been conr rnced that a fcu davs of
modcrate bomburg rrould bc cnough to make him
changc hrs mrnd and srgn the Rambourllet pro-
posals. Westcnr leaders scnt a totallr \\rong slg-
nal to Mr Mrloseuc rn nrlrng out an\ lnten,cn-
tron bv ground forces on the ternton' of Kosor.o
rf he did not agree to thcm lt mar also have been
a u-ristake on the part of NATO's polrtrcal leadcr-
shrp to step up the intensrh' of the arr campalgn
onh' graduallr'. a decrsion which scems to have
gone agarnst the adr rce of the mrlrtan' rn charge
of preparing the arr stnkes Nor uas the Allrance
rmmedrateh' preparcd to copc urth the hugc in-
flux of Kosovar rotugces and deported pcrsons
tnto nerghbounng countries uhich. rn thc earlr'
da1's of NATO's arr opcratron. nearlv brought
NATO to the bnnk of defeat rn the battle to rr in
the support of pr-rbhc oplnlon. even though the
refugcc problem \\as a conscqllence of Serbia's
carefllllv planned and rmplcmented Operatron
"Horseshoe" and not of NATO's air stnkes
240 It u'as also rr.rong to assulne- as manv ln
thc Alliancc did. that arr stnkes agarnst tlie FRY
uould quicklv producc the same rcsults as the
bombrng rards rn Bosnra had done rn August and
Scptcmbcr 1995. leadrng Presrdent N{iloseric to
agree to srgn the Darton Peacc Agreemcnt In
Bosnia. it uas easv for NATO alr po\\er to drs-
mpt thc rclatn,elv ucak and partlv rrregnlar Scrb
forces: also. the arr stnkes could exploit concur-
rcnt succcsscs on tho ground bv Croatra's re-
centlr retrarned. re-cquippcd and mobile rcgular
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forces. When President Milosevic finalh con-
ceded. hc u-as called a "reahst" and left more or
Icss unharmed bccause thc Contact Group con-
sidercd him cmcial to the implcmentation of the
Darton Peace Agreement.
241. Thc situation in Kosovo \\'as ver)' differ-
cnt. Among thc Serbran forces on the ground u'as
a sizeable contrngent of the u'cll-equipped and
uell-traincd Serbian arrn\'. as u'ell as the Serbran
pohce forccs and militia There uas no equir,a-
lent to the Croatian arrnv to do the job rn the
field. The KLA u'as not w'ell-equipped and had
Irttle tramrng. if an' at all Air strikcs did not inr-
mediatell' affect the Serbran armv because rt de-
libcratell'deploved rts hear,r' equiprnent m Koso-
var villages and small torrns and used rts rrell-
rehearscd concealment tactics- causing NATO
air attacks to inflrct considerable collateral dam-
age at grcat political nsk
(b) Why did Rambouilletfuil?
242 Clearh' the Rambourllet talks l.erc not a
success and thel' also reduced the credibilitv of
the Clinton administration. At thc end of thc con-
forence, Mrs Albright vcn' visibll'took charge of
the ncgotratrons. thus cxposing herself to the
polrtical nsks of success or failure
243 The Unrted States had choscn the no*
fashionable strategv of "muscular" medratron
uherebv the medrator. instead of carefulll' nego-
tiating a mutuallv acceptable compromise. puts
fonr,ard his ou'n solution and threatens to use his
considerable resources agalnst rvhrchcver side
rejects the agreement Even if one or both partics
do not like the dcal. it is assumed that cach uill
prefer rt to confrontrng the combincd strcngths of
the opponent and the medrator Thrs method u'as
successful in bringrng the Dalton Agreement into
being. Horr.ever. the Kosovo crisis cannot be
compared to the rvar in Bosnia
244. In the Kosovo crisis- hox'ever. the United
States did not havc much cffective ler-erage on
the Kosovar Albanians. The Albanian diaspora
supphed the KLA ri'ith ueapons. u'hich rvere
smuggled into Kosovo b1' the Albanians them-
selves. As the underdogs rn the struggle u,rth the
Scrbs. thel' knerv that the pubhc m Wcstern
countries would clamour for them to be protected
against further Serb atrocrties. even if thev lvere
inflexible at the negotiating table US leverage on
the Serbs rvas also ven' Irmrted There \\.as no
threat of a peacemakrng intcn,cntion br ground
troop deplovmcnt bocause poacc rn Kosovo uas a
prcconditron for stationing au intcrnatronal tbrce
on its tcrnton' and the thrcat of arr strikcs. uhrch
had alreadr been around for some months n'hrle
dn'ergent opmlons in the Alhed countnes orer
thcrr fcasibrlrtv had srdcll' bccn cxposcd rn thc
media. \\'as not consrdered particularlv credrblc
bi' the Serbian Gor ernment The Scrbs u'erc
dctermrned to rcslst 
- 
as the gol ernnrent and
Prcsident Miloser ic had alreadr stated 
- 
srnce on
no account rvere thev u ilhng to gir c up Kosor o.
245 At Rambourllet. both sides thought ther'
had more to garn b1' tightrng 
- 
of u'hich thev had
not I'et gro\\'n \\.can'- than b1' signrng an agree-
ment thct' drd not u'aut. It uas also thought br
both partres that the IJS and rts alhes did not
havc thc resolve to usc mrlrtan nrcans of cn-
forccment in *'hat u-as possibll' a hostrle enr i-
ronmcrtt. rn order to impose an agrcemont that
uas not to thc likrng of thosc bcrng requrred to
slgn lt.
(c) Operatiut Horseshoa: tlte defeut of the KL,4
anl deportation ofthe Kosovur Albuniuns
216. There has bccn much astonrshment and
drsmav over thc unprecedentcd numbcrs of refi.r-
gocs crosslng the Kosovo bordcrs rnto ncrghbour-
ing countries It uas obvious too that FRY forces
rvcre ablc to control the florv of refugees as thel
sau fit
217 The German Mrnistcrs for Foreign Affairs
and Defence have shod light on thosc evcnts br'
pubhshing evrdencc of Scrb plans of uhich thc
Britrsh and US rntelhgencc services arc sard to
have been a\\are. Accordrng to this documentf.
soon after the agreement bct*'een Rrchard Hol-
brooke and Presrdent Mrlosevrc- thc Serbran
Govcrnment started formulating a strategrc plan-
code-namcd "Horseshoe". the princrpal arm of
uhrch \\as to defcat or at least neutraltsc the
KLA rn Kosovo. Deportatron of thc Kosovar
Albanran population rvas clearlr' a part of this
plan. Not onlr u-ould thrs result rn a change in
the demographrc balance of thc pror mce. rt
rlould deprne thc KLA of its bascs and support
It is ri'orth remcmberrng herc that the Scrbian
opcratrons of spring and summer l99ti resulted
in 300 000 drsplaced persons and rcfi,rgees On
the initiatne of the Contact Group. an agreement
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\\as thon concluded on 13 Octobcr bctueon Mr
Holbrookc and Mr Nfilosevrc forcing the latter to
accept an OSCE vcrificatron missron and reduce
Serb forccs in Kosovo Thrs led to a rcturn er
mo.\.\a both of drsplaced persons and of the KLA.
Thrs last \\as ullacceptable to Belgradc rrhrch
regarded the KLA as an instmment of terronsm
and separatism.
2.llt According to the documcnt pubhshed by
the German Gor,crnment. Operatron Horseshoc
started at a lou' l*cl of rntensitv in November
1998 It uas stepped up in Januan' 1999 and
continued during thc Rambourllet negotiations.
After Rambouillet. rt gained rn strength and car-
ncd on unrnterrupted during the Parrs ncgotla-
trons. Operatrons started in northcrn Kosovo. in
the regions of Podqero and Mitror,ica. and from
thcrc Serbran forces graduallv moved doun to
tl-re south-u,estcm and south-eastern borders of
Kosovo. drir ing out thc inhabitants. principallv
to FYRON{ and Albanra The Gcrman document
also suggests that General Perisic- the former
Chicf--ot--StafTof thc FRY armv u'as dismrssed at
the end of November 1998 because he uas op-
posed to the intcn'cntron of Yugoslav armed
forcos in Kosovo
(d) N,170 uir operations
249 On 19 March 1999. after the negotiatrons
in Parrs had bccn adjourned uithout the Yugo-
slav Government srgning thc proposed peace
agreemcnt and u'hrle Serbian forccs l,r'erc fulh'
engaged in stepping up the pressure in Kosovo.
thc Amencan mediator Rrchard Holbrooke again
met Presidcnt Miloseric in Belgrade. Mr Hol-
brookc's elel'cnthhour rncdiation farled hou-erer
to extract anv concessrons from Mr Milosevrc
NATO accordrnglv had no choice other than to
rmplement its threat of launchlng air strikes
agalnst thc Federal RepLrbhc of Yugoslavia
250. In an officral prcss statemcnt on 23 March-
NATO Secrctan'-General Javier Solana f-rrst
explained the reasons u'ht' action u'as taken' .'We
are taking action follourng the FRY Gov-
ermnent's rcfusal of the internatronal commu-
nitr"s demands. acceptance of the rnterim politi-
cal settlement uhich has been negotrated at Ram-
bouillet : full observance of limits on the Serb
armt' and Specral Pohce Forces agreed on 25
October 1998: ending of excessir,,e and dis-
proportionate use of force in Kosovo" He then
descrrbed the objectrve as follorls, "Thrs military
action is intcnded to support the political aims of
the internatronal communrtr. It rrill bc directed
touards disrupting thc violent attacks berng
commrtted br tho Scrb armr and Spccial Polico
Forces and scakonurg their abilin to cause fllr-
ther humanitarran catastrophe. We ursh therebv
to support internatronal cfforts to sccltre Yugo-
slav agreement to an intcrrm polrtrcal scttlcmcnt",
Mr Solana fi.rrther sard that -'a vrable politrcal
settlement must be guarantccd bv an rntentational
rnihtan prescnce NATO had acted --to prevont
more human suffcring" and 'to prcvcnt rnstabrl-
itr spreadrng in thc region"
251. On 24 March. Secrctan'-General Solana
sent a lctter to fire of Yugoslaua's nclghbours.
Slor,'enia. Romanra- Bulgana. FYROM and
Albania. ln u'hrch he assured them of thc
Alhancc's srrpport rn the er,cnt of their bcing
threatened- addrng that '-the sccllntv of NATO
mcmbers rs linkcd to that of its parlners''
252. There ucre to be 3 drffcrent phascs
l. SACEUR authorrtv to commence arr
operations rn Kosovo agarnst anti-air de-
fencc targets throughout Yugoslavia.
2 Operatrons against a broader range of
asscts rn a urder aroa ertendrng as far as
the 44th parallel north.
3 Ertensron of thc opcratrons berond
thc 44th parallel
253. US President. Brll Clinton. sard the action
\\-as necessary to stop the escalatron of r.'iolcncc
in Kosor'o and to shou'that thc West \\'as serrous
about u-orking to crcate a stable. peaceful and
safe Europe
254. UN Secretarl'-Gencral Kofi Annan qucs-
tioned the legalrtv of thc arr stnkcs- savrng that
the UN Secuntr. Councrl "should be rnvolr,ed rn
anv decrsion to rcsort to the use of forcc"+' Both
Russra and China msrsted that the air stnkes
violated mtemational larr
255 The Russran Prcsidcnt. Bons Yeltsrn.
"deeplv shocked" b1'the NATO air raids. froze
militan' co-operatron \\ith NATO and rcsen'ed
the nght to take "militan' measures" should
NATO strikes agalnst Yugoslar,ra result in tlie
conflict spreading u'ithrn Europe.
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256 The Russran mlrtan representative to
NATO s'as recallcd to Moscou'. but thc Russran
Ambassador to NATO and Belgrum rcmained in
Brussels. Russra reportedlv decided to break off
coopcratron u'ithrn the frame*ork of the PfP and
thc NATO-Russra Foundrng Act of 1997 and to
suspend discussions on the establishment of a
NATO mihtan'mrsslon rn Moscou'.
257. The European Council. meetrng tn Berltn.
denounced the rcprcssion of Kosovar Albanians
b1 FRY securitr,' forces and the fact that Presr-
dent Mrloselrc had pcrsistentlv reftrsed to engage
scnouslr ur thc scarch for a political solution. It
also statcd that Europe rvas "under a rnoral obli-
gatron to enslrre that rndiscriminatc behavrour
and violence \\cre not rcpcated and that "an
aggressor must knou' that he rvrll have to pa)' a
high prrcc"
25lt For a full drscussron of NATO-s air op-
erations and other milrtan'and dcfcncc aspects of
thc Kosovo conf'lrct- rcfbrence is madc to the
report submrtted b1' the Defence Commtttee on
"The situation rn Kosovo". co-Rapportcurs Mr
Blaauu' and Mr Barsonr,.
(e) Peuce initiatives
259. While the paragraphs belou mention onlv
thc most important peace initiatrves. it rs of
courso clear that manv more attempts har c been
made to medrate and makc contributions to a
possiblc solution of the conflict in Kosovo both
bl go'r,cmmcnts and politicians on diff'erent
lel,els.
Meclntion otlempl by I'nme Mrruster Pnmakrry
260. On 30 March. Russran Pnme Mrnister
Yo'genr Pnmakor,. accompar-ried bv Defence
Mmrster Igor Sergevev and Forergn Mrnrster lgor
Ivanor,. had talks nith Presidcnt Milosevic in
Belgrade in an attempt at mediation, The Prrme
Minister thcn met uith the German Chancellor.
Gerhard Schroder. President-in-Office of the
European Council. to discuss the results of hrs
efforts Mr Schroder. horvever. concluded that
Presrdcnt Mrlosevic's proposals. as presented bl'
Mr Pnmako\,- \\'ere not a basis for a political
solutron in Kosovo.
261. President Mrlosevic had asked for a halt to
NATO militarl' operations rn the FRY. after
uhich he rvould engage in negotiatrons. He also
reputedll' said he rvas readt'to create the condi-
tions for thc return to Kosor,o of all peaceable
rcfugces.
262. Chanccllor Schroder took the vier,r' that
Presrdent Mrloselrc had to gil'e a clear signal of
hrs u'illingness to take the Rambourllet peacc
agreements scriously' and first and foremost thc
demand for a complete ir ithdras al of Serb troops
from Kosovo.
263. NATO pointed out that Prime Minister
Primakor.''s medration cfforts contamed no refer-
ence to the polrtical framerrork. proposed at the
Rambouillet negotiatrons and srgncd br the
Kosovar Albanians. u,hich included rmplemcnta-
tion of a peace agreemcnt under thc supervision
of an international pcace force deploved ln
Kosovoa6.
264. At the samc timc. Secrctary-General So-
lana declared that NATO's priontl'\\'as to "stop
the killing and help refugecs'' adding "u'e cannot
toleratc that a situation of thrs tvpe shotrld con-
tinue rn Europe". because of a man so far
"removed from our cornmon valucs"*'.
Pre.yrclent Mrlosevc's ceose.ftre prctpo.sal ol
6 Aprul 1999
265. On 6 April. thc FRY Govcmment offered
a unilateral ceasefire from 20.00 that da1'. sug-
gesting that negotiations could start on the return
of refugees. As rvell as the ceasefirc, Mr Milo-
se\'lc s proposal also rncluded a political panel.
He proposed to Mr Rugova that he cooperatc in
dralving up a loint -'provisional agreemcnt"
uhrch- in time. rvould lead to "substantial auto-
nomv for Kosovo. The agreement rvould create
the conditions under uhich the organs of self-
govcrnment of the Albanran. Scrbran and othcr
national comrnunrties could operate . After a
period of time had elapsed. this agreement u'ould
constitute the basis of a durable arrangement for
substantial autonomv for Kosovo rvithrn the
frameu'ork of Serbra and Yugoslaua. Mr Rugo-
va was also invited to draft a prograrnme for the
retum of the refugees. riith the appropflate
particrpatron of IINHCR and thc ICRC jointlv
rvrth Belgrade. Mr Milosevrc apparentll' pro-
posed to provide comfort for reftigees u'hom he
had expelled from their homes and lands rn a
carefulll' planned and orchestrated military op-
a6 
. Itlantic,\Zurs No. 3096. 2April 1999.
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cratlon. As so often rn thc past- hc uas again
presenting himsclf as thc reasonable peacemaker
ln a crrsls shrch had bccn provoked bl' hrs olrl
infamous policr
266. Aftcr consultatrons bctrveen the Allics. the
NATO Sccretan'-Gencral re.;ccted thrs proposal
as "clearlv rnsufficient". He repeated that
NATO's milrtan' objcctrve \\.as to establish "a
peaceftll. multi-ethnic. democratrc Kosovo ln
uhich all its people can livo in sccuritr"'. Those
arms could onlv be achier cd through "thc retum
of all rcftigecs. ( ) the dcplovmcnt of an mter-
national secuntv presence. uithdrasal of thc
Serb mrlitan - police and paramilitan, forces and
putting rnto placc a polrtrcal frameu'ork for
Kosoro uhrch uas bascd on thc agrcements of
Rambouillct"
267 In hrs statement- the NATO Secretan'-
Gcneral. for thc first trme since the beginning of
thc arr operation- drd not sa1 that the mterna-
tronal forcc should bc "undcr NATO command''
apparentlv in an effort to acconmodatc the Rus-
srans. uith uhonr thc discussron in the Contact
Group u.as to be re-opened on 7 April Thrs
rrould be the first such meetrng since thc Rus-
slans suspended thcrr contacts ir ith NATO rn
rcsponse to thc air strikes At the same time. it
\\as no\\. evrdent that the rnternatronal force
u'ould not onlv havc the task of controlling the
rmplemcntatron of a possible agreement. as the
Rambouillet text had proposed. but also of guar-
anteerng the return ofthe refugees
The appeal by UN Secretarl,-General Koli
Annan
268 After a penod of rnaction. parth' due to the
fact that the Contact Group and NATO had
takcn thc lcad in the Kosovo crisis. the LN Sec-
retan'-Gcneral rcappearcd on the scene on 9
April and launched an urgent appeal to thc
Yugoslav authonties to make even effort to:
rmmediatelv end its campaign of in-
trmrdating and driving out the clv'ilian
populatton.
stop all actrvrties of militan' and para-
mrlrtan'forces rn Kosovo and uithdrau
thcm from the province:
- 
accept unconditionallv the return to
thcrr homes of refugees and all drs-
placed persons:
- 
accept deplovmcnt of an intematronal
milrtan' force to guarantee that reftl-
gees could retum in sccuritv and that
humanitarian aid rvould be distributed
rr rthout obstruction:
- 
allou thc intcrnational communitl' to
r erifi' that those undertakrngs \l'erc re-
spectod
269. lf Belgrade accepted the conditrons. the
Secretan'-Gencral u'ould ask NATO leaders to
suspend their air strikes against FRY territon
rmmedratelr. The end of hostilrtres should be a
preludc to a durablc polrtrcal solution. uhich
could be reached onlv through diplomac]' Mr
Annan's initiatil'e u.as uelcomed rn many Euro-
pean capitals and at NATO and it u'as folloued
up in the EU initiative uorked out on l-l Apnl
I 9e9
Etrropean (lnron meefing on l1 Aprul 1999
270 The heads of state and government of the
European Union held an informal meeting in
Brussels on 14 April 1999. in uhich the United
Nations Secretarl'-Gcneral. Kofi Annan. also
took part Here. the EU heads of state and gor'-
crnment supportcd the lN Secretan'-General's
9 April 1999 rnitiativc regarding Kosovo in
u'hich he summed up the demands of the inter-
natronal communitv to the FRY Government. on
uhich there could be no compromlsc. These u'ere
as follo*'s:
- 
an immediate halt to the use of force.
- 
u'ithdral'al of all military and specral
pohce forces and rrregular unrts.
- 
dcplovment of an international milrtary
force on the territon' of Kosovo:
- 
the return of all refi.rgees and displaced
persons
27l. In their vierr-- onlv acceptance and imme-
diate implementatlon of those demands could
lead to a suspension of NATO's milrtan actlon
and par,'e the u'av for a political solution.
272 The EU heads of state and government
dcclared that the abovemcntioncd princrples
should be included in a resolution to be adopted
b-v the UN Secunty' Councrl under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter. Chapter VII. and especiallr'
Articlc -12. alloils the Sccuritl' Council to takc
"such action bv air- sea or land forces as mav be
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neccssan to malntaln or restorg rntemational
peaco and securitr"'. if measures not involving
the use of armed forces havc prol'ed to be rnade-
quate
273. Obvrouslr,- Russia's agreement u'as indis-
pensable for the adoption of an1 resolution en-
visagcd b1'the EU leaders Thel' also asserted
that a polrtical settlement of the Kosovo crisis
should be based on u'hat they called the
"Rambouillet accpn.s" - prorrding for substantial
autonomy srthm FRY borders.
271. The EU's posrtion rvas that an interim
arrangement for Kosovo. to be estabhshed di-
rectly after the end of the conflict. must tnclude
the follorving maln elements:
estabhshment of an mtornational in-
terim admrnistration u'hrch the Euro-
pean Union could takc over:
- 
creation of a police force that reflected
the composrtron of thc population of
Kosovo:
- 
the holdrng of frec and farr elections:
- 
deplovment of international militan'
forces guaranteeing protectton for the
u'hole populatron of Kosol'o
275. The heads of state and go\,'ernment
stressed the necd for the EU to plav an acttvc
part in overcomlng the crisis and cmphasised thc
importance of close cooperation uith the Russian
Federatron. Once again they' reaffirmed the soli-
dantl' of the EU. and tts member statcs. regard-
ing humanitarian assistance for reftlgees and
displaccd persons and asststance for nerghbour-
ing countries of the FRY. Lastli'. thet'announced
that thel'nould convsne a Conference on south-
eastern Europc "to decrde upon further compre-
hensive measures for the long-tcrm stabihsatron-
security'. dcmocratisatron and economic recon-
struction of thc entrre region".
7'h e lvh I o.; evt c -C he rno mltrcl t n c r t m p r o mt s e p I an
276. On 22 April 1999. President Yeltsin's
special envo\'. Viktor Chernomvrdin. had talks
urth President Milosevic in Belgrade. resulting rn
the follomng proposal:
(i) sublect to agreement rvith the FRY.
there u'ould be an tnternatronal presence in
Kosor,'o under IIN aegis and lvith Russian
particrpatron,
At) possrble reduction of FRY military
and pohce forces in Kosovo- accompanied
bv simultaneous uithdrau'al of NATO
forcos deplol'ed at the border of Yugosla-
via:
(rif resumpron of uork on the political
framervork for the future autonomv of
Kosovo.
(v) safe return of reflrgees and displaced
pcrsons:
(v) proviston of humanrtarian atd:
(vr) nlemational cooperation in thc re-
construction of the FRY econom\'. includ-
mg Kosovo. and the rvholc region
277. Presrdent Mrlosevic made clcar that the
"intcrnational prescnce" in Kosovo had to bc a
LN civilian mrssion. in u'hich countrtes particr-
pating in the NATO air operations u-ould not be
represented. Hc also said that negotiatrons should
be reopened directlv bet*een Serbs and Kosor'ar
Albanrans. not betu'een the Yugoslav or Serbian
Government and the representatil'es of thc tnter-
natronal communit\'lE.
278 Presrdent Clinton and Prtme Minrster Blarr
relected thrs proposal as soon as it became clear
that President Milos*'ic u'ould not accept thc
presence of an rnternational militan' forcc in
Kosovo and that the proposal rtself did not in anv
rvay meet NATO's demands.
NAIO poltct'as regarcls lhe cn.sts rn Ko.vovo cts
.stalecl at the Washmglon Summrl
279. At NATO's Washington Summit on 23
and 24 April 1999. the heads of state and gov-
ernment rssued a statement on Kosor-o in rvhrch
thev summariscd their polio' regarding the cnsrs
in Kosovo.
280. Thel' reiterated that NATO's mtlttan'
action agamst the FRY supportod the polrtrcal
aims of thc intcrnatronal community to achier c
a peaceful. multr-ethnic and dcmocrattc
Kosovo u'hcre all its people can lil'e in securitr
and enlov univcrsal human nghts and frecdoms
on an cqual basis"
281 Ther' further stated that Prcsident Milo-
ser ic must'
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- 
"ensure a venfiable stop to all militan
actron and the rmmediate ending of
vrolence and repression in Kosovo:
- 
uithdrarv his militan. pohce and para-
militan fbrces from Kosovo:
- 
agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an
international militan' prescnce:
- 
agree to the unconditional and safc re-
turn of all refugces and drsplaced per-
sons. and unhindered access to thcnr br
humanrtarian aid organisations: and
- 
provide credible assurarlce of his ii'ill-
ingness to u'ork for the establishment
of a political frameuork agrcement
based on the Rambourllct accords."
Thev added that "There can be no compromise
on thcse condrtions".
282. Additional measures rvere put rn place to
tightcn the constraints on the FRY Government.
rncluding intensrfied implementation of economic
sanctions and an embargo on petroleum prod-
ucts. led bv thc EU.
283 Thc Defence Ministers uould dctermme
\\avs rn whrch NATO could contribute to halting
the delrr cn of rlar material.
284. lt uas again emphasised that:
"NATO is prepared to suspend its air
strikes once Belgrade has unequivocallv
accepted the abovementioned condrtions
and demonstrabll' begun to rvlthdrau its
forccs from Kosovo according to a precise
and rapid tirnetable. This could follou'the
passage of a UN Securitv Councrl Resolu-
tron- rvhich r,r'e urll seek. requirrng the
u'ithdraual of Serb forces and the demili-
tarisation of Kosovo and encompassing the
deplovment of an international militan'
force to safeguard the su'ift return of all
refugees and displaced persons as r,r,ell as
thc establishment of an international pro-
vrsional administration of Kosovo under
uhich its people can enjol' substantial
autonomv u'ithin the FRY. NATO remains
readr,' to form thc core of such an interna-
tional militan, force. It u,ould be multrna-
tronal in character u'ith contributions from
non-NATO countries".
285. The statement further stressed that Russra
had a particular responsrbtlity' rn the United Na-
trons and an important role to plav in the search
for a solution to thc conflrct rn Kosovo. adding
that thc Alliance rranted to u'ork constructivelr
urth Russra. in thc spirit of thc Foundrng Act.
286. It uas also stated that NATO rrould ''not
tolerate threats b1 the Belgrade regimc to the
securitv of rts neighbours [t u'ould] respond to
such challenges bl Belgrade to its nerghbours
rcsulting from the presence of NATO forces or
their actirities on therr ternton' durrng this cri-
sis''. NATO rcaffrrmsd rts "support for the tcrri-
tonal rntegritr and sovereigntv of all countrics in
the region". It also reaffrrmed rts "strong support
for thc democraticallr.elected govemment of
Montenegro Anr move br Bclgrade to under-
mrne the govermnent of Prcsident Djukanovrc
u'rll have gra\,'e consequences. FRY tbrces should
lea'r,e the dcmilrtarrsed zonc of Prevlaka immedi-
atelr'.''
I'res t de nt NIt I t t.s ev c'.s s rx- poi nl plan
287. In an intcrviov on 29 April l999re. Presr-
dent Milosevrc outlined a pcacc plan u'hich he
based on the follosrng six points:
" l . Cessation of all militan, activitics:
2. Withdrau'al of NATO troops along
thc Kosovo border urth Albania and Ma-
cedonia and srmultaneous ivithdrau'al of
90 000 Yugoslav forces from Kosovo.
leaving "normal garrison strength" of
I I 000 to l2 000 Yugoslav troops:
3. Introduction of a LN peacekeeping
mission to include rcprcsentatives of neu-
tral nations. Russra. Ukraine. Belarus and
Westcrn European nations that are not
members of NATO. The peacekeepers are
not to bc called a force nor are thev to
carn an\' \\capons other than those re-
quircd for sclf-defcnce:
4. Thc return of all refugees, "regardless
of their ethnic or rehgrous affrhation''- and
frce acccss to the reftlgees bv the UNHCR
and the ICRC:
5. The continuation of the political
process started uith Ibrahim Rugova. the
moderate Kosovar Albanran leadcr. rvith
the internatronal community present as ob-
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sen/ers and u'ith a vieu to achieving the
uidest possiblc autonomy for Kosovo
uithin Scrbia-
6 An economlc recoven' plan for Ser-
bia. Kosor,'o and Montenegro that havc
''been heavilr darnaged bv NATO aggres-
sion."
288. In the intervior. Mr Milos*,ic ingenioush,
presented a trvisted versron ofthe facts. The fol-
lorving quotes provrde intcresting examples of his
reasoning:
- 
On the KLA: '-That movement is Nazi
in its character bccausc of its pubhclr'
declared goals of a racrallv pure state
... Where can you find such a state in
the u'orld todar' .. Ethnically mrred
states are the trend in thc neu' global
villagc. Tho Kosor.'ar terrorists \\'ere
tn'ing to rcr,erse a global phenome-
non'.
- 
Asked about mass expulsions: "We
reinforced our forces after Rambouillet
for a rnajor offensive against KLA tcr-
rorists. not to ethnicalll' clean Kosovo
as \\,as done uith thc expulslon of
500 000 Serbs from Croatia. u'htch
u'as rgnorcd b1' the *orld media. And
the reftlgees u'ere fleeing because of the
war against the tcrrorrsts and also be-
cause of disinformation horror stories
bcing spread bv the terronsts ...".
- 
On the economv: "We arc all market
economies nou' In fact. Yugoslavia is
a little brt ahead in this respect. having
startod before the collapse of the Soviet
Union and communism... Parallel rvith
thrs s'as the process of privatisation
rvliich u-e started long before our for-
mer corrrmunist nerghbours''.
The G8 proposal
289. An rmportant developmcnt took place at
thc meeting of the G8 foreign ministers 
- 
repre-
senting Canada. France. Germanr'- Itall'- Japan.
the United Kingdorn and the United States plus
Russia 
- 
in Bom on 6 Mav 1999 At that meet-
ing. the ministers adopted the follor,ring declara-
tion
" 1 . The G8 forcign mrnrsters adopted the
follori'ing general principlcs on the polrtr-
cal solutrorr to the Kosovo crisis'
- 
immediate and verifiable end of vio-
lence and reprcssion in Kosovo.
- 
rvithdraual from Kosovo of militan'.
police and paramrlitan' forces:
dcplovment in Kosovo of eff'ective in-
temational civil and securitt' presences.
endorsed and adopted bv the Unrted
Natrons- capable of guaranteeing the
achicvement of thc common objectrves:
- 
estabhshment of an rnterim admrnrstra-
tion for Kosovo to be decrded bv the
Security Council of the Unrtcd Natrons
to ensure conditions for a pcaceful and
normal life for all inhabrtants rn
Kosovo:
- 
the safo and free retum of all refugees
and displaced persons and an unlm-
peded access to Kosovo bv humanitar-
ian aid organisations:
- 
a polrtrcal proccss ton,ards the estab-
lishment of an interim polrtical frame-
r,vork agreement providing for a sub-
stantial solf-government for Kosovo.
taking full account of the Rambouillet
accords and the principles of sover-
eigntv and territorial integntv of the
Fedcral Repubhc of Yugoslavia and thc
other countries of the region. and the
demilitarisation of the KLA.
comprehensl\re approach to the eco-
nomic development and stabrlisation of
the crisis region.
2. In order to implement thcse prin-
ciples, thc G8 foreign minrsters rnstructed
thcrr political directors to prepare clements
of a UN Securitl-Council resolutron:
3. The political dircctors rvill drau- up a
road map on future concrete steps totvards
a political solution to the Kosovo crists;
4. The Gtt presidencl' uill inform the
Chinesc Government on the results of to-
dar,'s meeting:
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5 Forcrgn mlulsters u rll reconr ene tn
due trmc to re\'le\\.the progress which has
boen achreved up to that point "
290 The Bonn meetrng of the G8 rvas an lm-
portant step becausc. for the first ttme since the
arr strikcs started. Russia agreed *'rth the basrc
prrnciples for a polrtrcal solution of the Kosol'o
conflict
291 Thc declaration *'as consrdered to bs one
stcp further torvards a [.N rcsolution uhich
uould include the deplovment of an international
force rn Kosol'o uhile. at the same trme. the FRY
could be seen as being more isolated from the
lnternatlonal communitv It reitcrated the essence
of principles u,hrch had been stated earlier b1 the
EU and NATO. but some phrases u'cre adapted
rn ordcr to help secllrc Russra-s agrecmcnt.
292 The dcclaration mentioncd the deplol.rnent
of "cfTectrve rnternatronal civil and secuntv pres-
enccs. endorscd and adopted bi'the Unrted Na-
tlons" and lcft out anv mention of NATO mrli-
tary forces uhich r.rntrl then liad becn a conditron
of most \\'estern countries and a taboo for Rus-
sia Wcstem countncs also agreed to strpulate
that an lntcnm pcacc agreement should take full
account of the pnncrples of sor,'erergntv and terri-
tonal integntv of the FRY and rnclude the demili-
tarrsation of the KLA.
2()3. Among the questtons uhich remained un-
resolved and u'ould still cause manv problems in
further negotlatrons to*'ards a scttlemcnt uere
the precrse composltlon and mandate of the
peacekceping force. u'hrch Yugoslav forces and
hou' manv should u'tthdrau' from Kosovo. at
*hat stage the arr stnkes should be suspended
and rrhether a peace settlement could bc imposed
rvrthout Mr l\liloser ic's agrccment
291 The Russian Foreign Minister u.as quoted
as saving that ''u'rthout the agreement of the
state. nothmg rs possrble"'"
295 In N'losco*. hou'ever. the Ministn'of
Forcrgn Affairs made it clear that a future UN
Securitv Council resolutron should refer to
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. rmplring tliat a
settlement could be rmposed upon Belgrade. Thc
Foreign Minister remained adamant about the
Russian principlc that rt uas impossible to start
seeking a real scftlcnrcnt rf NATO arr strikcs
continucd'r.
296 Just bcfore the Bonn G8 statemcnt. Presr-
dcnt Chnton ackno*ledged that he expected Mr
Milosevic to be rnvolr,ed in anv settlement over
Kosor,'o. whereas he had prcvtoush' mamtarned
that the Yugoslav Presidcnt's u'ar crimcs had
made rt rmpossrble tbr him to remaln rn poucr in
the FRY.
297 A point worth noting is that the Gft dcclar-
atron mentloned an interrm administration for
Kosovo to be decrded b1'the l,N Secuntv Coun-
cil rihile the Rambouillet plan envisagcd an
elected go\,crnmcnt led bl ethnic Albanians in an
autonomous Kosovo u ithrn the FRY.
298 Mr Ibrahrm Rugova. *'hom thc Serbs
allor,red to go to Rome. rmmedratelv gar,e broad
support to the G8 dcclaration. addrng that thc
deplolmcnt of an international peacc forcc in
Kosovo consrstrng of forccs from NATO and
other countnes and the urthdrarval from the
pro\rrncc of Serb forces u'ere kev conditrons5r
Hou'ever. at that timc Mr Rugova's posltlon as a
representatl\ e of the Kosor ar Albanian com-
munrt\,\\as not clear. He had been cxplorted b1
Mr Mrlosel'rc *'hen under sun'erllance rn Pris-
tina. but his regarned freedom u'as supposed to
brrng him back on the scene . The Russians cer-
tarnlr'preferred to dcal uith him rather than wrth
thc KLA rcpresentatir-es. The KLA's provisional
go\ emment rnsrstcd on the deplol ment of a force
under NATO command and ruled out a L,N
forcc. It also relected thc G8's dcmand for dis-
armamcnt of the KLA- something uhrch had
been accepted b1' the Kosovar Albanian delega-
tron in Pans rvhen rt signed the Rambourllet plan
() A peace seltlement for Kosovo
299 In the rveeks that follolved- intensive talks
*erc hcld bct*een representatives of the United
Statcs. Europc and Russia in order to claritl a
numbcr of points in the Gti proposal. Under-
standablr'. the rvestem Allics rrantcd to bc sure
that Russia rvould participate flillr in a peace
settlement over Kosovo. Thc EU nominated the
Prcsident of Finland. Nlarlti Ahtisaari. as its
specral representatlve. The United States put
fonrard its Deputl' Secretary of State. Strobe
" Le ^\k,ru\e.8 Mar 1999
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Talbott. and Viktor Chernomvrdin continued to
represent Russia in the talks The discussions
betu'een the Alhes and Russia concentrated on
thc composrtlon. command and status of the in-
tcmational peacekeeping force to be deplol'ed in
Kosolo
300. 81' the first u'eek of June. follou'ing an
intensive round of shuttle diplomao' betu'ccn the
caprtals rnvolved- the various participants in the
talks had found enough common ground to pres-
ent a peace plan to Belgradc
301 On 28 Mar'. the government in Belgrade
announced that it acccpted the G8 proposal uith-
out. horrever. specrfirng holv it rntendcd to com-
ply lvrth it. This acccptance u'as confirmed in a
letter from the Yugoslav Forergn Minrster to the
German Foreign Minrster. also urthout further
specification. Prcsident Ahtrsaan. Mr Cherno-
mvrdin. Mr Talbott and thc EU Prosrdent-in-
Offrce. Chancellor Gerhard Schrodcr. finalh' met
in Bonn on I and 2 June to drscuss the details of
the G8 proposal.
302. Prcsrdent Ahtrsaari and Mr Chernomyrdin
then n'ent to Belgrade on 3 Junc to present a ten-
polnt peace plan to the Serbian Government
uhich u.as not ncgotrable After the Serbian Parl-
iament had voted to accept the plan bv 136 rotes
in favour and 34 agalnst. the government then
declared it accepted (see Appendix).
303. In an apparent srgn of deep mistrust of anv
undertakings given bv Presrdent Miloscvrc-
NATO leaders announced that air stnkes uould
contrnue untrl a veritiable rvrthdrasal of Serb
forces took place but it uas reported that the
operatron uould be scaled don,n to take account
of the "nerv political situatron"'r.
304. On 5 and 6 Junc. a Yugoslav militarl'
delegatron led b1' Deputl' Chref-of-Staff General
Svctozar Marjanovic. and a NATO militarl'
delegation led by' Lrcutenant Gcneral Sir Michacl
Jackson met in Kumanoro (FYROM) to define
the modalities of the uithdrau'al of Serbian
troops from Kosovo and the entn, of a first
NATO contingent. On 6 Junc. thc talks \\-ere sus-
pended for lack of agreement. The Serbs also
called into question the principle of a total riith-
drau'al of their forces. Finallr'. thev argued that a
document on thcir ruthdrarval and the entn' of
NATO troops into Kosovo could not be srgncd
unttl a LN Securrtv Councrl resolution on a
settlement of the conflict had bccn adopted'r.
30-5 In the meantlme. a text uas berng draftcd
for approral br the G8 Forergn Mrnrsters uho
u,erc to meet in Bonn on 7 and 8 June After
appror al. thrs text on a peace settlement in
Kosovo u'ould be thc basis for a UN SecunI'
Council resolutron to be adopted later that u'cek
306 It u'as noted that the LfN Securitr,' Council
resolution u'ould not specifi' the detarls of the
organisation of the internatronal militan' peace-
keeping force in Kosovo. KFOR The deplor'-
ment zones of the different units of this force and
rts command structure rrere being discussed bv
the mrlrtan authorrtres of NATO and Russra,
European govcrnmcnts emphasrsed that the UN
Securiq Council resolutron should be adoptcd
before KFOR entcrcd Kosoro. Both the Unrted
States and the European allies noted that the arr
strikes could be suspended onlv after an agreo-
ment on the modalities of the uithdraual of
Yugoslavra's armed forces from Kosovo.
307 President Mrloserrc u.as not allo*cd to
negotlate over thc Gtl peace plan presentcd to
him bv thc Ahtrsaan-Chernomvrdin dclegation 
-
his options being eithcr to take rt or leare it The
neu' plan uas consrderably' diffcrent from the
Rambouillct proposal shich he had refuscd to
accept.
308. Whercas the Rambouillet plan strpulated
vtrtuallr limitless access for NATO-led troops
across the rrhole territon' of the FRY. the G8
peace plan speaks onlr of the deplor ment in
Kosovo. undcr UN ausplces. of an "rntemational
securitv prescnce r.uth an essential NATO pres-
ence''- rrhich mav suggest that such militan'unrts
uill not be able to morc rnto Serbian territon'.
uhile Mr Mrlosevic can explain to hrs people that
the force in Kosovo rs a UN force.
30q Thc Rambouillet proposal imphed that a
referendum on rndependence could be hcld tn
Kosovo at the end of a thrcc-r'car penod. Thc Gu
peace plan mentrons onlv the "estabhshmcnt of
an interim admrnistratron for Kosovo ... lrhich
the UN Sccuritr Council u'ill decidc" It also
savs that a politrcal process uill '-securc essential
autonomv for Kosovo rvith flill taking lnto con-
'3 Financial Tnnes.54 June 1999
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sideration of the . pnncrples of soveretgntl' and
terrrtorial rntegntv of the Fcderal Repubhc of
Yr.rgoslavla .. "
310 Observers have noted that thcre are ambr-
guitrcs rn the G8 tert uhrch mav in practrce help
to creatc an international protcctorate in Kosovo.
to be follorred rn due course br othcr settlcments
in the region
3 I I Albanian rcaction to the Gt3 plan as ac-
ccpted by Mr Mrloser,rc rras mixed The plan
mentions demilitansatron of the KLA and not its
polrtical and milrtan' transformation. as the
Rambourllet plan did. Demrlitansation of the
KLA rs important for stabilising the situation in
Kosovo. but rt urll onlv be possible if therc are
enough guarantccs that Serbian armed forccs and
pohce forces urll uithdrau' and that an lntcma-
tional mrlrtan' forcc lvill protect tho Kosorar
Albanians u'ho rcturn to their homes The more
radrcal Kosovar Albanians argue that onlf inde-
pcndencc of Kosovo can guarantee their sccuritl'
and thcr cxclude the possrbrlrtv of peaceftil co-
existence among Serbs and ethnic Albanians in
thc prorlncctt. Manv Albanians notc that rt uill
bc difficult to create a democratic and stable
Kosor o u'itliin a countn' s,hich is netthcr one nor
thc othcr and u'hose lcaders har e becn rndrctcd
for vn.ar crlmcs.
(g) Indictment of hesidetfi Milosevic
for wur crimes and crimes uguinst humunifi'
312. On27 Ma1 1999. the Intemational Crrmi-
nal Trrbunal for the former Yugoslar ra (ICTY)
indicted Presrdcnt Mrlosevrc for crimcs against
humanitr and uar cnmes rn Kosovo. Togethcr
u'ith Mr Mrlosevic. four othcr Serbs in high of-
fice u'cre indicted Mrlan Milutinovrc. Prcstdcnt
of Serbia. Nrkola Sarnovic. Deputl, Prime Minis-
ter of the FRY and Mr Mrloser'ic's specral cnrov
in the Kosovo crisis. Vlalko Stojiljkor rc. Serbia's
Mrnrster of the Interior rn charge of its police
forces and Dragollub Oldanic. Chref-of-StafT of
the Yugoslav armed forces. Thev are accused of
having "planned. rnstigated. ordered. commttted
or othenvise aided and abetted in a campaign of
terror and vrolence dirccted at Kosovo Albanran
crvilians".
3 13. The rndrctmcnt is based on the accounts of
numerous refugees and on classified information
uhich rr-as provided bv a numbcr of alhed gor-
emments and u'hrch rrrll onlv bc pubhshcd uhen
the accused appcar beforc thc Trrbunal. The
Tribunal-s chief prosccutor- Lourse Arbour. did
not orclude that possrbrlrtv at a latcr stagc Mr
Milosevic urll also bc rndrcted for hrs rolc rn
earlior conflicts rn Croatra and Bosnia and Hcr-
zegol'ina Thc ICTY has rssucd an rntemattonal
arrest \\'arrant agalnst thc fir c rndictcd persons
31.1. Intemational reactron to the indrctments
u'as varicd. As might har c bcen expectcd. the
government rn Belgrado descnbed thc action of
thc ''non-existent tnbunal" as "monstrous".
Russia called rt a polrtrcal dccision uhrch scn-
ouslv undcmlned the authorrtv of the TnbLrnal
and interfercd n'ith the peacc process The Rus-
slan envo\'. Viktor Chernoml'rdin. said Mr Mrlo-
sevic u as a legitrmatell' electcd head of state u ith
u'hom he rrould continue to negottate China u'as
also said to be uorricd about the possible nega-
tlle consequences for the pcace process Most of
the allied leaders u'olcomed thc rndictrncnt ln
public. but govcrnmcnt officials admrtted that rt
rvould not facrlrtate thc ncgotiatlons ovcr a peacc
settlement
315 What consequenccs thc rndrctmcnt *rll
have for the role and posrtron of N{r Mrloscvrc
rcmarns to be seen but it is unhkelv that he has
anr' future as a rvell respccted stateslnan.
(h) &tme preliminary conclusions regurding
lhe Kosovo utnJlict
316. Although a peacc scttlement secms to be
urthrn reach at the trme of untrng (8 June 1999)-
stabiliti' in south-eastem Europe can b1' no
mcans be taken fbr granted unless. among other
things. the European Unron makcs a sustarned
effort to assist and slrpport all the countncs rn
that rcgron in thc frameu'ork of a long-term pro-
gramme. The Stabrlrtv Pact for south-castern
Europe berng proposcd b1' the ELI is a step ur thc
right drrectron and therefore descn-es to be paid
thc greatcst attention
317. Europe prides itself on having taken thc
management and solution of a malor crrsis into
its oun hands but rt has taken manv vears. thou-
sands of victims on both srdes and a malor refii-
gee cnsis for a peace settlcment to bc forccd
upon thc Federal Repubhc of Yugoslavra
3 I8 It s-ould thcreforc secm usefihl to reflect on
a number of elements uhrch should bc taken into55 'lI'ctll Street.lournal. -l-5 June 1999
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accollnt \\'hen dra$rng up the main hnes of a
future European polo fbr south-eastem Europe .
319 The Kosor o crlsls began to smoulder in
1989 u'hen Belgrade abolishcd Kosovo's auton-
omr'. Europe drd not take anv decisive stcps
rvhich could havc helpod to solve the conflict
until earlr 199ti uhen a Serbran massacre of
Kosovar Albanian cn'rhans put the cnsrs rn the
lunelight as a rcsult of ertenslve cor.'erage in the
mcdia From that polnt on\\'ards. Kosovo could
no longer bc rgnorcd.
320 For too long Europe had remained passive
and thus allorred a crisis situation to develop into
a vrolent confltct There rrere several roasons
u'hv rt sas rcluctant to act docrsivolv in ordcr to
prevont an armcd confrontatron in Kosor,'o and it
is uorth recaprtulaturg some of them here:
the Darton Peace Agreement of 1995.
stronglv supported bi' the Europeans-
ga\c a neu lcasc of political life to Slo-
bodan Mrlosc'r'ic uho had been prarsed
for hrs flexrbrlrtv and sense of realism
after hc had cocrced his Serbian vassals
rur Bosnra to stop fighting and agree to
a settloment For a number of years he
u'as untouchable becausc he uas con-
srdcrcd to be a ker pcrson in marn-
tarning poacc in Bosnra and the Bal-
kans. Thc EU member states drd not
approve of Mr Milosevrc's policl, in
Kosovo but drd not \\'ant to interfere in
Serbra's rntornal policl':
rn the prcparations for Dalton- no
European stlte insrsted on an agree-
mcnt uhrch rvould also mclude a
settlcment for Kosovo. l'here a conflict
u'as in the offing All the govemments
u'antcd a qLrick fix for Bosnia because
cven'bodv uas tired of rvar. The US
Presrdent needed an important forergn
policv success for hrs re-election and
no European countn' u'anted to com-
plicate the situation further:
although Ibrahrm Rugova and his
part)'. the LDK. focused for manv
vears ol1 obtaining a peaceful settle-
ment of thc cnsis. rvhich was the result
of Mr Mrlosevic's policr'. thel' received
no more than lukeu'arm support from
rrcstem European states afraid ofbeing
accuscd of urterfering tn a countn's
internal affarrs.
- 
Europoan states onlv started to takc an
interest in Koso.l'o n'rth the emergencc
of armed resistance br the KLA bol-
stcred bf incrcasing support from a
populatron uhrch n'as trrod of peaceftll
resrstance r.r'rthout anrthrng to shou' for
it Even a 1996 agreement bctu.een
Slobodan Mrlosorc and Ibrahim Rug-
ova on cducatron for Kosovar Alba-
nians in their o*n langr"rage u'as not
implcmentcd.
terrorist action b1- the KLA increased
inter-ethnic tension rn Kosovo and de-
terrcd the European states from lookrng
upon the KLA as a rcspectablc partner
q'ith a rolc rn the crisrs but uhrle rt did
not receive anv senoLls or officral sup-
port. ncrther \\'as ant' action taken to
stop the illegal flou of arms into
Kosovo to eqLup the KLA. This pro-
vrded Mr Miloscvic rrith the arguments
he needed for hrs brutal oppressron of
the Kosovar Albanian population. of-
ficiallv to eradicate terrorism. but rrrth
the intended side-effect of terrorrsing-
displacing and dcportrng the majoritr'
of that population
321 The Kosovo conflrct has also changed a
numbcr of premises in the European securitr-
equation rvhich rrill have consequences for future
actlon in this field. The sol'creign nghts of a
European state over its ternton'have been chal-
lenged For thc f-rrst time smce the second u-orld
s.ar. rr.cstern Europe states and therr transatlantic
allies have used militan means against a Euro-
pean countn' in order to force rt to bring rts poh-
cies into line nith prevailing European standards.
322. NATO's reputation as the onlv effectivc
and invrncible militan' organisatron in thc u'orld
has also suffered some setbacks. Leaning on a
massive US presence urthin the organisatron- rt
portral'ed itself as the most efficient and crcdible
polrtrco-military structure rn thc uorld. After
morc than six uecks of rntcnsrve air stnkes.
Mr Milosevic had strll not glven ln to Western
demands, rvhich NATO over-confidentlv thought
*ould happen ri'ithin a fcu davs Nor had it pre-
vented a humanitarian disaster. u'ith massacres
-l-5
DOCUI\IENT l(,5i
of crriIans. ethnic clcansing and mass cxpulsron
of thc Kosorar Albanran population
323 NATO. desprte being the onlv mrlrtan
organrsation capablc of managrng large-scale
opcratlons. rs subloct to thc same phcnomenon as
thc Unitcd Nations u'hich 
- 
rn the oprnron of
NATO mcmbcr statcs 
- 
uas not capable of solv-
ing the Kosovo cnsrs. Whrle there is no doubt
that NATO has ovcnvhelmrng mrlitan' strength.
its mrlrtan' capacltv is subject to the political
control of rts member states uhrch arc not prc-
pared to do much morc than rs 
-prdged acccptablc
b1'public opinron NATO has as httle oxpenence
as othcr organisations of post-cold uar cnsts
managcmcnt. n'hich apparentlv demands von'
spccrtic skills and capabilities
321 NATO nrav hare brought NIr Nlrloserrc to
hrs knces u'hen he accepted the Gtt proposal as
presented bv Prcsrdcnt Nlarlti Ahtrsaan and
Viktor Chernomvrdrn. but a peace scttlement urll
not u'ork urthout a LN Securitv Councrl rcsolu-
tron for uhrch the agreemcnt of both Russra and
Chna rs rcquired. and each of thcm mav uant
somc conccssions from thc Alliancc in erchange
for therr agrcelnent
32-5 Europe. and rn partrcular thc European
Llnron- has understood that rt neods to takc actron
to strcngthcn thc comrnon European polrcv on
security and defcnce
326 At its Colognc Summrt. the European
Council declared that rt \\as "con\rnccd that thc
Councrl should have thc abilrtr to takc decisions
on thc full rangc of conf'hct prer ention and cnsis-
mauagement tasks defrned rn the Treatt' on Euro-
pean Union. thr' "Pctcrsberg tasks " Thrs rs an
encouraging srgn. but sunrlar pronounccmcnts
har c been nradc bcfbre and tlic qucstlon reuralns
hou rnd uhcn thc Colognc Declaration urll be
implcmcntcd.
327 Explarning the Cologne decrsions. tho
German Mrnistcr of Statc fbr European Affarrs.
Gunther Verheugcn. has alreadv sard that thc text
onlv regards "Petcrsberg missions" and nothing
clsc Hc cxcludcd operations such as the one in
Kosor o bcrng cnl isagcd fbr a long trnre to come
Unless Europc rs capable of managing a Kosoro-
Itke crisrs- rts secuntv and dcfcnce capabrlitv uill
bc extrcmeh rcstrictcd. not to sav usclcss
X. Greece
328. In Grcccc. uhcrc thc rast maJontv of the
populatron as ucll as the mass media arc s\mpa-
thetic to the Serb nation. thc present phasc of the
Kosoro cnsls ls sccn as both a tragedr and a
potential dangcr of urdespread dcstabr[satron rn
the Balkans Er-en puttrng aside orthodor soli-
dantr'(the Greek Church collccted monc\ to help
the suffering Scrb peoplc) and the traditronal
fricndship bctuecn the tuo natrons (th* have
becn allies srnce 18.10). the mere possibilrtr of a
change in Balkan fiontrers as a rcsult of possrblc
rndependcnce for Kosovo cannot help but be of
concem to Grcccc. uhosc policr rs clcarh' rn
f'avour of dereloping good rclatrons. rf possible
rrith all rts neighbours- ln an atmosphcrc of po-
litical stabilrtv Especrallv rrorn'rng is the pos-
srbilitl' of destabrhsation of FYRON{ through an
uprising of its Albanran communrtr'- rrhrch
threatens in thc short tcnn to lcad liugo numbers
to take reftigc in a countn'alrcadv saturated urth
foretgncrs. and ln thc longcr tenn to upsct the
u'holc dehcate balancc of thc rcgion
329 Ner ertheless. Greece scems dctermlncd to
shori rtsglf a farthful NATO allr' Thus it has not
opposcd NATO's decision to launch air stnkcs
agarnst Yugoslar lan targcts and rs clearlr sup-
po(rng e\tcnsl\e autonomr for Kosoro On the
othcr hand. the Grcek Governmcnt rs tn ing to
holp deftrsc the crrsrs through drplomatrc initra-
tn cs such as the meeting of scnror forergn policr
officrals from Bulgaria. FYRON'I. Romanra and
Turker- lhrch took placc rn Athcns on 19 April
1999 Pnme Mrnrster Sirnrtis. gtvlng vorce to thc
general con\ rctlon. dcclared pubhclv rn Neu
York that a politrcal solution should be found.
and at the samc trme strongh' condemncd Scrbran
operatrons in Koso'r'o"' As rcgards the possiblc
use of Thcssalonrka as a pornt of transit fbr
NATO troops for anv land opcrations against the
Serbs. this rs somcthrng Greece uould clcarlv
prefer to ar ord It should bc noted- hou'er cr. that
nerther the Grcck Pnmc Nlnistcr nor the Mrnrster
for Defence have rulcd out thc possrbilrtr'. rvrth
thc Pnmc N{rnrstcr stating rn gencral terms that
Grcccc should shou' rtself a taithlirl NATO allr'
and thc Defence Minrster maintaimng that to
allorv NATO troops passage u'ould not contra-
.16
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\,ene the Greek Constitutron'7. But both have
mlcd out anr form of participatron bv Greek
troops rn such operafions.
XI. Montenegro
330 At the start of the NATO arr strikcs. the
Presrdcnt of Montenegro. Milo Djukanovic. de-
nounced the "rnad polio' (on the part of Bel-
grade) of confronting the uhole u'orld" He also
said that his country had done eventhing to prc-
vent this "surcrde venture" and referred to hrs
govemmont as 'the onlv votce of reason in this
rcgion".
331. Thc Montenegnn Government condemned
thc arr stnkes but. at the same time- tried to foil
attempts b1'the Yugoslar,' Federal Armv to mobt-
hsc rcserv'ists in Montenegro. u'htle continumg to
cntrclse Mr Mrloseric's policl' Moreorer. Prcst-
dcnt Dlukanouc marntained a free press tn
Montenegro. rcsrsted Belgrade's demands that
the medra be sub.lect to mrlitan' ccnsorshrp and
granted accommodation to refugecs from Kosovo
*.hose numbers totalled 68 400 on 2 June 1999
332. At thc end of Ma1'. Presrdent Dlukanovrc
r rsrted Bonn. Pans. London and Washinglon in
ordcr to urn support for himself and hrs countrv
Thc federal govcrnment accused hirn of vtolattng
hrs "legal obligation and patrrotic dutl ( ) to
contrrbutc to the defence of thc countn' against
NATO". and condenmed him for visrting forcign
caprtals5n
333 After the rmpositron of tlie orl embargo
against the FRY. declared bv the EU and ten
contral and eastern European countrics. the gor'-
ernmcnt of Montenegro suggcstcd that tt u'ould
continue to let orl entcr rts port facilrtres rn Bar
for "humanitanan purposcs Tliis sould not
onlv cor,er thc nocds of humanitarian organisa-
tions takrng carc of thc tens of thousands of refu-
gecs in Montencgro but uould also help thc gor'-
ernment u'hich is at a loss and tnav not be ablc to
pal the police forccs it has mobrlised rn order to
protect rtself against thc fioderal armed forces,
Latcr on. the 'r'ugoslav arrnv and navl' scized
control of Montenegro's borders and barrcd the
Athens Nervs Agcnq'. 20 Apnl 1999
II-oll Street.htuntol. 31 Mar 1999.
entn' of humanrtarran ard and rau matorials into
the countn'
33+ Rumours of an attempt b), Bclgrade to
regarn control of Montencgro s'ith the hclp of thc
Yugoslav armed forces and to apprchend N{r
Dlukanor,,ic havo becn circulatrng from the be-
ginnrng of NATO's arr stnkes. uhrch did not
sparc the ternton' of Nlontencgro. A gol'ermnent
sourcc in Montencgro has statcd that bets'een the
end of March and the end of NIav 1999. thc
number of fedcral troops deploved on its tcrriton
increased from 9 000 to 35 000. The countn'urll
soon ask Belgrade to amrouncc the end of the
state of rvar uhich s'as declared at the cnd of
March and to bnng the numbcr of fcderal sol-
dicrs back to thc prc-uar strength5".
335 As earlr,' as 2 April. after Prcsidcnt Nhlo-
se'r'ic rcplaced thc mrlitan' chief of thc 2nd
Yugoslar. armf in N{ontenegro urth a Bclgradc
lovalist"". and on several other occasions. NATO
Secrctary -General- Javtcr Solana. u-arned him
that NATO u ould rntcn'cnc if he attemptod a
coup against hrs reformrst opponents in Monte-
negro President Djukanovrc has recentlv strcng-
thcncd hrs lurks uith thc Scrb opposition and ts
consrdered rn somo \\ cstcrn countries as a
possible succcssor to Mr Nliloserrc.
336. Montenegro receivcd the ncu s of Bel-
grade's approval of a peace scttlement rvtth great
cautron and offrcials sard that any lnove torvards
pcacc in Kosovo could shilt the confltct tnto
Montengro. partlv becauso Mr Milosevic thrivcs
in conflict srtuatrons6r
337 . Presrdent D-;ukanovtc dcclared that after
the peace settlement Montoncgro u-ould try to
reach agreement urth Serbra on thc pnncrplos of
democratic relatrons bctu'ecn thc t*'o republics
If thei' succcedcd- Montenegro uould considcr
the Federal Repubhc of Yugoslavia an acccpt-
able frameuork rn rrhich to realtse its oblecttves
If an agreement uith Serbra \\as not possiblc-
then the gor,'erruncnt *'ould hold a ref-crcndutn to
dccidc on the filturc ol Montcrtegro6r
5" I-e ,\\ontle.5 June 1999
6" l;tnanctal Tune.s. 3-1 April I 999
"t U-oll ,\trcet,Journal. l-5 June 1999
62 Lc )Iontle.9 June I999.
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XII. A velcome regional initiotive:
tlte Multinutionql Peace Frtrce
S zut h-Ea stern E u rope (MP FS E E)
338 In September 1998. Albanra. Bulgaria.
FYROM. Greece. ltalr. Romania and Turkev
signcd an agreement to establish the MPFSEE
At that timc. manv detarls still had to be uorked
out and thrs has nou.bccn done. as confirmed br'
the srgnrng of a protocol in Athens on l2 Januarv
I 999.
339. The command of the force w'ill rotate
even' t$'o vears among the seven particrpatrng
countries. starting r,r'ith Turko' in August 1999.
to be follosed b1' Greecc in 2001. The samc
rotation pnncrple applies to the scat of the forcc
and the charrmanshrp of the pohtico-militan'
committec The headquarters i,rill rotate even
four vears bctu'een Bulgana. Romania. Turkev
and Greece. uith Plordir (Bulgaria) as its first
locatron. The Presideno' and the seat of the
milrtan committee have been assigncd to Greece
for the first tuo I'ears and urll then rotate to
Romania and the other participattng statcs re-
spectivell'.
340. The MPFSEE rvill not consist of a perma-
nent contrngent but urll have a 2 0OO-strong
brrgade composed according to the specific mis-
sions it urll have to accomplish. According to the
September 1998 agrecment. the force *ill be
available for possiblc emplormcnt m UN- or
OSCE-mandated NATO-led or WEUJed con-
flict-prevention and other peace-support opera-
tions. including pcacekeeprng. peacemakmg.
peaccburldrng and humanitarian operations
XIII. Europeon lctiln
in suuth-esstern Europe
(u) Partnership for prosperifi' ?
341. On 9 March. speaking at a conference in
London. NATO Secretan'-General Javier Solana
suggested establishing a "partnership for pros-
peritr'" for the Balkans. An effective settlement
of the conflrct rn Kosovo should be the starting
point for the entire Euro-Atlantrc communitv to
becomc engaged in creating the condrtions for
reconstructron and reconcrhation. He rightll, said
that "rvithout a comprehensit'e approach to the
reglon s problems. rre rvill never get bey'ond
trcating its svmptoms".
342. The idea of a Marshall plan for south-
eastern Europe has also been grren a sceptrcal
receptlon Expcrts argue that the financial means
prouded mar bc insrgnlficant ln r i*r of the
dramatic situation At the same tlmc. it is sard
that manl of the economres concerncd rrrll srm-
pl1'not be able to absorb more aid, A number of
them cannot cope rr ith the present ard monev
bcing officred. If a plan is drawn up. rt should be
directed tou'ards thc der elopment of infrastruc-
tures and thc cstablishrnent of 
.1ornt prolects uith
\\'estcrn companies. It should encouragc and
guarantec foreign rnl'estment rn the region and
liberalise thc flou of goods and caprtal betrr-ecn
countries rn the region Those countries should be
encouraged to cooperate more u'ithin the frame-
uork of a regional market. rather than indirrdu-
allv tryrng to cstabhsh closer hnks urth \\'estem
countnes and the EU
(b) Initiul fin ancial support
343. At the end of March rt became clear that
because of Scrb liolence and organrsed mass
deportations of Kosovar Albanrans to the borders
of the province. ncrghbourrng countries rrere
facing a maJor cnsis ou'ing to the massir'e influx
of refugees. On 7 April thercforc. the European
Commissron proposcd to provide an arnount of
€250 million to help countrics in thc regron face
the drastic conscqucnces of the rcfugee influx.
having alreadv spent. in Kosovo. the €22 million
avarlable in thc 1999 budget for humanitarian
prolects.
344 The €250 mrllion. u'hrch \\,as to be re-
leased at short notlcc. uould be dr\,rded into
- 
€150 million's rvorth of humanrtarian
aid. managed bv ECHO.
€100 million rn economrc aid to Alba-
nra- FYROM and Montenegro to make
sure thesc countries r.r'ould not be po-
liticallv destabihsed. and that rcfugees
and displaced and dcported persons
rvould be assunilated and supported
u'ithin the rcgion. to maintain the pros-
pect of a quick return to their oun
countn'
(c) The Stubilitt, PactJbr south-eustern Euntpe
345 In earlv April. the German Presidencv of
the European Unron proposed that after the end
of the Kosovo conflict, a "Stabilitv Pact for
south-eastem Europe" be concluded uhich
,+8
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should be the basis tbr reconstructron of the re-
gion as a uhole. This stabilitv pact uould con-
cern Albania. Croatia. Bosnia and Herzegovina.
the Fcdoral Republic of Yugoslavra and
FYROM The European Commissron has pro-
posed concludrng u,ith each of these countries a
"stabilisatron and associatron" agrccment. It is
lrorth noting that onlv tl'o of these fi'r,'e countrics
- 
Albanra and FYROM 
- 
fulfil the political and
economic condrtions for such agrccments. in
partrcular. regardmg democrao - human rights
and a market econom\'.
346. In a communicatron adopted on 26 Mav
1999. the European Commissron proposed 
- 
at
the Councrl's request 
- 
a Stabllitv Pact for
south-castern Europe. Although rarious bilateral
agreements har,e bcen concluded betrveen thc EU
and a numbcr of countncs in the rogion. includ-
rng FYROM and Albania. the Commissron's rdea
is to dc'r,elop a global regional approach (in ac-
cordance uith the strategv defincd in 1996)
u'hrch uill also take in the FRY once it has met
the basrc condrtrons for coopcration r,rith the EU
The origin of the pact *'as a proposal from the
German Presidcncv to u'hrch the European Coun-
cil agreed on l4 April. It rs part of the EU'sloint
stratcgv on the Balkans. as set forth at the
European Council Summit rn Vrenna Commrs-
sioncr van den Broek u'as given rcsponsibilitt, for
the project s'hrch hc subniitted to the Com-
missron as a rvhole on 20 Mav bcfbre fonrarding
it to the EU Councrl Given that the purpose of
the pact is to ostabhsh a procedure fbr the re-
gion's economic regeneration and democratic
stabilisation. it is to be seen as a projcct for the
medium and longcr term. A Council dccision on
the pact could be taken b1' the end of June as Mr
Fischer said he n'anted to convene a mrnistenal
meeting on the matter before the end of the Ger-
man Presidencr-of the EUu3.
347 As the pact rs based on a global concept.
action bl' the relevant EU institutrons and the
member statos u'ould also be accompanied br
initiatives on the part of NATO. the Council of
Europe. the major financial institutions (lMF.
World Bank. EIB. EBRD) and the Unrted States.
Canada, Turkel'. Russia. Japan and the Unrted
Nations It mav also be opened to regional or-
ganisations and initratir es
34lt Thc EU's rnain objective rs to send a
strong political signal to thc statcs concerncd
rvtth a l'icu to speedier and more intcnsn,c rap-
prochement. As thrs is intcndcd to lcad to therr
integration in the "European famrly of nations".
the EU $'ants to reassllre those countnes u'anting
to join that rt urll pror ide them rvith the means to
do so Thc Commissron's project accordingh
makes provision for them to take a number of
avenues and proposes assistance to impror,'e therr
politrcal and economic situations. Thc various
areas for cooperation proposed arc outlined be-
lou.
349. Democratts'crtion: devcloping mstitutions
and strcngthening civil socictics support for free
elections. assistance n'ith education: freedom tbr
the media: help uith the police and justtcc s]'stcrn
u'ith a vlew to establishing thc rule of lau and
effective pubhc adniinistration: development of a
network of foundattons for democrac\'.
350. T'racle' devcloping preferentral trade
schomes along the lines of agreements alrcadl'
concluded u rth Albania.
351. Economrc' and.financrul urcl: althotrgh thc
total ard package for thc region alreadt' stands at
€'732 6 mrlhori for 1999, thc Commissron nghtlv
considers it to be far too lou. Under the pact-
there uill be far more f'lexibilitv for using EU aid
schemos and promoting pnt'ate rnvestntent. The
Commission also proposes to reduce 
- 
and even
cancel 
- 
the debt oued b1'the states concerned
and to channel somc of the ard into multrnatronal
or cross-border cooperatron betu'een the coun-
tnes of the region.
352 Poltficsl dtalogue' developing a multrlat-
eral dialogue at regional level betueen senlor
govcrnment otl-icials or ministers for the purposc
of setting up perrnanent arrangements for dia-
loguc anrong thc Balkan countries
353. Justtce ond internal a.f/tnrs: promoting an
independent judrcian' and effective police forces.
The Commission consrders that WEU could har e
a role to plav here on the basrs of its expericncc
rn Albania. This area could include schemes to
help fight drug-traffickrng and assist lrrth border
controls as rvell as prograrnmes designcd to pre-
vent mrgratron to the EU.
354. When presentrng the prolect- Mr van den
Broek stressed that the eventual objective for thc
countrrcs in questron was their integration rn"3 See Bullefin Europe No. 7-173. 28 Mav 1999
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E,uro-Atlantrc structures urth the proccss rn-
r,'olrcd to constltute a lralf-uav stage betu'een
Europe Agreements and assocration agreements.
Commentrng on the prolcct rn his capacitv as
Charrman of the EU Cotrncil. Mr Fischer said tt
should arm to create thc condrtions for a lastrng
pcace that uould rnake it possrble for thc coun-
trrcs of the region to bccome frrmli' rooted tn the
Euro-Atlantlc communrtv and bc offcred the
prospcct of ELr membership Furthermore. at a
confercnce held bi thc Centre for European Pol-
ro' Studies. Mr Prodr confirmed that thc pnontr'
for thc European Comrntsston hc u'as to hcad
uould be to dcfinc a post-\\'ar strateg)' for the
Balkans.
3-55 Referrrng to thc matter of a timetable. Mr
r an den Broek gave the follou'ing rnfbrmation.
fu) the Commrsston u'ould gtve pnontv
to submrttrng pcrhaps as carlv as this
sumner a fcasibrlitv rcport on ncgotra-
trons urth FYRON{. uhtch could begrn
ncxt autrrmn:
(h) ncgotrations uith Albanra could pro-
cced on thc same basis once it had taken a
number of correctrve mcasures:
(r') ncgotratrons u'ith thc three srgnaton'
countnes to thc Darton Peace Agreemcnt
(Croatra. Bosnia and Herzcgovrna and the
FRY) u'ould follou' Croatia in particular
had still not fullv mct somc of the basic
condrtrons laid doun at Darton regarding
rnler alto electoral laus. refugce lssues
and frcedom ofthe nrcdia
356 Finallr'- NIr ran den Brock pointcd out that
othcr countrics in thc region \\'cre assocrated rn
othcr uat's rrrth the process of building Europe
As an eramplo he referrcd to the EU acccssion
procedure that apphcd to Bulgaria. Romanra and
evcn Hungan
3-i7 Let us note that thc funding for this pact
has not r et bcen discussed although the Com-
nrrssion's ncrv Presidcnt. Romano Prodr. has
indicatcd that rt coLrld b0 €-i brlhon per vcarut On
l2 Ma1' 1999. thc European Commrssron and the
World Bank set up a task force uhich rrrll coor-
drnate the financral aid for rcconstruction
358 On the other hand. the Europcan Com-
mission has askcd the Council to drau' a clear
drstrnctron betucen the stabilitv pact for thc five
south-eastern Europcan countncs and thc EU
enlargemcnt process uhich concems ten ccntral
and castern European countrtcs and Cvprus In
the fram*rork of the enlargement process.
"European assoclatlon agrecments" havc been
concluded urth the countnes rnr olr cdo'
(d) Sunctions ugainst the Federal Republic
of Yugoslaviu
359 ln late Apnl the EU Council approved a
proposal from the Commission for the rmplemen-
tation of a package of econonrrc sanctrons agalnst
the FRY Arnong othcr thrngs thrs rncludes: (r/ a
prohrbition on thc salc of orl products- (tt) re-
strictrons on thc movcments of Presidsnt Milo-
sevrc and mcmbcrs of his famrh' and on Yugo-
slar mmistcrs and senior officrals: (trr) a freeze
on thc asscts of the Yugoslar Government and
statc-orrncd compallles: (n) a btn on all flrghts
betrrcen the FRY and the EU. (v) a rcstrictron on
the cxport of goods lrablc to hclp repair damage
cased bv the arr strrkes: (r'rl a prohibrtion on thc
export of caprtal.
360 In a declaratron rssued on 14 Mav in Brus-
scls- thc countries bclongrng to the Europe Eco-
nomic Area and the EU assocrated countries
(Bulgana. Czech Repubhc. C1'prus. Hungan'.
Estonia. Latvia. Poland. Romania and Slovcnia.
together *'ith Iceland. Lrechtcnstern and Nonray')
agreed to applv the nreasurcs spccrfied for the
cmbargo.
361 Furthermore. NATO decided to reinforce
the cmbargo armed pnmanlr at stopping dclrver-
rcs of orl products and armaments. On 26 Mar'.
the Permanent Councrl of the Atlantrc Alhance
accordinglr adopted a decision making pror,rsion
for a naval "stop and search" opcration although
it stopped shoft 
- 
at the rcquest of alUes such as
Italv and Gemranv uhich u'antcd to arord con-
frontatron urth Russra 
- 
at uslng forcc. as cnvis-
agcd undcr thc Unitcd States plan for stepprng up
actron to cnforce thc cmbargo At a meetrng hcld
in Washington on 26 April betu'een representa-
tivcs of NATO and the st:\en countries borderrng
on Yugoslavra (Albania. Bosnta and Herze-
t't Thcsc countnes are Bulgana. C1pms. the Czech
Rcpublic. Estonia. Hungan'. Lahra. Lrthuarua. Poland.
Romania. Slovakra and Sloverua
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go\'lna. Bulgana. Croatra. FYROM. Romanra
and Slovenra). thc latter recorded thcir Luire-
servcd endorsement of NATO action.
(e) Enlargement of the European Union
362. Whrle thc rmportancc of mrlitan' securitv
and polrtrcal stabilin' for the countrics of central
and eastorn Europc should not be undcrcsti-
mated- it rs gencrallv rccognised that rt is socio-
economic stabrlitv and prosperitl' that are most
conductvc to peacc. That rs uhv the onlargcment
of the EU is the best policv to cnsurc peace and
stabrlrtv in Europe, Mcmbcrship of the EU is
thercforc thc ultrmate obiective of all thc exlstlng
contral and castern Europcan states
363 The EU has nou started cnlargement ne-
gotrations u'ith Clpms. thc Czech Rcpubhc.
Estonia. Hungan'. Poland and Slorcnra Europe
Agreements have bcen concluded rrith Bulgana.
Latl'ra. LithLranra. Romanra and the Slor.'ak Rc-
pLrblic. uhrch are applicants. but cnlargemcnt
ncgotiatlons hare not )'et started As part of the
prc-accession stratcg\ adopted at the Esscn
European Council rn Dccember 1994. thc Euro-
pean Commtssion bcgan. on 3 Aprrl 1998. an
analr,trcal cxaminatior-r of the acqfi,\' L'ont-
ntltnqulotre u'rth these fir.'e countnes In Febru-
an' 1999. the Commission pubhshed a White
Papcr tbr the purpose of proriding a guide to
assist these assocrated collntnes in preparing
themselves for opcratrng under tho requrrcmcnts
of the EU's intemal rnarket It rdentifies thc kev
measures to be taken rn cach sector of thc intcr-
nal market and suggosts a sequence tn u'hrch the
approximatron of lcgrslation should bc tacklcd.
Through PFIARE. thc EU rs alreadv proridrng
assistancc fbr such approximatron and thrs lrll
nou' be enhanced and adapted to thc Whrte
Paper- s rccomnrendations
0 Thefight against organised crime
and crtrruption
36.t. [n order to rcinforce the capabilitics of
central and eastern European countries and a
numbcr of ex-Sorret republics to fight organiscd
crime and corruptron. thc European Commissiou
and the Council of Europe rn 1996 set up a loint
programmc called ''Octopus I" to cover the pe-
riod 1996-98 South-eastern European parttci-
pants ln thrs programme \\'ere Albanra. Bulgaria-
Croatra. FYROM and Romania
365. Thrs programme has nou been extcndcd as
"Octopus II". uhrch ls to nut untrl 3l Dccernbcr
2000 Its objcctn'e rs to achrere the adoption of
all tlrc occltus commrmatiatre tn the frcld of lus-
tice and rntenor affairs Octopus II mcludes in-
tenslu'e trarning and operatrons to assrst officrals.
ludgcs. represcntatrves of the Public Prosccutor
and police oft-rcers rrto. in therr respectivc coun-
tnes. aro rcsponsrble for thc fight agatnst organ-
iscd cnme and cormptton. Anrong tlie fields par-
trcularlr' enr rsaged are inqurn tcchnrques. rnfbr-
nration cxchange. cooperation betu'ccn publrc
bodies. protcction of rulnerablc authorrtres. rn-
tematronal cooperation rn thc field of cnminal
lau and measures to dcal u'ith cconomrc of-
fenccs
366. Thc Octopus programme rs consrdercd to
bc an rrnportant contribution to thc reinforccrnent
of legrslatn'c and constltutlonal reforms in thc
countrics conccrned
XIV. Conclusirtns
367 Er.rrope docs not uant anv ntorc \\ars on
lts territon'. After thc pcacc settlement ut
Kosovo- armcd conflict must bc banucd as an
unacceptable method for solr ing drsputes among
European statcs or pcoplcs Rccent histon' has
shorrn that south-eastcrn Er"rropc rs the regron
most prone to \\ars and armcd conflrct. not least
bccause its instabilltv is rootcd in thc complox
mtx of ethnic populatrons and thc vanous tcrrr-
tonal clarms rrtich are a consequence ol ccntu-
nos ol forcign dominatron
368 What should be done to guarantcc poacc
and stabilitv rn south-eastern Europe'l
369 Both NATO and Europo lr11 havc to as-
sume their responsrbilrtres as the protagomsts ln
a coordinated. long-term intcrnatronal pohcr to
malntaln peacc. Thcv uill also hare to accept
that a sizeable foreign militan prosence rvill bc
needed. not just for a numbcr of vears but for
decades in order to prc\''ent destabrhsation in
Albania. Bosnra and Herzcgovina. FYROM.
Montenegro and Scrbra- rncluding Kosovo
370 Europc urll hal'c to bolster rts common
sccuritv and defcncc poho The Amstcrdam
Treatv and the Colognc Declaration adoptcd br'
the Europcan Councrl on 3--l Junc 1999 are steps
rn the riglrt direction But lords are uot enough.
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Deeds arc uhat arc needcd above all else. If
Europe rcallv *'rshes to implement its dccisions.
it must acquire state-of-the-art technologv and
improve its defcncc rndustrial base and rnrlitary
capabilitres It will have to carn' out radical
militan'restructunng and spcnd morc on defence
than the average of less tban 2oA of national
GDP. If Europe is not prepared to do this. it urll
alrvavs rcmaln a defence drvarf. dependent on US
military capabrlin' Indeed. the da1' urll soon
come u.hen it uill not cven be able to operate
alongside its transatlantrc allr'
371. Manl' decades of totalrtarianism. follorved
bv almost a dccade of uar and conflict. have left
south-eastcrn Europe tn a dtsastrous economic
situatron ln manv countries of the reglon cco-
nomic grouth is slou'ing doun. foretgn rn\,'estors'
confidencc is drvindling. trade routes and export
markcts havc been lost and thcre is an ever-
increasrng nced for forergn ard Sccuritl and
stabrlrtl'rirll onlv increase rf the cntirc population
has a reasonable standard of li'r'ing and rf the
natronal economies of thc countries of the region
hare viable prospccts for the flrturc. The EU is
assuming rts responsrbilrties in this field bv
claboratrng its Stabrlrtv Pact for south-castcrn
Europe u'hrch rvill include a conccrted cffort to
bring relief and cconomrc grorrth to the region.
At the same tlme. rt holds out the prospect of tho
countnes becomrng part of the European Union.
372. The Kosovo peace plan currentll' bcrng
negotiated is ambiguous as rcgards the filture
status of the province It affrrms thc territorial
intcgrrtl' of the Federal Repubhc of Yugoslavia
(FRY) and the other statcs rn the regron and
provides for the deplovmcnt rn Kosovo- under
LN auspices. of an rnternatronal crvil.presence in
order to provide an intenm admrnistration and
promote thc cstablishment. pendrng a final
scttlcment. of substantral autonomv in Kosovo
In practrce. Kosovo mav become an intcrnational
protectorate for thc forcseeablc f,rture Most of
the countnes rn south-eastcrn Europe prefcr to
malntaln the cxrstrng borders. but it seems that
this rvill onlr bc feasiblc if mrnortttcs are giveu
appropriate nghts of sclf-govornment and if the
countrics involved rcspect the mlcs of democracv
and protect and promote human rtglrts
373 Thc return of reftrgccs. deportces and dis-
placed persons to thcir homes rn Kosovo must be
a prroritr'. but this uill onlv be possible in the
presence ovcr a long perrod of an rnternational
military protectron force (KFOR) and the simul-
taneous demilitarisation of the KLA and othcr
anncd Kosovar Albanran groups The demrlrtarr-
sation of thc KLA. in partrcular. utll be a deli-
cate task since manv Kosovar Albanrans consider
the movcment to be the s1mbol of therr reslstance
against thc regime in Belgradc. On the other
hand. thc cxistence of a milrtra uhrch is not sub-
ject to full democratic control cannot bc toler-
ated.
374 Peace in Kosoro rs cssential. but therc can
be no lastrng pcace in thc region if President
Milosevic and his clique- urdicted fbr u'ar crimcs
and crimes against hurnanrtr'. rcmain ln po\\'cr.
Thev are neither able nor urlhng to provrdc the
population of Serbra u ith democratic gol'crnmcnt
and economlc reform because they knou tull riell
that thel' could not sun'r\ e tn such an enr iron-
ment. and 1'et thesc are essential if Serbia is to
havc ant' chance of bcing part of a future inte-
gratcd Europe. If Mr Milosevic's regrme u'ere to
continue. it is almost bound to guarantcc furthcr
trouble and conflict 
- 
Montenegro. Volr'odina.
Sandjak. and perhaps others. mav be next in ltne.
375. Europe must makc evcn' effort to hclp the
Yugoslar people bring about tme democracl' in
therr countn'. There is no u'av of solvrng the
massivc problcms of reconstnlctlon. consoltda-
tion of dcmocracv and human nghts protection
uhrle Mr Milosevic remalns u-l po\\er
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The ten points of the Kosovo peace plon
.'ln order to move fonvarJ tort'ard solving the Kosovo crisis. an agreement should be reached on the
follou'ing pnnciples:
L hnminent and verifiable end to violence and repression of Kosovo-
2. Verifiable rvrthdras'al from Kosoro of mrlitan'. police and paramilitan' forces according to a
quick timetable:
3. Deplolmcnt in Kosovo. under [IN auspices. of efficient international civilian and securitv pres-
ence uhich rvould act as can be decided according to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and be capable of
guaranteeing fu lfilment of joint goals:
4. International securitv presence. lvith an essential NATO participation. must bc doploy,ed undcr a
unified control and command and authorised to secure saf-e environment for all the residents in Kosor,o
and enable the safe return of tho drsplaced persons and refugees to their homes:
5. Establishment of an interim adnrinistratron for Kosovo... u'hich the UN Securitv Councrl will
decide and under u'hich the people of Kosovo u'ill enjov substantial autonomy uithin the Federal Re-
pubhc of Yugoslavra. Tho interim administration [rvill] secure transitional authoritl'during the timc [for
thc] interim democratic and self-governing institutions. [establish] conditions for peaceful and nomral
life of all citizens of Kosovo.
6. After the u'ithdraual. an agreed number of Serb pcrsonnol w'ill bc allou'ed to return to perform
the follos'rng duties: liaison rvrth thc intcrnational civilian mission and internatronal securit\ proscnce.
marking mrnc fields. maintaining a presence at places of Serb heritage. maintaining a presonce at ke1'
border crossings:
'1. Safe and frec return of all refugees and the displaced under the superv'ision of UNHCR and
undisturbed access for humanitanan organisations to Kosovo:
tt. Political procoss dirccted at reaching interim political agreement rvhich u'ould sccure essential
autonom),for Kosovo. uith full taking into consideration of the Rambouillet agreement. the principles
of sorereigntl' and territorial intcgritv of the Fcderal Republic of Yugoslavia and other statcs in the
region as u'ell as dcmilitarisation of the Kosovo Liberation Arm),. The talks betu'een the sides about the
solution should not delal'or disrupt establishment of the democratic self-governing institutrons:
9. General approach to the economic developmont of the crisis region. That rvould includo carrying
out a pact of stabrlitv for south-castern Europe. u'ide international participation in ordcr to adr,ance
dcmocracv and economic prosperitl', and stabilit-"- and regional cooperation:
10. The end of militan'activities rvrll depend on acceptance of the listed principlcs and srmultaneous
agreement rvith othcr previouslv identified elcments which are identified in the footnoter belou. Then a
militan'-technical agreemcnt uill be agreed u'hich rvill among other things specifi' additional modalities.
including the role and function of the Yugoslar'. i.e. Serb. personnel in Kosovo:
The process of rvrthdrau'al includes a phased. detailed timetablo and the marking of a buffer zone
in Serbia bchind rvhich the troops u'ill u'ithdrau'.
The returning personnel. the equipment of the retuming personncl, the range of their ftlnctional
responsibilities. the timetable for thcir return. determination of the geographic zones of their activitr'. the
' Other required elements: Iast and precise timetable for the uithdraual rvhich means for imtance - seven &rrs to end
the rvithdra*'al: pulling<ut of u'eapons of air defence from thc zone of the muturl securih'of 25 krlometres uithin -[8
hours: return of the personncl to fulfrl the four duties will be camed out under the supcnision of the international
securitl'presence and rvill be limited to a small agreed number 
- 
hundreds. not thouvurds.
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rulcs gr.riding their rclations uith the mternatronal securitl'presence and thc intcrnational cirilian mis-
slon.
Suspensron of milrtary actions uill happen after the beginnrng of the withdraual u'hich can be
rerified Discussion about the mrlrtan-technical agreement and its reachrng uill not prolong the agreed
pcriod for the u ithdrau al "
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